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Abstract
RYAN E. CARLIN: Distrusting Democrats in Latin America: Meanings,
Measures, and Tests in Chile and Argentina.
(Under the direction of Jonathan Hartlyn.)
By focusing on support for democracy and trust in political institutions, this dis-
sertation makes important contributions to the study of democracy. It develops more
refined conceptualizations and measures of both concepts. Using high-quality data
demonstrate when and if support for democracy and distrust in political parties can be
expected to generate accountability-seeking actions. Connecting these democratic be-
liefs and attitudes to political actions is crucial to understanding the linkages between
mass beliefs and democracy in Latin America.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
What are the cultural foundations of democracy? While scholars typically assume
there is a link between mass beliefs about democracy and evaluations of democratic
institutions, empirical tests of this connection have not been convincing for a variety
of reasons. This dissertation claims that one of those reasons is our lack of refined
conceptualizations and valid and reliable measures of support for democracy and trust
in political institutions, in particular, political parties. My research focuses on Latin
America, a region where democracy has often proven fragile and of low quality. I spent
four and five months of fieldwork in Santiago, Chile and Buenos Aires, Argentina, re-
spectively, collecting data on support for democracy and trust in political parties based
on interviews, focus groups, Q-sorts, and surveys. I formed this research into three
studies, each with a distinct conceptual, methodological, and theoretical contribution
to the study of political culture and democracy.
Chapter 2 begins by noting that in established democracies “critical citizens” chan-
nel their mistrust in political actors and representative institutions and democratic
support into political behaviors that seek to hold elected officials accountable. In post-
authoritarian Latin America, however, overall levels of democratic support are modest
and offset by support for populist and non-democratic governance. Lack of political
trust is even higher than in established democracies and, moreover, political participa-
tion is low and variable. Since “critical citizens” are likely to be fewer in Latin America
and may not be as politically active, we need to identify them and compare how their
behavior differs from their less democratic counterparts.
This chapter combines original data and high-quality survey data into a multi-
method test of how “critical citizens” and their less democratic counterparts participate
in the political process in Chile. The major conceptual and measurement innovation
is what I call a multidimensional profile of support for democracy. This measure is
based on a procedural definition of democracy, which implies that an ideal-type “de-
mocrat” is a citizen who has liberal (as opposed to illiberal), unconditional (as opposed
to conditional), and committed (as opposed to uncommitted) orientations to proce-
dural democracy. I measure citizen orientations to three classes of objects central to
procedural democracy: democracy as a regime of governance; political rights and pro-
cedures; and civil liberties. Then using Q-sort methodology with data collected in the
field and cluster analysis with survey data from LAPOP/AmericasBarometer, I detect
five of profiles of democratic support in Chile. From there I model how citizens’ pro-
files of democratic support condition the effects of political trust on protest activism
and electoral participation. As in established democracies, distrusting democrats are
active protesters. But unlike their counterparts in established democracies, distrusting
democrats are less likely than other Chileans to participate in elections. Distrusting
Chileans who support a “delegative” form of democracy, however, do tend to partici-
pate in elections. Delegative Chileans prefer heavy-handed governance and leaders who
are likely to govern without taking the legislative branch into consideration. There-
fore, given the distribution of profiles of democratic support in Chile - in which the
“democrats” are the fewest and the “delegatives” are the most - citizen-led advances
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in the quality of democracy seem unlikely. Yet the presence of active distrusting de-
mocrats makes it less likely that presidential crises will lead to democratic breakdown
in Chile.
In Chapter 3, I delve deeper into the concept of trust in political parties. Though
pioneering theories of political culture propose that trust in political institutions and
actors is critical for democratic institutions to function well, recent research has turned
this assumption on its head. Still others have shown that the types of trust and distrust
in political actors and the institutional conditions under which it is extended determines
the quality of new democracies in Latin America. Over the past four decades, trust in
a wide range of political actors has slowly eroded in advanced democracies. Theorists
considered a variety of reasons for this erosion, including declining performance in an
increasingly complex and difficult governing environment; lower levels of social capital
in which trust plays a key role; and the rising importance of economic performance for
individuals’ well-being (Hardin, 2000). At the mass level, however, distrusting citizens
have managed to press for institutional reforms to square political institutions with
new participatory norms and give citizens a greater voice in government (Cain, Dalton
and Scarrow, 2003).
In new Latin American democracies, however, trust in political institutions (e.g.
parties and congress) dropped precipitously from very high levels during democratic
transitions to levels lower than those found in established democracies. Many scholars
took this to mean that transitions had generated unrealistic expectations and that once
democracy’s honeymoon period was over, citizens would once again entertain authori-
tarian alternatives. While levels of democracy, understood as political rights and civil
liberties, have oscillated in Latin America over the past three decades, full democratic
reversions have been exceptionally rare. Yet some of the longest-standing political par-
ties and most consolidated party systems in Latin America have recently collapsed. In
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their wake, populist leaders have won the presidency with antiparty campaigns and
platforms. Once in office these presidents run roughshod over the institutions meant
to check presidential power, namely legislatures and the judiciary. As a result, the
quality of democracy declines. Whereas in established democracies growing distrust
has lead citizens to demand democratic reforms to increase accountability, in Latin
America growing distrust is correlated with the rise of leaders who use decree powers
and other emergency reforms to decrease accountability. This calls into question the
utility of extant measures of trust and distrust in political parties to explain variation
in democratic quality.
To improve improve on existing measures, I conceptualize party trust and distrust
as judgements of party trustworthiness in three dimensions: integrity, competence,
and responsiveness. Using data from Q-sorts and focus groups, I show that trust
and distrust in parties Chile and Argentina stem from citizen evaluations of party
trustworthiness according to one of three rubrics. These rubrics represent the relative
weight citizens assign to norms of party integrity, competence, and responsiveness. I
extend my tripartite conceptualization to test contradictory theories about the effects
of party trust and distrust on democratic quality using survey data from Argentina,
Chile, and the rest of Latin America. My findings suggest that respondents who perceive
parties as highly competent and responsive are likely to have higher levels of political
action (i.e. signing petitions, participating in public demonstrations, boycotts, and
illegal strikes). Yet respondents who judge parties as lacking in integrity are less likely
to take political action. Meanwhile, the less-theoretical but more commonly cited
measure of party trust/confidence explains relatively little about political action in the
region.
My final empirical chapter, Chapter 3, attempts to bridge the gap between an-
thropological and behavioral approaches to the study of support for democracy. The
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anthropological school assumes political culture as a rather static set of routinized and
unquestioned attitudes and behaviors. Therefore it can be understood only through
verstehen, or an inductive interpretation based on a deep, intimate knowledge of the
target culture. The classic example for Latin America is Wiarda’s 2004 interpretation
of Latin American culture as hierarchical and authoritarian due to the influence of the
Catholic Church in the region. The behavioral approach, in contrast, seeks to test
objectively the extent to which polities exhibit a stable and coherent culture by observ-
ing patterns and distributions of individual attitudes and (often) behaviors. Scholars
in this field prefer surveys or experiments to inductive and often unreplicable expert
interpretations. Despite their shared roots, over time these two traditions have become
further apart.
I believe public opinion surveys offer great advantages over more interpretative
methods. My assumption is, however, that evaluating and improving current measures
requires an injection of a holistic understanding of culture. To prove this point, I con-
ducted with subjects whose views on support for democracy, political equality, and
tolerance greatly contrast. Then I combined phrases taken verbatim from the inter-
view and focus group transcripts with phrases from well-known survey questionnaires
into a Q-sorting exercise. The Q-analyses find profiles of democratic, authoritarian,
delegative, and instrumental regime support among the Chileans, and democratic, ex-
clusionary, and hyper-presidential profiles of regime support among the Argentines.
Using two cases helps pinpoint the extant survey items which best distinguish among
regime support profiles and those items which may lack cross-national validity. A key
finding is that the most common measures of democratic support, the Linzian and
Churchillian measures, perform moderately well in Chile and extremely poorly in Ar-
gentina. The emphasis given to verbatim items sheds light on the concept formation
of regime support and illuminates the continuity and discontinuity between popular
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and scholarly conceptions. Finally, this study shows how qualitative anthropological
approaches can be combined with behavioral methods to inform survey-based measures
of democratic support, the cultural bases of democratic stability and quality.
By focusing on support for democracy and trust in political institutions, this dis-
sertation makes important contributions to the study of democracy. Regarding both
concepts, I develop more refined conceptualizations and measures. Using high-quality
data demonstrate when and if support for democracy and distrust in political par-
ties can be expected to generate accountability-seeking actions. Certainly, connecting
these findings to variation in democratic stability and quality at the regime level re-
quires much more theory and evidence. But by connecting these democratic beliefs and
attitudes to political actions, this dissertation makes some important initial linkages
between mass beliefs and democracy in Latin America.
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Chapter 2
Beyond Critical Citizens: Support
for Democracy, Trust in Political
Parties, and Political Participation
in Chile
What kinds of citizens enrich and sustain democracy? Recent scholarship focuses on
“critical citizens” (Norris, 1999c; Nye, Zelikow and King, 1997; Inglehart and Welzel,
2005; Booth and Seligson, 2005) distinguished by three characteristics. At root, critical
citizens are “democrats.” They “share widespread aspirations to the ideals and princi-
ples of democracy” and “adhere strongly to democratic values” (Norris, 1999b, 1, 3).
They are also “critical,” decrying hierarchical representative institutions as untrustwor-
thy, unaccountable, and at odds with more autonomous modes of participation. Lastly,
the dissonance created by their democratic support alongside their critique of the in-
stitutional status quo inspires critical citizens to seek accountability and to demand
reform. Myriad factors mediate the connections between political culture and regime
outcomes, but a key first step is to determine who participates, in which ways, and
what they believe about democracy and democratic institutions.
Declining institutional trust in established democracies is puzzling (Pharr and Put-
nam, 2000), but many see it as a net positive: “[l]ess trust about government and more
activism interacting with government: these may be the ingredients of a less comfort-
able but more robust democracy” (Tarrow, 2000, 289). Clearly institutional mistrust
has not eroded support for democratic governance (Dalton, 2004), and new autonomous
forms of political participation have emerged (Norris, 2002) without seriously hamper-
ing overall levels of electoral participation (Rose, 2004). Scholars credit this new brand
of participatory politics with a wave of reforms aimed at squaring democratic institu-
tions with the demands of an engaged, if critical, citizenry (Cain, Dalton and Scarrow,
2003). Thus established democracies are presumably replete with critical citizens who
benefit, not threaten, democratic quality.
But in new Latin American democracies we neither know how many critical citi-
zens there are nor their impact on democratic quality. Though trust in representative
institutions is low, the modest levels of democratic support (Hagopian, 2005; Payne,
Zovatto and Dı´az, 2007) imply critical citizens in the region may be fewer. Moreover,
they may not be the most active participants in the political process. Citizens who re-
ject democracy are likely to vote for ex-authoritarian candidates (A. Seligson & Tucker
2005) and tolerate political violence (Canache, 2002). Many scholars group declining
participation in political, civic, and labor organizations following the dual transition
to democracy and markets (O’Donnell, 1993; UNDP, 2004; Kurtz, 2004) into a general
syndrome of “low-intensity citizenship” in Latin America. In addition, falling electoral
participation threatens to undercut elections as mechanisms of vertical accountability
and opens space for anti-system rulers (Payne, Zovatto and Dı´az, 2007; O’Donnell,
1999). While indigenous movements, NGOs, and civic groups deserve credit for en-
hancing political accountability (Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Smulovitz and Peruzzotti,
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2000), such groups are unevenly spread across the region, and their influence, degree of
co-optation by formal regime institutions, and democratic bona fides vary widely. Yet
occasionally throngs of protesters have ousted Latin American presidents or forced the
hand of formal institutions to begin impeachment proceedings (Pe´rez-Lin˜a´n, 2007).
In the context of new democracies, it is unclear how much a small number of crit-
ical citizens can be expected to affect democratic quality. Connecting mass values to
observable regime outcomes is a daunting and pressing theoretical task (Coppedge,
N.d.). Yet several analytically prior conceptual and behavioral questions must first be
addressed. My central argument is that understanding the relationship between mass
democratic support and democracy in Latin America requires going beyond “critical
citizens.” We must revisit some fundamental questions: What beliefs qualify citizens as
“democratic”? What exactly do citizens believe when they espouse ambivalent values
or reject democratic governance and norms outright? Do the behavioral consequences
of institutional trust and distrust depend on these overall belief systems? To ascertain
the democratic implications of mass support for democracy in Latin America, it is im-
perative to identify critical citizens as well as their less democratic counterparts and to
compare how each behaves in the political arena.
I propose that stated support for (or rejection of) “democracy” does not exist in
a vacuum but rather forms part of a larger belief system about which rights and free-
doms are legitimate. Thus I conceptualize support for democracy as a multidimensional
profile of orientations to democratic governance, open contestation, and citizen partic-
ipation (Dahl, 1971). Next I identify profiles of democratic support empirically in
Chile with two mutually reinforcing approaches: a Q-sorts study conducted in late
2005 and cluster analysis with survey data from the 2006 AmericasBarometer. Both
approaches find an ideal-type democrat support profile along with several ambivalent
support profiles. From there I expand the critical citizens framework by testing whether
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these profiles condition the relationships between trust in parties and participation in
protests and elections in Chile. The results suggest that distrusting Chileans with “de-
mocrat” support profiles, i.e. critical citizens, are typically inclined to political protest
but not to vote. Yet distrusting Chileans with “delegative” support profiles are com-
paratively more active in electoral politics. The consequences for democratic quality
are ambiguous and require further analysis. Nevertheless, these contributions lay the
analytical groundwork for the construction and tests of more general theories linking
profiles of democratic support to participatory norms that bolster democratic quality
and stability.
2.1 Case Selection
Chile is a good case to study these phenomena because while many of its political
institutions resemble those in established democracies, critical citizens there are likely
to be few and less effective at pushing political reforms. On objective indicators of
democratic quality, Chile scores at or near the top among Latin American democracies,
but at or near the bottom among established democracies (Kaufmann, Kraay and
Mastruzzi, 2007). Political parties played a central role in politicizing a series of cross-
cutting social cleavages as suffrage steadily expanded in both established democracies
(Lipset and Rokkan, 1967) and Chile (Scully, 1992). Institutionalized party systems in
both contexts currently face the challenges of widespread political dealignment (Dalton
and Wattenberg, 2000; Ortega Frei, 2003).
Like many new democracies, Chile confronts authoritarian legacies (Hite and Ce-
sarini, 2004) that hinder effective participation. Over the first three civilian adminis-
trations, Pinochet’s 1980 Constitution gave the military checks on civilian power1 and
1While the constitution was recently amended to remove most of its authoritarian enclaves, at the
time the data were collected for this study the effects of these reforms had yet to be felt.
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enforced a pact to maintain the military regime’s neoliberal economic model. While
the model produced steady economic growth and helped reduce poverty, it did not
lower income inequality and it undermined the mobilizational capacity and leverage
of organized labor (Kurtz, 2004), popular organizations (Oxhorn, 1995), and social
movements (Petras and Leiva, 1994). An electoral system that over-represents Rightist
parties, excludes Far-Left parties, and narrows the policy distance between the two
major coalitions dims the prospects of effecting reform via elections.
Civil society in Chile also faces several major roadblocks. According to Fuentes
(2006), the concentration of authority in the executive grants the president wide sway
over the political agenda and public debate. Citizens or groups voicing politically
inconvenient demands or issues in conflict with the president’s agenda face an uphill
battle. The lack of a pluralist media in Chile makes influencing the public agenda
dependent upon the tacit approval of conservative sectors. When asked in a recent
Latinobarometer (2006) poll, “What is the most effective way you can influence how
things change?”, 54% of Chileans said voting for a party that defends one’s positions,
just under the regional average (57%). Indeed, many distrusting citizens cast blank/null
ballots or fail to register to vote (Carlin, 2006). Only 7% responded “participate in
protest movements and demand change directly,” exactly half of the regional average
(14%). Therefore, even if critical citizens exist, their actual and perceived ability to
influence democratic quality may be quite limited.
2.2 Profiles of Support for Democracy
Judging the impact of critical citizens and their counterparts on the quality of new
democracies requires refined concepts and valid measures. I begin by defining democ-
racy as a political system with procedures in place to foster open contestation, public
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participation, and government responsiveness (Dahl, 1971, 1-9). Next I propose to mea-
sure support for democracy as a multidimensional profile of orientations to three classes
of objects implied by procedural democracy. The first class of objects pertains to the
regime itself - democracy and its authoritarian alternatives. The next two classes of
objects correspond to the essential political rights and procedures (voting, running for
office, free and fair elections) and the civil liberties (expression, association, alternative
sources of information) that undergird procedural democracy. Thus profiles of support
for democracy consist of general orientations and inclinations to the regime itself and
the core principles, norms, and procedures that embody the democratic procedural
minimum.
Liberal – Committed – Unconditional
Illiberal
Conditional
Uncommitted
(2)
(1)
(3)
Figure 2.1: Orientations to Procedural Democracy
Which orientations matter? A profile of support for democracy includes orienta-
tions to the objects mentioned above that fall along three continua (see Figure 4.1):
(1) liberal ↔ illiberal, (2) unconditional ↔ conditional, and (3) committed ↔ uncom-
mitted. Whereas a liberal orientation suggests a firm preference for democracy or its
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concomitant rights and liberties, illiberal orientations reject them outright. Indelible or
unconditional orientations contrast with support for procedural democracy only under
certain conditions. Committed orientations to a democratic regime and its principles
are the antitheses of indifferent or uncommitted stances on them. Thus, orientations
to any of the objects associated with procedural democracy that can be located in the
three-dimensional space depicted in Figure 4.1 pertain to a profile of democratic sup-
port; orientations outside this space are not considered part of the profile of democratic
support.
As an illustration, recall Linz’s (1978) argument that on the eve of democratic
breakdown elites and citizens are either loyal, semi-loyal, or disloyal to the regime.
View through the lens of my conceptualization, the object of support in question is
the democratic regime. Loyalists hold liberal (not illiberal) orientations to democratic
governance. Insofar as they resist the conditions that brought the regime to the brink
of collapse, loyalists’ orientations prove unconditional. The position of the disloyalists
is clearly conditional. Finally, the loyalists are committed to the democratic regime
though their semi-loyalist counterparts are not, which, as Linz argues, makes semi-
loyalists susceptible to disloyalists bent on altering the status quo. Profiles of support
for democracy do not stop with the “regime” object. Rather they encompass lib-
eral/illiberal, unconditional/conditional, and committed/uncommitted orientations to
the full range of objects associated with procedural democracy.
This conceptualization of profiles of democrat support implies that an ideal-type
“democrat” is a citizen who exhibits liberal, unconditional, and committed orientations
not only to democracy in the abstract, but also to its essential political rights and pro-
cedures and civil liberties. An ideal-type “non-democrat” living in a non-authoritarian
context espouses illiberal, conditional, and uncommitted orientations to democracy and
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its concomitant rights and freedoms. Ambivalent support profiles feature a mix of ori-
entations to democratic governance and political and civil freedoms. Multidimensional
support profiles grounded a prior in a procedural definition of democracy not only
sharpen our definitions of a “democrat,” “non-democrat,” and an “ambivalent”. They
also neutralize thorny validity and conceptual issues facing extant measures of support
for democracy.2
The most damaging validity problem is that citizens hold contested, vacuous, or
even pejorative conceptions of democracy. If citizens interpret democracy differently,
common survey questions asking citizens point-blank if they prefer “democracy” as a
form of government will obviously lack validity. As Coppedge argues, much of the con-
fusion stems from failing to define our terms ahead of time: “If we are interested in the
nature, causes, or consequences of what we mean by ‘democracy,’ we cannot surrender
the authority to define the concept to our research subjects” (N.d., 31). Multidimen-
sional profiles of democratic support overcome this issue by measuring citizens against
a clear standard of a “democrat”: one with liberal, unconditional, and committed ori-
entations to democratic governance, political rights and procedures, and civil liberties.
Citizens whose support profiles do not approximate this standard are not, by defin-
ition, democrats. It must be noted that grounding measures of democratic support
in any a priori definition would constitute an advance over extant measures. Indeed,
one can imagine casting support profiles according to the emphases of republican, di-
rect, social, deliberative, communitarian, and even classical definitions of democracy
(Held, 2006). The liberal-rights based conception is appealing because it parallels a
compelling classification strategy for classifying regime sub-types. Political regimes
2See Carrio´n (forthcoming), Schedler and Sarsfield (2007), (UNDP 2004), and papers presented
at Candidate Indicators for the UNDP Democracy Support Index (DSI), Center for the Americas at
Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN, May 5-6, 2006 (http://sitemason.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/
LAPOPUNDPWorkshop).
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featuring some but not all of Dahl’s baseline criteria for procedural democracy are
considered “democracies with adjectives” (Collier and Levitsky, 1997) or “electoral au-
thoritarian” (Schedler, 2006; Levitsky and Way, 2002). Likewise, democratic support
profiles grounded in procedural democracy can distinguish ideal-type democrats and
non-democrats from citizens with mixed belief systems. Liberal-rights based measures
of democratic support, thereby, provide a high degree of cross-level equivalence with
measures of democracy presented by Freedom House and Vanhanen’s Polyarchy Index.
Another conceptual issue is how to understand citizens who profess democratic
support on one survey question, but express contradictory orientations on others. One
report claims that between 30-60% of Latin Americans who say they prefer “democ-
racy” would also endorse coups d’etat under various circumstances; would support the
president acting above the law, restoring order by force, and controlling the media;
and see parties and congress as dispensable (UNDP, 2004). To weed out these “ques-
tionnaire democrats” (Dalton, 1994) who “pay lip-service to democracy” (Inglehart,
2003), scholars either approximate democratic support with items tapping support for
democratic rights and norms (e.g. Gibson, Duch & Tedin 1992), or de-link support
for democratic governance from rights and norms (e.g. Inglehart 2003). But these ‘so-
lutions’ ignore theoretically relevant mixed or ambivalent support profiles behind this
lip-service. Indeed, some citizens may support a regime that has taken up the banner of
“democracy” but regularly curbs free contestation and participation. Multidimensional
democratic support profiles couch orientations to “democracy” among additional orien-
tations to political and civil freedoms that do not mention the “d-word.” Measuring a
more complete system of beliefs detect nuanced ambivalent support profiles that other
approaches might dismiss.
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Lastly, extant measures separate conditional and unconditional orientations to democ-
racy though they are theoretically linked. Conditional orientations follow an instrumen-
tal rationality - support for democracy as a means to an end. Unconditional orientations
derive from an intrinsic rationality - support for democracy for democracy’s sake (Brat-
ton and Mattes, 2001; Sarsfield and Echegaray, 2006). However, we expect today’s in-
strumental (conditional) orientations become tomorrow’s intrinsic (unconditional) ori-
entations (Easton, 1975; Lipset, 1981) to the extent a democratic regime outperforms
the preceding authoritarian regime in terms of economic and political stability (Mishler
and Rose, 2001; Bratton and Mattes, 2001). Moreover citizens may develop uncondi-
tional orientations to some governing norms, political procedures and rights, and civil
liberties more quickly than others. While some survey questions tap unconditional-
conditional support for democratic governance, they do not typically specify whether
the respondent would sacrifice all democratic procedures, political rights, and civil
liberties or just some of them. And given the theoretical implications of conditional
support for the short- or long-term reversion of democracy or a sub-set of its rights,
procedures, and liberties (Bermeo, 2003; Boix, 2003), the issue merits close attention.
Multidimensional support profiles help remedy this problem.
In sum, detecting critical citizens and their counterparts calls for valid measures
of democratic support. I propose multidimensional profiles of democratic support
grounded in an a priori definition of a democrat based on liberal/illiberal, uncondi-
tional/conditional, and committed/uncommitted orientations to procedural democracy
(Dahl, 1971). Any citizen’s support profile can be judged against the ideal-type demo-
crat this conceptualization implies. Conceiving of democratic support as a multidimen-
sional profile neutralizes some of the complex validity problems facing extant measures.
Incorporating conditionality helps account for the distinct rationalities underpinning
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democratic support. Finally, this conceptualization points up two measurement tech-
niques that together can reveal the number and nature of democratic support profiles.
The next section describes these methods and how I apply them to detect profiles of
democratic support in Chile.
2.3 Detecting Profiles of Democratic Support
We cannot test the argument that critical citizens bolster democratic quality in new
democracies unless we know something about profiles of democratic support in these
contexts. Previous studies and the conceptual discussion above suggest an empirical
analysis of multidimensional support profiles in Chile might uncover support profiles
approaching democratic and non-democratic ideal-types and some ambivalent profiles
(Schedler and Sarsfield, 2007; Carnaghan, 2007; UNDP, 2004; Powers, 2001; Catterberg,
1991). My approach to detecting democratic support profiles in Chile is two-pronged.
The first entails a Q-methodological experiment conducted with 73 participants in
Santiago, Chile in late 2005. The second tests the generalizability of the Q-analysis
with a cluster analysis using 2006 AmericasBarometer survey data. I employ both the
Q-analysis and the cluster analysis as exploratory, inductive ways to identify support
profiles. Thus, their findings’ credibility hinges on face validity and the degree of overlap
between the two sets of results. In this case, both are substantial. The representative
sample of the AmericasBarometer survey is crucial for testing hypotheses about the
main research question - how does democratic support condition political participation?
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2.3.1 Profiles of Democratic Support: A Q-Sorts Approach
Developed in psychology, Q methodology’s goal is to understand sets of orientations,
attitudes, and perspectives from the subjects’ point of view. In other words, Q method-
ology seeks to identify systematically conceptions shared by a group of subjects (Brown,
1980; McKeown and Thomas, 1988). For instance, Drzyek and Holmes (2002) examine
democratic discourses in post-Communist societies and link them to four distinct paths
to democratization. Theiss-Morse (1993) connects distinct conceptions of citizenship
to diverging modes of political participation in the United States. Zechmeister (2006)
shows that different connotations of Left-Right ideological labels reflect political sophis-
tication and correspond to elite packaging in Argentina and Mexico. Thus Q-methods
are quite flexible.
How does Q methodology work? The method revolves around a measurement instru-
ment called a Q-sort. To complete a Q-sort, a participant (a member of the P-sample)
physically rank-orders along a spectrum, conventionally from agree to disagree, a set of
statements (items of the Q-sample) about a concept written on small cards. The spec-
trum I use in this study is depicted in Figure 2.2. Since a finished Q-sort represents a
free construction of the Q-sorter’s subjective perspective on a concept it is more akin to
an in-depth interview than an opinion survey (Brown, 1980). Multiple Q-sorts are then
compiled and factor-analyzed to identify latent constructs upon which participants,
not variables, load. The factor analysis of Q-sorts is often referred to as “inverted”
factor analysis because a Q-sorts data set is the inverse of a survey data set. With a
survey data set that places items in columns and subjects in rows, regular confirmatory
factor analysis determines which items tap a latent variable. Q data sets, however,
place subjects in columns and items in rows. The factor analysis, now “inverted” and
exploratory, determines which subjects tap a latent variable or “shared conception.”
The letter q is meant to distinguish these “person correlations” from Pearson’s r -based
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“trait correlations.”
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Figure 2.2: Quasi-Normal Q-Sort Distribution, 36 Items
To detect multidimensional democratic support profiles in Chile, I ask multiple par-
ticipants from Santiago to express their support for democracy by completing a Q-sort.
Afterwards, I searched for shared profiles of democratic support with by analyzing the
participants’ Q-sorts with the “inverted” factor analytic techniques described above.
A participant adheres to a shared support profile to the extent that her own Q-sort
resembles it, as measured by her Q-sort’s factor loading. Analyzing the factor scores
associated with the Q-sample statements indicates which orientations carry the most
relative weight within a given profile. Ideally, the profiles of democratic support ob-
served here will prove generalizable to a representative sample of Chileans. If so, we can
test the interactive relationships between democratic support profiles, political trust,
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and political participation implied by the critical citizens literature. Before contin-
uing, I discuss the structure of Q-sample, recruitment of the P-sample, and on-site
procedures.
The Q-sample is the central measurement instrument in Q methodology. It con-
tains all the items the participants Q-sort. While surveys sample from the popula-
tion of respondents, Q-samples draw from the universe of perspectives on the con-
cept of study. I purposively sample and adapt 36 items from the universe of survey
items tapping support for democracy3 to structure a Q-sample to match a multidi-
mensional profile of democratic support. To simply the dimensionality, the sample
includes three different items tapping each of the combinations of four orientations
(liberal, illiberal, conditional, uncommitted) to three objects (democratic governance,
political rights/procedures, civil liberties). For example, a “liberal” orientation to the
object of “democracy”, item #1 reads, “Democracy is preferable to any other form of
government.” Items #2 and #3 tap the same orientation and object. Combining “con-
ditional” views with “political rights,” #17 says, “For the common good, sometimes
you have to suspend the right to run for public office for people with extremist ideas.”
As an “illiberal” view on “civil liberties”, item #31 states: “in general the government
should limit the right to form associations.” Blending “uncommitted” with “democratic
governance”, #12 reads, “I wouldn’t care if the military came to power again.”
After structuring the Q-sample, the next step is to recruit the P-sample, i.e. par-
ticipants, to perform the Q-sorts. Unlike survey research, Q-methods do not require a
large number of participants, and they need not be randomly selected. Rather, in line
with best practices for small-n methods (King, Keohane and Verba, 1994), Q priori-
tizes maximizing the diversity of perspectives by recruiting participants who are likely
3Questionnaires sampled include surveys by LAPOP/AmericasBarometer, the World Values Survey,
Latinobaro´metro; Chilean sources include Centro de Estudios de la Realidad Contempora´nea (CERC),
Instituto de Estudios Pu´blicos of Universidad Andre´s Bello.
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to view the concept distinctly. To recruit my P-Sample of 73 Santiaguinos I offered
refreshments and, when necessary, paid transportation costs and made donations to
organizations that allowed me access to their members and venues. Although the par-
ticipants come from contrasting backgrounds,4 we cannot speculate on how pervasive
the support profiles are in the population or whether other shared support profiles exist
since they are not a representative sample of Chileans. The cluster analysis below is
meant to overcome these limitations.
On site, participants first completed a short questionnaire about political support
and demographics. Next they sorted the 36 Q-sample items - statements typed on small
laminated cards - into three categories: agree, disagree, and no strong feeling either
way (Brown, 1980). Subjects then ranked the statements by sorting them into eleven
ordinal categories ranging from -5 (“least agree”) to +5 (“most agree”) conforming to
Figure 2.2, where 0 is neutral.5 Afterwards, the research team recorded the Q-sort and
analyzed the data off-site.
Once the 73 Q-sorts were compiled into a data set, I performed an exploratory factor
analysis of them and named each of the extracted factors. After varimax rotation, the
factor analysis of indicated four factors, or shared multidimensional democratic support
profiles: Democrat, Delegative, Instrumental, and Non-Democrat. Criteria for factor
extraction include a scree test, explaining at least 5% of the variance, and at least 5%
of subjects loading on it significantly.6 The four-factor solution explained 52% of the
4E.g., state employees, professionals, students, middle-class families, shanty-town dwellers, party
militants, academics, blue-collar workers, mothers and women’s associations, neighborhood associ-
ations, NGOs, a nationalist group, and a homosexual rights movement. See Appendix for more
information on the P-sample.
5The quasi-normal distribution of Figure 1 guarantees that the Q-sorts will not be unduly skewed
or otherwise difficult to compare, but does not significantly alter the results (Brown, 1980).
6The eigenvalue (which equals the sum of squared factor loadings for each factor) is a common
extraction criterion in r -based factor analysis, but aggregating across numerous variates, as done here,
may inflate artificially them (Brown, 1980, 40-43). Thus, the percentage of variance explained by a
factor (which equals the eigenvalue ÷ n subjects sorting) helps ground the information the eigenvalue
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variance across the 73 Q-sorts. This breaks down by factor (and eigenvalue) as follows:
Liberal Democrat = 32.5% (23.7), Delegative = 8.0% (5.8), Instrumental = 5.7% (4.1),
Non-Democrat = 5.5% (4.0). Seven participants failed to load significantly on any of
the four factors.
The names of these support profiles reflect my interpretation of the results in Tables
2.1-2.4. There are two sets of entries for each item: normalized (z) factor scores and,
for the sake of comparison, their score as it transposes to the 11-point scale (–5 to +5)
used in the Q-sort. Essentially, “the factor scores represent weighted combinations of
the placement of statements in each individual’s Q-sort and thus reflect ideal typical
patterns” (Theiss-Morse, 1993, 363). In calculating the factor scores, the raw data in
each Q-sort are weighted to allow participants with higher factor loadings to contribute
more.7 Then the raw Q-sorts data are multiplied by their corresponding factor weight,
summed across each item, and normalized (mean = 0, standard deviation = 1). I report
these in the far right-hand column. Next these z-scores are transposed to scores on the
11-point Q-sort scale, reported in the far left-hand column. To focus on the profiles’
orientations, I report the twelve most dominant in Tables 2.1-2.4.
First we observe an ideal-type democrat support profile of liberal, unconditional,
and committed orientations to democratic governance, political rights and procedures,
and civil liberties (see Table 2.1). Democrats’s firmest orientations are, respectively,
unconditional and liberal rejections of democratic reversions: “Under no circumstance
could there ever be sufficient reason for a coup d’etat” (factor score 2.15, transposed
to +5) and “We would be better off if the military were running the country,” (factor
score 2.07, –5).8 Furthermore, they are strongly committed to democratic governance,
provides.
7Based on w = f/(1− f2), where w is the factor weight and f is the factor loading (Brown, 1980,
241-2).
8From now on I refer only to the transposed scores for the sake of simplicity.
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Table 2.1: Democrat Support Profile
Transposed Normalized
Factor Score Democratic Governance Factor Score
+5 Under no circumstance could there ever be sufficient reason 2.15d/i/n
for a coup d’etat. (unconditional)
+4 Democracy is preferable to any other form of 1.96d/i/n
government. (liberal)
+4 Democracy may have problems, but it’s better than any 1.61d/i/i
other form of government. (liberal)
–3 In certain circumstances an authoritarian government could –0.94d/i/i
be preferable to a democratic government. (unconditional)
–3 For me there isn’t a big difference between democratic –0.97d/i/i
governments and dictatorships. So the type of regime
doesn’t really matter to me. (committed)
–3 I would support an authoritarian government if resolves –1.24d/i/n
economic problems. (unconditional)
–4 Things cannot be resolved. Our country needs a government –1.44d/n
with a heavy hand. (liberal)
–4 I wouldn’t care if the military came to power again. –1.78d/i/n
(committed)
–5 We would be better off if the military were governing the –2.07d/i/n
country. (liberal)
Political Rights & Procedures
+3 Except for those excluded by the Constitution, all Chileans 1.24n
deserve the right to vote, even those who protest against the
government. (liberal)
+3 Any citizen of voting age should be allowed to run for public 1.15i/i
office. (liberal)
Civil Liberties
+3 I approve of people participating in legal public protests. 1.31i
(liberal)
Note: Score significantly different from d (Delegative), i (Instrumental), and n (Non-democrat), p < .001.
Variance explained: 32.5%; subjects defining: 63.0%; eigenvalue: 23.7.
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“I wouldn’t care if the military came to power again”, (–4). Democrats display liberal
orientations on items representing so-called Linzian (“Democracy is preferable to any
other form of government”, +4) and Churchillian (“Democracy may have problems
but it’s better than any other form of government”, +4) formulations of support for
democratic governance. Democrats strong disagree that, “We would be better off if the
military were running the country” (–5). As the rest of the scores indicate, democrats
clearly support the civil liberties and political rights of polyarchy, most intensely the
rights to vote, run for office, and protest.9 Parallels to this profile are found in Mexico
(Schedler and Sarsfield, 2007), Argentina (Powers, 2001), Russia (Carnaghan, 2007),
Belarus, Romania, and Bulgaria (Dryzek and Holmes, 2002).
Although Chile is not considered a “delegative democracy” - a regime in which
citizens delegate extensive power to elected executives who ignore institutional checks
and balances and govern as they wish (O’Donnell, 1994) - we nevertheless observe a
profile of delegative support (see Table 2.2). The support profile is truly ambivalent.
Delegatives do not believe the military would improve their lot (–3), but they desire
heavy-handed government (+5) and would increase the powers of an already powerful
president vis-a`-vis congress (+3). They hedge their bets on political rights and proce-
dures, at once championing suffrage rights while maintaining conditional support for
elections. Yet they hold liberal, unconditional, and committed orientations to civil lib-
erties. These findings corroborate evidence of delegative support in Chile and elsewhere
in Latin America (Gronke and Levitt, 2004).
Instrumental democratic support features conditional orientations to all three ob-
jects of support (see Table 2.3). Instrumentals would accept an authoritarian gov-
ernment on the condition that it solve economic problems (+5), agree that in certain
9Though not reported here, items in favor of plural electoral competition and freedoms of association
and the press score +2’s; illiberal orientations towards most political rights and civil liberties register
–2’s.
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Table 2.2: Delegative Support Profile
Transposed Normalized
Factor Score Democratic Governance Factor Score
+5 Things cannot be resolved. Our country needs a government 2.40l/i
with a heavy hand. (illiberal)
+4 In certain circumstances an authoritarian government could 1.74l/n
be preferable to a democratic government. (conditional)
+3 There are junctures that require the president to leave 1.22l/i
congress behind. (conditional)
–3 We would be better off if the military were governing the –2.07l/i
country. (liberal)
–3 To people like me it doesn’t matter if we have a democratic –1.15l/i/n
or undemocratic regime. (committed)
–4 Under no circumstance could there ever be sufficient reason –1.52l/i/n
for a coup d’etat. (conditional)
Political Rights & Procedures
+3 When the country lacks order the right to vote can be 1.37l/i
restricted. (conditional)
+3 Except for those excluded by the Constitution, all Chileans
deserve the right to vote, even those who protest the 1.28l/i
government. (liberal)
Civil Liberties
+4 Our government has to guarantee all citizens the right 1.50l/i/n
to associate. (liberal)
–3 In the case of a social emergency I would approve of the –1.02l/i/n
government censoring the media. (unconditional)
–4 The right to form associations is not crucial for our country. –1.52l/n
(committed)
–5 In general, the government should limit the right to form –2.04l/i/n
associations. (liberal)
Note: Score significantly different from l (Liberal), i (Instrumental), and n (Non-Democrat), p < .001.
Variance explained: 8.0%; subjects defining: 17.8%; eigenvalue: 5.8.
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Table 2.3: Instrumental Support Profile
Transposed Normalized
Factor Score Democratic Governance Factor Score
+5 I would support an authoritarian government if resolves 1.71l/n
economic problems. (conditional)
+4 I wouldn’t care if the military came to power again. 1.37l/d/n
(uncommitted)
+3 In certain circumstances an authoritarian government could 1.36l/n
be preferable to a democratic government. (conditional)
+3 We would be better off if the military were governing the 1.16l/d/n
country. (illiberal)
Political Rights & Procedures
+3 Except for those excluded by the Constitution, all Chileans 1.36n
deserve the right to vote, even those who protest against the
government. (liberal)
–3 When the country lacks order the right to vote can be –1.14d/n
restricted. (unconditional)
–4 Besides the people excluded by law, there are other groups –1.51l/d/n
and kinds of people who should not be able to vote. (liberal)
–4 Homosexuals should not have the right to run for public –1.69l/d/n
office. (liberal)
–5 It’s all the same whether or not the great majority have –2.19l/d/n
the right to vote or only a few people. (committed)
Civil Liberties
+4 In times of crisis, I would approve of a law that prohibited 1.44l/d/n
public protests. (conditional)
–3 I don’t approve of people participating in manifestations –1.05d
under any circumstance. (liberal)
–3 The right to form associations is not crucial for our –1.27l/n
country. (committed)
Note: Score significantly different from l (Liberal), i (Delegative), and n (Non-Democrat), p < .001.
Variance explained: 5.7%; subjects defining: 9.5%; eigenvalue: 4.1.
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circumstances they are better (+3), and would not mind the military returning to power
(+4). On political rights and procedures instrumentals show liberal, unconditional, and
committed orientations. Their liberal orientation to protest (–3) breaks down in crisis
situations (+4). Instrumental Chileans seem to tolerate democratic norms so long as
stability prevails. Conditional democratic preferences, ambivalence to civil liberties,
and political tolerance makes them resemble “ambivalent non-democrats” in Mexico
(Schedler and Sarsfield, 2007). Instrumental support in Chile exemplifies the means-
to-end rationality found throughout the region (Carrio´n, forthcoming; Sarsfield and
Echegaray, 2006) and in parts of Africa (Bratton and Mattes, 2001).
Last we come to non-democratic support (Table 2.4). Non-democrats are uncom-
mitted to democracy but spurn military rule and heavy-handed governance. They hold
illiberal and conditional orientations to political rights and procedures: they would
altogether exclude homosexuals and neo-nazis and, at certain junctures, forbid extrem-
ists from running for office and even halt elections. As such, they combine aspects of
“exclusionary” and “homophobic” democrats in Mexico (Schedler and Sarsfield, 2007).
Non-democrat Chileans remain unconvinced of democracy’s intrinsic value and they
reject a subset of the necessary freedoms for open contestation and participation. They
are not ideo-typically non-democratic but instead ambivalent, as their liberal and com-
mitted orientations to protest rights suggests.
This approach makes support for procedural democracy an empirical question par-
ticipants answer in a Q-sort. Factor-analyzing the Q-sorts reveals four support pro-
files that allow the researcher to interpret each item “in terms of the ‘flavor added’
by the total milieu of the accompanying behavioral field” (Brown, 1980, 46). I find
an ideal-type democrat profile and three ambivalent profiles (delegative, instrumental,
non-democrat). The Q-study provides rich insight into at least some of the democratic
support profiles in the Chilean polity, but do these profiles generalize beyond these 73
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Table 2.4: Non-Democrat Support Profile
Transposed Normalized
Factor Score Democratic Governance Factor Score
+5 There are other forms of government that could be as good 3.27l/d/i
as or better than democracy. (uncommitted)
–3 There are junctures that require the president to leave –1.03l/d/i
congress behind. (unconditional)
–3 We would be better off if the military were governing the –1.02l/i
country. (liberal)
–3 Democracy is preferable to any other form of –1.42l/d/i
government. (illiberal)
–4 Things cannot be resolved. Our country needs a government –1.49d/i
with a heavy hand. (liberal)
–4 Democracy may have problems, but it’s better than any –1.52l/d/i
other form of government. (illiberal)
Political Rights & Procedures
+4 Homosexuals should not have the right to run for public 1.57l/d/i
office. (illiberal)
+4 The participation of neo-nazi political parties in national 1.22l/d/i
elections should be prohibited. (illiberal)
+3 For the common good, sometimes you have to suspend the 0.66l/d/i
rights of persons with extremists ideas to run for publicly
elected offices. (conditional)
+3 When the country lacks order the right to vote can be 1.07l/i
restricted. (conditional)
Civil Liberties
+3 I approve of people participating in legal public protests. 1.04i
(liberal)
–5 Public protest is not a necessary right for our society. –1.70l/d/i
(committed)
Note: Score significantly different from l (Liberal), d (Delegative), and n (Instrumental), p < .001.
Variance explained: 5.5%; subjects defining: 12.3%; eigenvalue: 4.0.
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participants? If so, how they are distributed in the population? Moreover, do these
democratic support profiles condition the relationship between political distrust and
political behavior? To answer these questions, I use cluster analysis with nationally
representative survey data.
2.3.2 Generalization: A Cluster-Analysis Approach
Cluster analysis is designed to classify cases that vary along multiple dimensions. As
opposed to factor analysis, which assumes that the underlying dimensions and asso-
ciations in the data are continuous, cluster analysis assumes them to be categorical.
Since the goal here is to identify multidimensional profiles of democratic support, clus-
ter analysis will classify survey respondents into categories or “clusters” based on how
similar their orientations to democracy are. And by relaxing the linearity assumption
of factor-analytic techniques, cluster analysis can better describe and detect ambivalent
and inconsistent support profiles. Respondents in the same cluster hold orientations
to democracy that are most similar, while respondents in different clusters are most
dissimilar.
Identifying multidimensional profiles of democratic support, and later testing their
behavioral implications, requires an extraordinarily rich and large data set. The 2006
Chile AmericasBarometer survey fits the bill. Its large (n = 1517) and representative
national sample permits generalizations beyond the 73 Q-sort participants from San-
tiago.10 It was conducted just nine months after the Q-study. Adherence to sound
survey methodology ranks AmericasBarometer among the highest quality survey data
available for Latin America. The questionnaire contains multiple items gauging ori-
entations along the liberal ↔ illiberal and unconditional ↔ conditional spectra with
10± 2.57 at the 95% confidence level. The sample is stratified by comuna, multistage, and proba-
bilistic. Age and sex quotas are used in the last stage to match the distributions in the population.
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respect to democratic governance, political rights and procedures, and civil liberties.
Unfortunately, the AmericasBarometer includes very few proxies for committed and
uncommitted orientations. But uncommitted orientations only account for two of the
48 most salient factors scores in the Q-sort analysis and many committed orientations
amount to a rejection of indifference.
On these grounds, I proceed with the cluster analysis by constructing sets of mea-
sures that contrast (1) liberal to illiberal and (2) unconditional to conditional orien-
tations to democratic governance, political rights and procedures, and civil liberties.
For set (1), liberal versus illiberal orientations to democratic governance are measured
via level of agreement with following statement: “Democracy may have problems, but
it is still the best form of government”; responses range from totally disagree (0) to
fully agree (3). For liberal/illiberal orientations to political rights and procedures,
I construct a four-question scale gauging approval of extending Chileans who speak
poorly of government the rights to vote, to conduct peaceful protests expressing polit-
ical ideas, to run for public office, and to voice their views on television (α = .91).11
For liberal/illiberal orientations to civil liberties, I create a scale measuring disapproval
of laws prohibiting public protests and the meeting of groups who criticize the politi-
cal system, and laws to allow the government to censor television programs, books in
public school libraries, and critical media outlets (α = .84).
Set (2) measures pit unconditional against conditional orientations. I construct
and unconditional-conditional orientation to democratic governance scale that sums
responses about whether a military coup would be justified under the following five cir-
cumstances: high unemployment, many social protests, escalating crime, high inflation,
and rampant corruption (α = .81). The conditionality of political rights and proce-
dures measure asks respondents to choose between a government that would (1) cut
11Full question wordings, responses, and details on operationalizations are found in the appendix.
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unemployment in half and suspend elections versus respecting elections despite the un-
employment rate; (2) cut crime in half and suspend elections versus respecting elections
despite crime rates; (3) cut unemployment in half but pay no attention to congress or
the judiciary versus respecting these state powers despite the unemployment rate; and
(4) cut crime in half but pay no attention to congress or the judiciary versus respecting
these state powers despite crime rates (α = .86). Finally, I tap conditional support for
civil liberties via agreement with (a) “Our presidents must have the necessary power to
act in the national interest,” as opposed to, (b) “Our presidents’ power must be limited
so as not to put our liberties at risk.”
Following Schedler and Sarsfield’s (2007) work on the consistency of democratic
support, I use an exploratory technique known as agglomerative hierarchical cluster
analysis with Ward’s algorithm to cluster respondents by multidimensional profiles of
democratic support. Similarity in this method is measured by the sum of squared
Euclidean distances: distancex,y = Σi(xi − yi)2, where xi equals the value of variable
i for respondent x and yi equals the value of variable i for respondent y. The dis-
tance between two respondents on the six measures above is the sum of the squared
differences between their values for each and every variable (i1 - i6). Ward’s algorithm
calculates the sum of squared Euclidean distances from each respondent to the mean
of all variables and then minimizes the sum of squares of any two hypothetical clusters
that can be formed at each step.
After running the agglomerative hierarchical cluster analysis12 with Ward’s algo-
rithm on these six measures, Duda and Hart’s (1973) objective stopping rule suggests
12To verify appropriateness of cluster analysis as opposed to factor analysis, I calculated a correlation
matrix for the six measures. Only ten of the fifteen inter-correlations among the six measures reach
statistical significance, and even then with only moderate strength (the highest is r = .22). Moreover,
an exploratory factor analysis of these six measures fails to generate a single factor with an eigenvalue
over 1.
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a five-cluster solution.13 In other words, the analysis places the respondents into five
democratic support profiles I name: democrat, hyper-presidential, delegative, instru-
mental, and non-democrat. The orientations and their relative salience within the
support profile are determined by the mean scores for all respondents in that cluster
on the six variables. Positive entries in Table 2.5 represent liberal or unconditional
orientations to an object of support (democratic governance, political rights and proce-
dures, civil liberties) and negative entries denote illiberal or conditional orientations.14
For the sake of analysis and interpretation, variables are coded so that higher values
connote more democratic orientations. The data is unweighted, the scales are standard-
ized, and the dichotomous measure of contingent support for civil liberties remains 0/1.
Insignificant differences of means between clusters are noted below Table 2.5.
Like the Q-study, the cluster analysis detects an ideal-type democrat support pro-
file. Democrats not only display liberal and unconditional orientations across the six
measures, their mean scores are the highest of the five clusters on all but one dimension.
Yet at a mere 16.5% of the sample, the liberal support profile is the least pervasive in
Chile, a much lower percentage than the roughly 60% of respondents whose Q-sorts
loaded significantly an on the democrat factor. This reflect a bias in the Q-sorters,
many of whom were recruited from pre-existing civic groups whose members may be
13Single, complete, and average linkages do not contradict a five-cluster solution. Schedler and
Sarsfield (2007) employ subjective criteria rather than an objective stopping rule to settle on a cluster
solution.
14Missing values are imputed in order to maximize the number of respondents in each cluster. The
imputation model creates 5 multiple imputed datasets using the chained equations techniques (Roys-
ton, 2005). Equations incorporate each of the measures from the cluster and subsequent regression
analyses (see below) except for vote choice. Assuming the data are missing at random (MAR), which
should hold (King, Honaker, Joseph and Scheve, 2001), missing data for each variable is imputed
with the appropriate regression model (i.e. OLS for continuous variables, logit for binary variables,
multinomial logit for categorical variables, and ordered logit for ordinal variables). Since the normality
assumption on the posterior distribution of non-continuous regression coefficients may not be valid, I
rely on bootstrapping techniques to relax the normality assumption and produce robust estimates for
non-continuous variables (Li, Raghunathan and Rubin, 1991).
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more orientated to democracy than the average Chilean. Indeed, only 21% of partici-
pants disagreed on the pre-Q-sort questionnaire that “democracy may have problems
but it is still the best form of government.”
The next two support profiles favor a strong executive. Undetected by the Q-study,
hyper-presidentials are the more liberal of the two. Though generally displaying liberal
and unconditional orientations, hyper-presidentials would conditionally support the
subversion of civil liberties to a president acting in the “national interest”, as suggested
by the 0.00 in the last column. Akin to delegatives in the Q-study, the delegatives the
cluster analysis hold orientations to democratic governance that are not particularly
liberal (–0.18) or unconditional (0.00). And while they also place conditions on political
rights, their willingness to allow a leader to subsume individual liberties to the national
interest diverges from their more civil-libertarian Q-study counterparts. In general, the
delegative profiles in both the cluster and Q analyses reflect a good deal of ambivalence.
The last two profiles are instrumental and non-democrat, both of which resonate
with the Q-study. Instrumentals hold by far the most illiberal and conditional orien-
tations to democratic governance. That is, they do not believe democracy is the best
form of government (–0.63) and welcome coups d’etat in various situations (–1.47).
Instrumentals would readily swap political rights for economic and security gains, as
their conditional orientation (–0.35) shows. Non-democrats, in turn, are illiberal to-
wards democracy but unconditionally against military intervention (0.31). They prefer
limited political pluralism and equality (–0.68), but would certainly not relinquish risk
their civil liberties for a president to act in the national interest (1.00). It would appear
that non-democrat Chileans currently living in a democratic context brace themselves
against elected populists who might pervert democratic institutions. Despite distinct
methods and data, four of the profiles are remarkably similar to the profiles identified
by the Q-sorts, bolstering the overall validity of both analyses.
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2.4 Profiles of Democratic Support, Trust in Polit-
ical Parties & Political Participation
Constructing valid measures of democratic support profiles, we can now test whether
they condition the effects of trust in political parties on participation in protests and
elections? Before turning to the models of protest activism and electoral participa-
tion, I provide a quick review of the hypothetical expectations for each profile. Cit-
ing Gamson (1968), critical citizens scholars claim democratic orientations imbue cit-
izens with a sense of efficacy and responsibility that predispose them to protest when
they judge representative institutions untrustworthy (Norris, 1999a; Catterberg, 2003).
However, modernization raises the value citizens place on self-expression, fostering a
shift from conventional forms (like elections) to less hierarchical participatory modes
(like protests) (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). So critical citizens might be less likely to
vote than others with less liberal and unconditional orientations to democracy. Work
on Chile shows that lack of political trust makes increases the likelihood of not regis-
tering to vote or casting blank/null ballot (Carlin, 2006). Thus, trusting democrats in
Chile might be more inclined to participate in elections.
But what about citizens with mixed support profiles? Who protests and how ac-
tively are clues to the puzzle of social accountability in Chile. Hyper-presidential and
delegative Chileans’ would both support a president acting, presumably unilaterally,
in the name of the nation. If they distrust parties, we should not expect them to
participate in protests to demand accountability to representative institutions inhab-
ited by party politicos. On the other hand, distrusting delegatives, who already hold
illiberal and conditional orientations to political rights and procedures, may be prime
targets of mobilization for personalistic candidates running anti-party campaigns. Con-
sidering the moderately high degree of support for civil liberties instrumentals and
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non-democrats exhibit, they may be likely to participate if they trust political parties
enough to overcome their illiberal orientations to democratic governance. These ad-
mittedly rough expectations guide the models below, which present the first explicit
tests of these inherently interactive relationships between democratic support profiles,
institutional trust, and participation in accountability-exacting activities.15
In addition to the democratic support profiles, trust in political parties is my main
explanatory variable. No indicator of institutional trust has dropped so precipitously
in the post-authoritarian period as trust in political parties. According one source,
exactly half of Chileans trusted in political parties in 1995, but in 1999 only 28 percent
did so (Inglehart et al., 2004). Another source shows party trust fell by almost half,
from 31% to 17%, between 1996 and 2004 (Payne, Zovatto and Dı´az, 2007). The
prominence of parties in Chile’s transition to democracy and the favorable economic
conditions since 1989 makes rapid decline of party trust all the more dramatic. While
these trends make for shocking press releases, their behavioral implications are not well
known. Therefore, a measure of trust in political parties16 is a key independent variable
in my models below.
The models examine two dependent variables, participation in public protests and
elections, both of which offer citizens a degree of accountability. The first is Protest
15Norris’s (1999b, 260, 263) fails to include any measure of democrat support, focusing solely on
institutional trust. Booth and Seligson (2005) include various dimensions of political legitimacy in
their models, but do not consider their interactive effect. Inglehart and Welzel (2005, 124) show
a bivariate correlation between country aggregate measures of (1) the change in the percentage of
citizens claiming to have take political action and (2) temporally prior percentages of citizens holding
self-expression values. Catterberg (2003) comes closest. But rather than modelling an interaction
term, she simulates interactive effects by calculating changes in predicted probabilities at high and low
measures on her proxies for postmaterialism and democratic support, on one hand, and confidence in
governing authorities, on the other hand.
16The LAPOP survey questions reads, “To what extent to you have confidence/trust in political
parties?” Responses range from “none” (1) to “a lot” (7).
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Activism, operationalized as a four-point measure scored 3 if the respondent partici-
pated “often” in public protests in the last year, 2 if the respondent “almost never”
participated in protests last year, 1 if the respondent “did not” participate any protests
last year, and 0 if the respondent has “never” participated in a protest.17 The second
dependent variable is Voter Registration. In Chile voter registration is voluntary but,
once registered, voting is compulsory and enforced, if sporadically, with sanctions. Since
upwards of 90% of the population registered to vote ahead of the 1988 plebiscite on
Pinochet’s rule, most unregistered voters are between the ages of 18 and 40. Tracking
how their profiles of democratic support and evaluations of political parties influence
their behavior should lead to insights on the dynamics of democratic quality in Chile.
This variable is binary, scored 1 if the respondent was registered to vote in the 2005
national elections and 0 otherwise.
Controls include interpersonal trust, political interest,18 Left-Right self-placement,19
gender, education20 (Norris, 1999a), income, membership in civic organizations21 (Cat-
terberg, 2003), and marital status.22 Models of protest activism control for age, while
the electoral participation models use socialization cohort dummies, where the pre-1973
cohort is the reference category (Carlin, 2006). Missing values are imputed (see fn. 11).
17The survey question asks, “In the last year, have you participated in a public manifestation
or protest? Have you done this several times, almost never, or never?”. Employing the following,
more general question does not substantively alter the results: “At any time in your life have your
participated in a public manifestation or protest? Have you done this several times, almost never, or
never?”.
18This variable ranges 0-3 based on the question, “How much interest do you have in politics?”; 0
connotes “none” and 3 indicates “much” interest.
19Respondents place themselves on the ideological spectrum ranging from 0 (Left) to 7 (Right).
20Education ranges from no formal education (0) to full university education (17).
21This 14-point variable combines the frequency of attending meetings (never = 0, once or twice a
year = 1, once or twice a month = 2, once a week = 3) for religious organizations, parents associations,
neighborhood groups (juntas de vecinos), professional associations, unions, and political parties.
22Scored 1 if respondent is married, 0 otherwise.
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2.4.1 Regression Analysis & Results
The analysis starts by estimating a series of ordered logistic regressions for protest
activism reported in Table 2.6. Then it proceeds to a set of binary logistic regressions
for Voter Registration displayed in Table 2.7.23 Both analyses contain interactions
between party trust and dummy variables representing democratic support profiles. To
ease interpretation, Figures 2 and 3 provide visual representations of discrete changes
in predicted probabilities based on the interactive relationships highlighted in Tables
2.6 and 2.7, respectively.
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Figure 2.3: Discrete Change: Effects of Party Trust on Frequent Protest Activism by
Support Profile
The results of Models I and II suggest that democratic support profiles indeed
23For both sets of models, I combine the parameter estimates of the five multiple imputations of the
data using Rubin’s (1987) method. In addition I calculate robust estimates of the variance-covariance
matrix of the regression coefficients (Li, Raghunathan and Rubin, 1991).
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condition the effects of party trust/distrust on protest activism (see Table 2.6). Con-
forming to the expectations of the critical citizens hypothesis, Chilean democrats resort
to protest as they lose trust in political parties. As the solid line in Figure 2.3 illus-
trates, the probability that a democrat is a frequent protester24 increases by about 25%
as party trust decreases over its range. The dashed lines indicate, that compared to de-
mocrats, hyper-presidentials and instrumentals become slightly more prone to protest
the more they trust political parties.
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Figure 2.4: Discrete Change: Effects of Party Trust on Voter Registration by Support
Profile
Models II and IV in Table 2.7 examine how democratic orientations and evalua-
tions of political parties influence voter registration. The results imply that distrusting
24These relationships do not change if we consider infrequent protest participation.
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delegatives are more likely to engage in electoral politics. Their democrat and non-
democrat counterparts, however, become more apt to register to vote as their levels
of party trust rise (see Figure 2.4). The main insight here is that democratic sup-
port profiles condition the effects of trust and distrust in political parties in a way not
previously considered by theories that focus on established democracies. Moreover,
understanding how ordinary citizens shape democratic quality in Chile, and perhaps
other new democracies, must this into into account.
How much of an improvement do multidimensional profiles of democratic support
make over two of the most common measures of democratic support? Models V-VII
in Table 2.8 and Models VIII-X in Table 2.9 re-examine protest activism and voter
registration, respectively, but replace the multidimensional democrat support profiles
used in previous models with common measures inspired by Juan Linz and Winston
Churchill.25 As we can see, neither the Linzian and Churchillian of democratic support
are robust predictors of any of the components of any of the interaction terms in these
six models. Thus it is unlikely that democratic support measured in this way conditions
the effects of party trust on political participation. Such evidence supports my claim
that distilling the effects of democratic support and institutional trust on political
participation requires more conceptually refined measures of democratic support.
25The Linzian question is cited in full on page 9, and the Churchillian support measure is the liberal
orientation to democratic governance used in the cluster analysis, cited in full on page 17.
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Table 2.6: Support Profiles, Party Trust and Protest Activism in Chile
Model I Model II
β (s.e.) β (s.e.)
Party Trust .003 (.048) -.239* (.094)
Liberal × Party Trust -.246* (.104)
Hyper-Presidential × Party Trust .304* (.127)
Delegative × Party Trust .075 (.134)
Instrumental × Party Trust .380** (.148)
Illiberal × Party Trust .231 (.137)
Liberal 1.320*** (.380)
Hyper-Presidential -1.257** (.479)
Delegative -.984* (.480)
Instrumental -1.982*** (.559)
Non-Democrat -1.239* (.512)
Interpersonal Trust .071 (.081) .090 (.083)
Political Interest .522*** (.073) .496*** (.077)
Left-Right -.176*** (.030) -.167*** (.031)
Education .118*** (.026) .117*** (.027)
Income .067 (.040) .054 (.041)
Woman -.355* (.144) -.335* (.147)
Age -.009 (.006) -.010 (.006)
Married -.554*** (.152) -.541*** (.155)
Children .274 (.149) .274 (.152)
Cutpoint 1 2.263 (.432) .857 (.513)
Cutpoint 2 3.903 (.438) 2.508 (.521)
Cutpoint 3 4.309 (.438) 2.913 (.526)
-2LLF 1794.8 1781.5
Pseudo-R2McF .126 .132
N 1517 1517
*** p ≤ .001, ** p ≤ .01, * p ≤ .05 (two-tailed test)
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Table 2.7: Support Profiles, Party Trust and Voter Registration in Chile
Model III Model IV
β (s.e.) β (s.e.)
Party Trust .006 (.053) -.126 (.102)
Liberal × Party Trust .201 (.136) .333* (.165)
Hyper-Presidential × Party Trust .226 (.153)
Delegative × Party Trust
Instrumental × Party Trust .064 (.149)
Illiberal × Party Trust .257† (.153)
Liberal -.306 (.492) -.900 (.607)
Hyper-Presidential -1.063† (.572)
Delegative
Instrumental -.458 (.538)
Illiberal -.965† (.567)
Interpersonal Trust .053 (.092) .047 (.095)
Political Interest .437*** (.098) .461*** (.103)
Left-Right -.008 (.035) -.008 (.037)
Education -.011 (.031) -.009 (.032)
Income .042 (.047) .041 (.049)
Woman .044 (.170) .047 (.177)
Post-Frei -3.920*** (.318) -3.909*** (.331)
Transition -1.838*** (.330) -1.818*** (.341)
Dictatorship -.883** (.332) -.873* (.344)
Married .295† (.179) .286 (.186)
Children .531** (.172) .544** (.179)
Constant 2.155*** (.506) 2.714*** (.607)
-2LLF 1040.3 1033.2
Pseudo-R2McF .389 .393
N 1517 1517
*** p ≤ .001, ** p ≤ .01, * p ≤ .05, † p ≤ .1 (two-tailed test)
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Table 2.8: Linzian and Churchillian Support, Party Trust and Protest Activism in Chile
Model V Model VI Model VII
β (s.e.) β (s.e.) β (s.e.)
Party Trust -.047 (.093) -.034 (.049) -.151 (.137)
Linzian Democrat × Party Trust .013 (.105)
Linzian Conditional × Party Trust -.015 (.139)
Linzian Uncommitted × Party Trust -.001 (.142)
Churchill Democrat × Party Trust .022 (.028)
Linzian Democrat .210 (.381)
Linzian Conditional -.274 (.515)
Linzian Uncommitted -.157 (.498)
Churchill Democrat -.069 (.093)
Interpersonal Trust .066 (.082) .066 (.082) .093 (.080)
Political Interest .533*** (.074) .534*** (.074) .512*** (.074)
Left-Right -.183*** (.031) -.183*** (.031) -.183*** (.030)
Education .125*** (.027) .126*** (.027) .122*** (.026)
Income .074 (.041) .074 (.041) .068 (.040)
Woman -.368 (.144) -.370** (.14) -.387** (.142)
Age -.009 (.005) -.009 (.006) -.009 (.006)
Married -.570*** (.153) -.571*** (.153) -.536*** (.150)
Children .299* (.150) .300* (.150) .297* (.148)
Cutpoint 1 2.297 (.432) 2.104 (.513) 1.691 (.590)
Cutpoint 2 3.972 (.438) 3.780 (.521) 3.310 (.599)
Cutpoint 3 4.357 (.438) 4.164 (.526) 3.713 (.602)
-2LLF 1955.6 1955.6 2025.0
Pseudo-R2McF .121 .121 .115
N 1517 1517 1517
*** p ≤ .001, ** p ≤ .01, * p ≤ .05 (two-tailed test)
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Table 2.9: Linzian and Churchillian Support, Party Trust and Voter Registration in
Chile
Model VIII Model IX Model X
β (s.e.) β (s.e.) β (s.e.)
Party Trust .001 (.092) .080 (.060) -.147 (.149)
Linzian Democrat × Party Trust .079 (.109)
Linzian Conditional × Party Trust .069 (.142)
Linzian Uncommitted × Party Trust -.224 (.145)
Churchill Democrat × Party Trust .043 (.031)
Linzian Democrat -.307 (.394)
Linzian Conditional -.263 (.522)
Linzian Uncommitted .838 (.513)
Churchill Democrat -.115 (.104)
Interpersonal Trust .038 (.095) .034 (.095) .075 (.094)
Political Interest .423*** (.099) .418*** (.100) .430*** (.099)
Left-Right -.006 (.036) -.007 (.037) -.001 (.036)
Education -.014 (.033) -.015 (.033) -.017 (.032)
Income .039 (.049) .044 (.048) .023 (.048)
Woman .022 (.173) .030 (.173) .048 (.172)
Post-Frei -3.970*** (.341) -3.980*** (.341) -3.981*** (.339)
Transition -1.871*** (.354) -1.884*** (.354) -1.954*** (.350)
Dictatorship -.970** (.355) -.971** (.355) -.906* (.358)
Married .304 (.184) .304 (.184) .308 (.183)
Children .568*** (.178) .568*** (.178) .498** (.176)
Constant 2.418*** (1.048) 2.117*** (.529) 2.817*** (.678)
-2LLF 1602.3 1602.3 1636.0
Pseudo-R2McF .392 .392 .394
N 1517 1517 1517
*** p ≤ .001, ** p ≤ .01, * p ≤ .05 (two-tailed test)
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2.5 Discussion
By reinvigorating long-standing debates over the relationship between political culture
and democracy, Critical Citizens earns Gabriel Almond’s jacket-cover endorsement: “It
is The Civic Culture study 40 years later.” The volume argues that as citizens lose faith
in democratic institutions, they will engage in contentious yet democratic modes of par-
ticipation to demand accountability and to press for political reform. But this account
is built on the assumption of widespread democratic support, valid only in long-lasting
stable democracies, and it neglects the importance of electoral participation. The cur-
rent study strongly urges scholars of new democracies to look beyond “critical citizens”
to identify citizens with less-than-liberal orientations to democracy and observe their
political behavior in the streets and at the ballot box. These citizens are critical, if
often missing, pieces of the larger theoretical puzzle. This study contributes conceptual
and methodological innovations that help fill in some of the pieces of the empirical and
theoretical puzzles surrounding democratic beliefs and the quality of democracy.
The main conceptual and methodological advances concern the measurement of sup-
port for democracy. Previous conceptualizations of democratic support fail to define
what “democrats” do, in fact, support. This hinders valid measurement and theory
construction. Profiles of democratic support grounded in Dahl’s (1971) democratic
procedural minimum highlights the orientations to democracy and the objects of sup-
port essential essential to a profile of democratic support. Methodologically, Q-sorts
and cluster analysis prove to be powerful and complementary ways to identify support
profiles. The resulting measures address the pitfalls and tradeoffs that plague extant
measures of democratic support reasonably well. Multidimensional profiles offer one
way to incorporate the “d-word” into a valid measure of democratic support that draws
information from a respondent’s orientations to the core elements of procedural democ-
racy. Knowing which aspects of procedural democracy citizens support could pave the
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way for better hypothesis testing about the linkages between democratic support and
the viability and quality of procedural democracy. In a crucial first step, the analy-
sis suggests support profiles explain accountability-inducing behaviors, and they do so
better than extant measures.
This study paints a drastically different picture of democratic support in Chile
than previous studies. According to recent polls (Latinobaro´metro, 2006), 56% of
Chileans are “democrats” as determined by the Linzian support measure and 74%
are “democrats” if we look only at the Churchillian measure of support. Using data
from the 2006 LAPOP survey, Carrio´n (forthcoming) combines Linzian support with
preference for liberal (as opposed to populist) rule and reports 61.4% of Chileans are
“liberal democrats.” By clustering orientations to three class of objects (regime, polit-
ical rights/procedures, civil liberties) using the same LAPOP data, I find just 16.5%
of Chileans qualify as liberal “democrats”. My research takes an additional step to-
wards validating the distinctions between democrats and their counterparts by showing
that they tend to behave quite differently. Moreover, in a head-to-head competition, my
measures outperform Linzian and Churchillian measures for predicting protest activism
and voter turnout.
The empirical results of this study nuance our theoretical understanding of how de-
mocratic beliefs and attitudes might influence the stability and quality of democracy.
In Chile, low trust in parties motivates “democrats” - and only “democrats” - to seek
accountability via protest. In post-authoritarian Latin America, protesting catalyzed
political actors and institutions to impeach or force from office elected presidents with-
out causing a democratic breakdown (Pe´rez-Lin˜a´n, 2007). Therefore, a small group
of distrusting democrats in Chile could potentially be expected react similarly in an
emergency and, thereby, preserve democratic stability.
But the implications for democratic quality are less clear. As “democrats” lose
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trust in parties they shy away from electoral participation. As “delegatives” lose trust
in parties, however, they embrace it. So not only are Chilean democrats outnumbered,
they also surrender their leverage over elected officials by remaining on the electoral
sidelines. Perhaps this behavior owes to the difficulty of ‘throwing the rascals out’ posed
by the binomial system, generational shifts in participatory norms (Carlin, 2006), or
disgust with mandatory voting laws. Whatever the reason, democracy presupposes
that elected officials represent those who voted them into office. In this sense, Chilean
distrusting democrats seem to be betting that elected officials will pay more attention
to the protesting (democratic) few than the voting (ambivalent) many. What remains
to be seen is whether political opportunists will decide to see their bet and rise to power
backed by a less-than-democratic majority. This insight underscores the empirical and
theoretical contributions of this study as well as the challenges ahead.
A fuller understanding of how the distribution of democratic support at the mass
level translates into observable outcomes at the regime level depends on myriad consid-
erations (see Coppedge N.d.). Greater access to mass surveys from LAPOP and Lati-
nobaro´metro should facilitate research on cross-national patterns and within-country
dynamics over time. Surveys of Latin American elites, like PELA, allow scholars to
explore how democratic beliefs systems at the elite level take cues from or influence
democratic support profiles in the populace. Further investigation into the political op-
portunity structures, capacity to overcome collective action problems, and the framing
of motives may help link this research agenda to a broader theoretical story about the
nature of contentious politics. More work also remains to be done on the determinants
of democratic support profiles. Meanwhile, this study provides some conceptual and
theoretical guideposts for future research on this central theme of democratic theory.
47
Chapter 3
Political Party Trust, Distrust, and
Trustworthiness: Concepts,
Rubrics, and Implications in Chile
and Argentina
Latin American publics trust political parties less than any other political, economic,
and social institution or actor, as survey after survey finds. Yet the implications for
democracy are unclear. If it equates to antipartyism or support for antisystem leaders,
then lack of trust in parties may threaten democratic quality and stability (Torcal,
Gunther and Montero, 2002; Linz, 2002; Hagopian, 2005). But if it signals the growth
of a critical citizenry in search of new forms of political representation and participation,
it could have a salutary effect on democracy (Norris, 1999a; Catterberg, 2003; Dalton
and Weldon, 2005; Cleary and Stokes, 2006). Or perhaps the implications depend
on why citizens find parties untrustworthy. If citizens are simply appreciating the
increasing complexity of governance, then it may well be that lack of party trust “does
not matter very much” (Hardin, 2000, 50). But if low party trust reflects outrage over
moral impropriety and a crisis of representation, it could fuel demands for institutional
reform and accountability. To understand the consequences of party trust in Latin
America we need to know how to conceptualize it, how citizens judge parties, and how
these judgements influence political behavior.
Most research on trust in political parties in new Latin American democracies em-
ploys measures modelled on the General Social Survey (GSS) item, “How much confi-
dence do you have in political parties – Much, Some, Little, or None?” In Spanish, the
stems use “confianza,” which means both “trust” and “confidence”.1 The instrument is
problematic on many levels. As I argue above, it impedes theorizing by obscuring citi-
zens’ criteria for assessing party trustworthiness and, thus, the behavioral implications
of party trust and distrust. Cook and Gronke Cook and Gronke (2005) cite further
shortfalls. By stopping at “None”, the response set truncates the continuum between
trust and distrust. It says nothing about distrust. Assuming that a lack of trust does
not necessarily constitute distrust (Ullmann-Margalit, 2004), conclusions about party
distrust are at best overstated and at worst misleading. Hence the GSS measure cannot
distinguish active trust or distrust from a lack of trust or distrust. Differentiating these
beliefs paints a more accurate portrait of party performance from the citizen point of
view and disentangles the behavioral consequences of distrust in parties.
My study focuses on these conceptual, measurement, and theoretical issues. It pro-
poses a conceptualization of party trust/distrust based on perceptions of party trustwor-
thiness along three dimensions: integrity, competence, and responsiveness. With this
tripartite conceptualization I investigate empirically the criteria upon which citizens
judge the trustworthiness of political parties and the behavioral consequences of party
1Surveys in Latin America come in two main variants. World Values Surveys use, “¿Cua´nta con-
fianza tiene usted en los partidos pol´ıticos – Mucha, Algo, Poca, o Nada?” Latin American Public
Opinion Project surveys prefer, “¿Hasta que´ punto tiene confianza usted en los partidos pol´ıticos –
Nada (0) . . .Mucho (7)?
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trust and distrust. Analyses of Q-sorts and focus-groups conducted in Santiago, Chile
and Buenos Aires, Argentina suggest that party trust and distrust are based on three
shared party trustworthiness “rubrics”, or sets of weighted criteria, that are remarkably
similar in both cases. Then I test the linkages between my three-dimensional conceptu-
alization of party trust/distrust and participation in elite-challenging political actions
in a region-wide comparative analysis with survey data from Latinobaro´metro (LB). In-
deed, my conceptually-grounded measures outperform the GSS measure of party trust
and tell a more nuanced story about how evaluations of parties influence participation.
The study closes by summarizing its contributions to theory and measurement and
pointing out paths for future research.
Case Selection
For this comparative analysis, Chile and Argentina can be viewed as most-different
cases in terms of political party integrity, the governing competence, responsiveness
to citizens, and citizen evaluations of parties. Chilean parties are far from perfect
on these scores, and Chileans themselves express only modest levels of trust in them.
Aside from recent scandals regarding impropriety in awarding government contracts,
corruption is considered quite low in Chile. Over the course of the transition to democ-
racy that began in the late 1980s, parties formed two coalitions on the Center-Right
and Center-Left of the political spectrum. The Center-Left Concertacio´n has won the
presidency in the four elections since 1989, while the Center-Right Alianza has played
the role of a dutiful, if sometimes internally-conflicted, opposition. Parties of the Far
Left compete well in municipal elections, but typically blocked from legislative repre-
sentation by the binomial electoral system. Historically, parties in Chile have been the
main political and social brokers (Valenzuela, 1977). These ties have weakened in the
post-authoritarian era as parties have shifted from programmatic to pragmatic linkage
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strategies (Posner, 1999; Luna, 2006). Since democracy’s return in 1989, civil society’s
leverage has declined (Oxhorn, 1995), and organized labor has only recouped a fraction
of its pre-1973 strike capacity (Kurtz, 2004). Trust in parties in Chile, at 23% based
on the GSS question, is surpassed only by four other Latin American countries in the
2004 LB.
Argentina’s party system nearly dissolved after an economic meltdown in 2001 trig-
gered a major legitimacy crisis of the political class. In the streets, demonstrators
chanted “Out with them all!”. In the 2001 legislative elections, blank and spoiled bal-
lots out-polled all party lists in some districts. Parties in opposition to Peronism have
never recovered. Successive administrations have battled hyperinflation and poorly
managed currency regimes since the return to democracy in 1983. Under the Menem
and De la Ru´a’s administrations corruption scandals dominated headlines fuelled cit-
izen discontent with the political class. Historically, Argentina’s labor movement, not
political parties, have been the primary vehicles of interest articulation for the middle
and working sectors. But party-base linkages in Argentina have drastically changed
since 1983. Menem’s “neoliberalism by surprise” (Stokes, 2001) shifted the Peronist
Party from its traditional labor-based linkages to patronage and clientelistic networks
(Levitsky, 2003a; Stokes, 2005; Auyero, 2001). If neoliberalism weakened organized
labor, it drove unemployed ex-syndicalists to form piquetero organizations who seek
redress by conducting roadblocks and other forms of collective action (Svampa and
Pereyra, 2003). GSS-based party trust in Argentina is 12%, fourth lowest in the region
in 2004.
Considering the vast dissimilarities between party systems, historical modes of rep-
resentation, party/coalition stability, and many other factors, there is little reason to
suspect citizens in both countries to judge parties on the same exact criteria. But if
we broaden the lens to view trustworthiness in the three dimensions I map out below,
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some patterns may arise. Any common findings across these two diverging cases could
prove generalizable.
3.1 Party Trust, Distrust & Trustworthiness
Despite abundant theorizing on other objects of political trust, political parties are
largely ignored. Drawing on Levi and Stoker’s (2000) review, I provide a conceptual
map of trust, distrust, and trustworthiness, both in general and as they relate to polit-
ical parties. Then I propose that party trust and distrust derive from citizens’ “rubrics
of party trustworthiness.”
Trust is relational and requires individuals to make themselves vulnerable to an-
other individual, group, or institution with the capacity to harm or betray them. One
grants trust over specific domains, but not unconditionally. Trust and distrust can be
either a matter of degree or dichotomous, and it is possible that one neither trusts nor
distrusts another person, group, or institution. Trust and distrust inspire action, such
as extending, monitoring, or severing a relationship. Thus trust is the truster’s belief
in the trustworthiness of the trustee.
Trustworthiness is relational insofar as individuals and institutions possess attributes
that potential trusters could perceive as trustworthy. Trustworthy attributes cluster
around integrity and competence in the domain of trust. Hence over a prescribed range
of actions and decisions, “the trustworthy will not betray the trust as a consequence of
bad faith or ineptitude” (Levi and Stoker, 2000, 476). Therefore while trust is a belief
and trustworthiness is a characteristic, they are connected since “to ask any question
about trust is implicitly to ask about the reasons for thinking the relevant party to be
trustworthy” (Hardin, 2004, 6).
Capturing these intuitions, Cleary and Stokes (2006) define trust as actor A’s belief
that actor B will take action X, which is in A’s interest, even though B could stand
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to gain by not taking this action, and A cannot directly monitor B ’s actions. Distrust
is A’s belief that B will not do X, which is in A’s interest. As such, distrust is “the
contrapositive of trust” (12). Trustworthiness is B ’s ability or predisposition to do X, as
judged by A. Trust and distrust, then, boil down to “assessment[s] of the trustworthiness
of the potentially trusted person or group or institution” (Hardin, 2004, 3) in a given
domain of action.
Borrowing this framework, trust in political parties is citizen A’s belief that political
parties B1...n will represent A’s interests X 1...n. Distrust in parties is A’s belief that
parties B1...n will not represent A’s interests X 1...n. Political representation is the
domain of action, assuming that citizens evaluate parties collectively as one in a range
of potential vehicles of interest aggregation and articulation, rather than one party over
another (e.g. Keele 2005). For parties to be effective vehicles of political representation,
they must have integrity, competence, and responsiveness. If citizens perceive political
parties as lacking in integrity, they will distrust them because parties will be likely
to betray citizens’ interests, break their promises, and/or become corrupt. If citizens
perceive political parties as incompetent, they will distrust them because parties will
be unlikely to govern effectively. If citizens perceive political parties as unresponsive,
they will distrust them because parties will be unlikely to aggregate and articulate
citizen interests and concerns adequately. Reversing these scenarios, trust in parties
becomes at least possible, if not likely. A summary measure about one’s level of trust
in parties, like the GSS measure, is a blunt instrument if citizens actually judge party
trustworthiness along these three dimensions.
My proposed conceptualization of trust in parties is consistent with recent theo-
retical discussions about trust in parties (Linz, 2002; Hagopian, 2005) in Latin Amer-
ica, as well as and trust in local and national governments in established democracies
(Jennings, 1998; Denters, 2002). In addition, it resonates with citizen perspectives as
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articulated in eight focus groups with in Santiago and Buenos Aires, and LB survey
data. The focus groups were formed with members of pre-existing groups who were
likely to have a variety of interactions with parties. In Santiago, these groups included
an anti-globalization citizen movement, ATTAC-Chile; a group of neighborhood associ-
ation leaders from Santiago’s working-class borough, La Granja; a Christian Democrat
Youth group from San Joaqu´ın, another working-class comuna; and the Gay and Les-
bian Brigade of the Socialist Party. The Buenos Aires focus groups were recruited
from members of the class-based coalition, Central de los Trabajadores (CTA); voca-
tional school students from the working-class districts of Vicente Lo´pez and General
San Mart´ın; young party members participating in a leadership seminar at the think-
tank Centro de Implementacio´n de la Pol´ıticas Pu´blicas para la Equidad y Crecimiento
(CIPPEC); and activists in a human rights group, Asamblea Permanente por los Dere-
chos Humanos (APDH). Despite variation in socioeconomic status, gender, ideology,
and relationship to parties, participants echoed concerns along all three of the proposed
dimensions. The next section elaborates this evidence with data from the transcrip-
tions.
Further validation comes from a 2004 LB survey question asking citizens from 18
Latin American countries the top three factors that determine their levels of trust in
public institutions.2 As Table 3.1 indicates, six of the ten responses match the proposed
conceptual dimensions of party trustworthiness: integrity, competence, responsiveness.
The other four factors reflect second-hand knowledge (reputation), do not correspond
clearly to political parties (equality), or allude to accountability mechanisms (third
party enforcement). Between 35-48% of respondents cite integrity criteria, 22-42%
2While the stem does not mention parties specifically, the two preceding questions probe the func-
tions of political parties (P31) and trust in several other groups and institutions (P32), i.e. Banks, the
police, the Church, the government, trade unions, television, armed forces.
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Table 3.1: Percentage Mentioning Criteria for Trust in Public Institutions
Which of the following factors, if any, are the most important in determining
how much trust you have in public institutions? Name up to three.
Criterion Dimension Argentina Chile Lat. Am.
If they keep their promises Integrity 47.9 39.4 39.9
If they admit responsibility when mistaken Integrity 37.4 36.4 35.1
The leadership and management quality Competence 21.2 22.8 18.5
If they give the required information Competence 23.6 31.1 32.1
If they are interested in one’s opinion Responsiveness 26.2 22.1 24.0
If the service responds to my needs Responsiveness 41.7 39.1 31.5
Total mentioning at least 1 of the 6 above 99.2 99.5 98.9
What friends and relatives say about it Reputation 6.8 5.2 9.6
What the mass media says about it Reputation 6.5 9.8 11.4
If they are supervised Enforcement 57.5 54.7 60.1
If they treat everyone equally Equality 57.5 54.7 59.7
Total mentioning at least 1 of the 4 above 64.5 63.4 71.3
Don’t know/No response 4.33 5.3 12.0
Source: Latinobaro´metro 2004.
Note: Entries represent the percentage of valid responses; DK/NR deleted list-wise.
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mention responsiveness, and 21-31% name competence standards. Just 1% of respon-
dents fail to mention any of the criteria in the proposed theoretical dimensions. Thus,
citizens generally judge the trustworthiness of public institutions on integrity, compe-
tence, and responsiveness.3 Citizens will either trust or distrust parties depending on
how well parties meet these criteria. This conceptualization lays the groundwork for a
closer look at the rubrics of party trust and distrust and how they drive elite-challenging
political actions aimed at holding elected officials accountable.
3.2 Rubrics of Party Trustworthiness
Conceiving of trust and distrust in political parties as beliefs deriving from evaluations
of party trustworthiness raises the question: do all criteria matter equally? For some
citizens, issues of integrity are most critical, while for others assessments capacity or
responsiveness are central. Do citizens organize and weight their trustworthiness criteria
systematically? I claim that citizens employ implicit “rubrics of party trustworthiness”
to arrive at trust or distrust of parties. To education researchers and practitioners, a
rubric is a scoring guide that weights performance criteria for student assessment (i.e.
grading). Rubrics systematize the process of evaluation and indicate areas of success
and failure. In short, I propose that citizens rely on trustworthiness rubrics and score
parties accordingly. Not all citizens use the same rubrics. But trust and distrust
in parties are likely to reflect citizens weighing their perceptions of parties against a
limited number of sets of criteria. Knowing what drives trust and distrust in parties
could clarify the consequences of these beliefs.
3The popularity of third-party enforcement (55-60% mentioned) affirms the distinction between
personal trust in politicians and institutional trust in the mechanisms of accountability (Cleary and
Stokes, 2006). Another 55-60% of respondents mentioned equality, but logic would suggest this cri-
terion is more applicable to formal institutions (e.g. congress, the judiciary, the bureaucracy) than to
political parties.
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Gauging political party trust or distrust based on how citizens “grade” the trust-
worthiness of parties has key advantages over the GSS measure. The most obvious
is that rubrics are multidimensional measures, whereas the GSS item is an omnibus
measure. And rubrics approach does not unduly truncate the spectrum between trust
and distrust. The GSS measure, on the other hand, presumably lumps citizens who
actively distrust political parties in with those who, simply, do not trust them. Yet
these are distinct phenomena with potentially diverging behavioral implications. What
do rubrics of party trustworthiness look like? Do common or shared rubrics exist either
within or across cases? Q methodology is a promising way to address these questions.
3.2.1 Detecting Party Trustworthiness Rubrics: Q-Methods
Psychologist William Stephenson (1953) designed Q methodology to study patterns of
human subjectivity. In short, it reveals systematic perspectives and conceptions that
are shared by more than one subject (Brown, 1980; McKeown and Thomas, 1988).
Prime examples in political science include Drzyek and Holmes’s (2002) analysis of
democratic discourses in post-Communist societies, which they link to distinct paths
to democratization. Theiss-Morse (1993) connects distinct conceptions of citizenship
to diverging modes of political participation in the United States. Zechmeister (2006)
shows that different meanings of Left-Right ideological labels reflect political sophisti-
cation and respond to elite packaging in Argentina and Mexico. I seek to detect rubrics
of party trustworthiness with Q-methods.
Q-methodologists observe a behavior called a Q-sort. Participants complete a Q-sort
by physically rank-ordering along a continuum, typically from “most agree” to “most
disagree”, a set of statements about the concept under study printed on laminated
cards. Completed Q-sorts are then factor-analyzed to identify latent constructs upon
which participants, not variables, load. Some describe this factor analysis as “inverted”
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since a Q-sorts data set is the inverse of a survey data set. A survey data set places
items in columns and subjects in rows. Factor analysis in this set-up shows which items
tap a latent variable. Q data sets, however, place subjects in columns and items in rows.
The factor analysis, now “inverted”, explores which subjects tap a latent variable or
“shared conception.” The letter q is meant to distinguish these “person correlations”
from Pearson’s r -based “trait correlations.”
To gauge party trust and distrust by exploring party trustworthiness rubrics, I
asked participants from Santiago, Chile and Buenos Aires, Argentina to construct their
own rubrics of party trustworthiness by Q-sorting statements that reflect assessments
of political parties. Inverted factor analysis of these Q-sorts revealed latent rubrics
of party trustworthiness shared among the participants. Whether a participant is an
active truster or distrusters or neither depends on the strength of her factor loading on
a given shared rubric. The sign of this factor loading indicates whether, after grading
parties with this rubric, the subject ultimately trusts or distrusts political parties. I
return to this conversation after describing the rubrics of party trustworthiness. Now
let us turn to theoretical and methodological considerations that influence the design
my Q-study: the construction of the Q-sample, the recruitment of the P-Sample, and
the on-site procedures.
In Q-methods terminology, the set of items participants sort is called the “Q-
sample.” Survey samples draw from the population of respondents, but Q-samples draw
from the universe of perspectives on the concept under analysis. Here the concept is
party trustworthiness, and my Q-sample (n = 24) draws from the universe of survey
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items on trust in parties, institutions, and government.4 The items were sampled pur-
posefully and I revised several to make “political parties” the object of the evaluation.
For each of the three dimensions of party trustworthiness that form my conceptualiza-
tion of party trust – integrity, competence, and responsiveness – there are eight items
or statements tapping that dimension. Of these eight items, four of the statements
are trustworthy assessments of parties and the other four are the corresponding un-
trustworthy evaluations of parties. This symmetry provides an important check on the
consistency and coherence of the rubric.
The P-sample refers to the participants who complete the Q-sorting exercise. Un-
like surveys, Q-sorts do not require a large number of randomly selected participants.
Rather, in line with best practices for small-n methods (King, Keohane and Verba,
1994), Q prioritizes a diverse set of participants who can maximize the range of ori-
entations to the concept under study, i.e. party trustworthiness. The P-samples were
recruited from contrasting ages and walks of life in both Santiago (81 participants,
October-December 2005) and Buenos Aires (82 participants, July-September 2006).5
This non-representative sample prohibits us from inferring how widely-used these trust-
worthiness rubrics are in the population and whether other rubrics remain latent. Yet
any similarities observed in both the Santiago and Buenos Aires analyses buttress the
validity and generalizability of the findings.
4Questionnaires are sampled from the following projects and surveys: National Election Study,
El Centro de Investigaciones Sociolo´gicas (Spain, various), Latin American Public Opinion Project,
Latinobaro´metro, Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, Danish Gallup Poll on Local Government
(1993), Consumers, Taxpayers, and Citizens Survey (Norway 1996), Local Democracy and Admin-
istrative Renewal Survey (Netherlands 1993), Public Opinion and Local Citizenship Survey (United
Kingdom 1994-95).
5Participants included state employees, professionals, students, middle-class families, shanty-town
dwellers, party militants, academics, blue-collar workers, mothers and women’s associations, neigh-
borhood associations, NGOs, a nationalist group, and a homosexual rights movement. In Chile, the
Q-study fell directly prior to the December 2005 elections. Argentina’s October 2007 national elec-
tions were more than a year away. Falling at different points on the electoral calendar accentuates the
most-different cases design.
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Least Agree                                ↔            Most Agree
 
           -4        -3          -2         -1         0        +1        +2      +3        +4 
Figure 3.1: Quasi-Normal Q-Sort Distribution, 24 Items
On site, participants first completed a short questionnaire about political support
and demographics. Next they sorted the 24 statements (Q-sample items) typed on small
laminated cards into three categories: agree, disagree, and no strong feeling either way
(Brown, 1980). Subjects then ranked the statements by sorting them into eleven ordinal
categories ranging from –4 (“least agree”) to +4 (“most agree”) conforming to Figure
2, where 0 is neutral.6 Participants place the item they most agree with under +4, the
next two they most agree with under +3, the item they least agree with under –4, and so
on. The research team recorded the position of the items in the Q-sort and analyzed the
data off site. Finished Q-sorts represent the rubric of party trustworthiness participants
employ in their decision to trust or distrust parties. Q methodology’s “inverted” factor
analysis can tell us if a participant’s rubric is unique or representative of a more general
set of evaluative criteria.
6The quasi-normal distribution of Figure 2 guarantees that the Q-sorts will not be unduly skewed
or otherwise difficult to compare, but does not significantly alter the results (Brown, 1980).
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3.2.2 Analysis & Interpretation
There are some technical aspects of the analysis that are essential to a substantive
interpretation of the results. Since the rubrics of party trustworthiness come from
an exploratory factor analysis of Q-sorts, they take on meaning and substance after
analyzing and interpreting the extracted factors. Some general statistical guidelines
structure my factor analyses. I use varimax, not hand, rotation. Extracted factors must
pass a scree test, explain at least 10% of the rotated variance, and 20% of subjects must
load ≥ |0.4|. The factor solution must explain at least 40% of the total variance. The
percentage of variance explained by a factor (equal to the eigenvalue ÷ n Q-sorters)
grounds the information eigenvalues provide.7 Following these rules, the factor analyses
of both the Santiago and Buenos Aires Q-sorts suggest three-factor solutions. In the
Santiago analysis (n = 81) the solution explains 41% of the rotated variance, while in
the Buenos Aires analysis (n = 82) it explains 51% of the variance.8 These six latent
factors represent shared party trustworthiness rubrics. As I describe below, each of the
three rubrics in Santiago has a corresponding rubric in Buenos Aires that is similar
enough to warrant the same name.
The most straightforward way to interpret and name these factors is by analyzing
the factor scores for the items in the Q-sample. As Theiss-Morse (1993) explains, “the
factor scores represent weighted combinations of the placement of statements in each
individual’s Q-sort and thus reflect ideal typical patterns” (1993, 363). Simply put,
a factor score is a criterion’s weight within the overall party trustworthiness rubric.
In calculating the factor scores, the raw data in each Q-sort are weighted to allow
7Eigenvalues (which equal the sum of squared factor loadings for each factor) are a common ex-
traction criterion in r -based factor analysis. But aggregating across numerous variates, as done here,
may inflate them artificially (Brown, 1980, 40-43).
8The explained variance can also be broken down by factor (and eigenvalue). For Santiago, Factor
1 = 20% (16.5); Factor 2 = 10% (7.9); Factor 3 = 11% (9.0). For Buenos Aires, Factor 1 = 19%
(15.4); Factor 2 = 18% (14.9); Factor 3 = 14% (11.5).
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participants with higher factor loadings to contribute more. Then the raw Q-sorts data
are multiplied by their corresponding factor weight,9 summed across each item, and
normalized (mean = 0, s.d. = 1). Next these normalized (z) factor scores are transposed
to scores on the 11-point Q-sort scale. This last step is not necessary, but transposed
z-scores “are usually reported since they conform to the format in which the data were
originally collected” (Brown, 1980, 243). Table 3.2 reports the transposed scores the
most dominant and consistent items by case, factor, and dimension. Dominant items
score +4, +3, +2, –2, –3, or –4. In some cases, a dominant item is inconsistent.
Inconsistency arises when a trustworthy statement has a positive (+) score and the
corresponding untrustworthy statement also has a positive (+) score. Or, conversely,
when a trustworthy item has a negative (–) score and the corresponding untrustworthy
item has a negative (–) score as well. In Table 3.2, trustworthy items are denoted with
t and untrustworthy items denoted with u.
The shared rubrics are named for the weight they assign to the different trustwor-
thiness dimensions. In this respect there are some differences in the three rubrics in
Chile and the three rubrics in Argentina, but also some patterns. The following deci-
sion rules identify those patterns and suggest rubric names. First, I create summary
scores for each dimension (integrity, competence, responsiveness) in all six factors and
report them in Table 3.3. These scores are the sum, by dimension, of the absolute value
of the transposed factor scores for the items in Table 3.2. If an item is inconsistent,
as defined above, its score is left out of the dimension’s summary score. The name of
the factor derives from the two dimensions with the highest summary scores, which
appear in bold in Table 3.3. The dimension with the highest sum across both cases,
whose scores are also underlined, comes first in the name. The three rubrics are Factor
9Based on w = f/(1− f2), where w is the factor weight and f is the factor loading (Brown, 1980,
241-2).
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Table 3.2: Rubrics of Political Party Trustworthiness: Santiago and Buenos Aires
Santiago Buenos Aires
Integrity 1 2 3 1 2 3
1t. I don’t think political parties are corrupt. -4 -2 -3
2t. Political parties fulfill their promises. -2 -4
3t. Political parties work for the common good. -3 -4
4t. The internal power struggle in political parties, +2 +3 -4 +2 -4
while unpleasant, is necessary.
1u. Political parties are corrupt. +4 -2 +3 +3
2u. Political parties don’t fulfill their promises. +2 +4
3u. Political parties don’t work for the common good. +3 +3 -2 +2
4u. The internal power struggle in political parties is -2 +4 -3 +4
unpleasant and, moreover, unnecessary.
Competence
5t. Most of the time political parties make good public -2 -3 -2
policy decisions.
6t. Political parties are capable of solving the country’s -3 -2 -3 +2 -2
greatest socioeconomic problems.
7t. Political parties have been able to improve citizens’ -2 -2
social reality.
8t. Most of the time political parties make good decisions -2 -2
about electoral strategies.
5u. Most of the time political parties make bad public +2 +2 +2
policy decisions.
6u. Political parties are not capable of solving the country’s +3 +3 +2 +2
greatest socioeconomic problems.
7u. Political parties have not been able to improve citizens’ +3 +4
social reality.
8u. Most of the time political parties make electoral +3 +3 +3
strategies that do not reflect what citizens want.
Responsiveness
9t. Political parties place a lot of importance on -3 -2
the opinions of the average person.
10t. Political parties not only come around during election -4 -2
time. Afterwards, they stay in contact, too.
11t. Political parties strive for power to help the people, -3 -3 -2
not for their own benefit.
12t. Political parties deal with issues that interest me. -2 -3
9u. Political parties do not place much importance on +2
the opinions of the average person.
10u. Political parties come around during election time, but +4 +3
afterwards they lose contact.
11u. Political parties strive for power for their own benefit, +2
not to help the people.
12u. Political parties do not deal with issues that interest me. +2 +3 +2
Note: Differences between scores ≥ |1| are statistically significant at p < .01 or better.
1: Competence and Integrity; Factor 2: Responsiveness and Integrity; and Factor 3:
Integrity and Competence. Now I describe these rubrics in turn.
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Rubric 1: Competence & Integrity
The first rubric grades parties primarily on competence and integrity. Responsiveness
is less of a concern, especially in Santiago. The main competence criteria the cases
have in common relate to parties’ ability to solve socioeconomic issues (#7t, 7u) and
to their ability to improve citizens social reality (#7t, 7u). The integrity-based trust-
worthy item, “Political parties work for the common good” (#3t), scores –3 and –4 in
the Santiago and Buenos Aires samples, respectively, while the item’s untrustworthy
counterpart, “Political parties don’t work for the common good” (#3u), scores +3 in
both analyses. Other criteria matter more in one case than the other. Santiaguinos
place more emphasis party corruption (#1t, 1u) and Bonaerenses are more critical of
parties’ electoral strategies (#8t, 8u), supporting Mora y Araujo’s (1991) thesis that
Argentines disapprove of the closed-door, party-dominated nature of candidate selec-
tion. In general, responsiveness figures more prominently in the Buenos Aires rubric,
particularly judgements about whether parties place their own interests above citizen
interests (#11t, 11u) and address issues of interest to citizens (#12u).
The rubric can be seen in a complain from a 36-year old woman from Buenos
Aires’s upper-middle class Palermo: “the people are tired of the political class because
the don’t solve any problems and because of the constant stream of fraud.” Echoing
this, a 26-year old woman from the lower-middle class district of General San Mart´ın
says she distrusts parties because “there’s no work; they make a lot of promises but
they don’t keep them.” A man of 23 from San Joaqu´ın, a working-class municipality of
Santiago, claims “Parties’ solutions do not go to the bottom of citizens’ real problems.
That is, politics today tends to be theatrical, done for the media. They give patchy
solutions just to able to cut a ribbon [for the cameras].” Another man, age 54, from
Santiago’s middle-class La Florida has a more nuanced view that also matches a rubric
of trustworthiness based on party competence and integrity: “The majority of parties
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in today’s political elite don’t aspire to solve problems but rather to maintain the
status quo.” These articulations boost our confidence that some citizens judge party
trustworthiness primarily on standards embodied in this rubric.
Rubric 2: Responsiveness & Integrity
When citizens employ Rubric 2 to assess party trustworthiness, the most heavily
weighted criteria they examine concern party responsiveness and integrity. The un-
trustworthy item (#10u), “Political parties come around during election time, but
afterwards they lose contact” registers +4 and +3 in the Santiago and Buenos Aires
analyses, respectively, while the corresponding trustworthy item (#10t) scores –4 and
–2. Across these cases, the centrality of parties’ motivations for seeking power (to help
people or to help themselves) is also fairly salient (#11t, 11u). As the dimension sums
across Santiago and Buenos Aires (S+BA) in Table 3.3 show, integrity items matter
much less to the Santiaguinos while responsiveness items matter quite a bit less to
Bonaerenses.
An excerpt from a focus group with leaders of juntas de vecinos (neighborhood
groups) in Santiago’s lower-working class comuna of La Granja shows citizens wrestling
chiefly with party responsiveness and integrity and relegating competence to a more
minor role. Forty-four year-old “Pilar” judges parties on these grounds: “For example,
[political parties] need me to vote for them. I participate, but if one day I need them
for something they say, ‘I don’t remember you,’ or they say, ‘I’ll call you,’ and they
never call you.” At another stage of the focus group, the participants appear to combine
responsiveness and integrity into the term “commitment” (compromiso). Competence
matters in this rubric as well, but to a lesser degree than the other dimensions.
Paula (age 58): Yes, [political parties] are capable.
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Ine´z (age 42): They see the problems but they don’t solve the problems. And they
promise and promise. . .
Paula: Yeah, [but] they are capable.
Pilar : To me, they aren’t capable. Put it this way: when they’re running for election,
[and] you have to vote, they offer you the sun, the moon, and everything else. And
the moment they are elected they forget about all of it. . . they deliver nothing!
Facilitator : And do you think they fail to deliver because they lack the capacity or
something else?
Pilar : They lack something else.
Ine´z : I believe more that they lack commitment.
Pilar : No. No . . .
Ine´z : Yes! I think so. Yeah, because a person who says, ‘I’m going to do something,’
and doesn’t fulfill their word lacks commitment.
While fleshing out the entire trustworthiness rubric is impossible from this interchange,
the subjects are clearly engaging in the types of assessment the rubric dictates. “Norma”,
from Greater Buenos Aires’s lower-working class district Vicente Lo´pez, takes a dif-
ferent angle but also judges parties on responsiveness and integrity, de-emphasizing
competence:
I don’t believe in any party because they make promises when it’s most
convenient for them. The give you the 20 pesos and afterwards they do
what they want. I think some of them are competent, but there’s always
the intermediaries. There’s the competent one, but the intermediary does
whatever s/he wants. Maybe [the competent one] does want the country to
move forward, but those surrounding him are waiting to seize the opportu-
nity to grab something for their own benefit.
Indeed, Norma’s point of view of political parties is marked by the pervasive patronage
politics in the provincial districts that ring the capital. Each of these expressions
resonate with research on the shift from programmatic to pragmatic party-base linkages
in Argentina (Levitsky, 2003b) and Chile (Luna, 2006).
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Rubric 3: Integrity & Competence
The integrity-competence rubric is not simply an inversion of the emphasis on compe-
tence integrity in Rubric 1. The items with the most weight in this factor, #4u and
4t, highlight parties’ internal power struggles. Not only are these items the most dom-
inant in this rubric, but the underlying normalized (z) factor scores of these items are
between 10-30% greater than any others in the entire analysis. Distrust based on this
rubric reflects the view that internal party politics are a nasty business. Party trust
from this rubric and connotes a “warts-and-all” embrace of political parties. In both
cases this rubric is marked by criteria regarding parties’ ability to make sound public
policy and, in Buenos Aires, electoral strategies. Other weighty items include respon-
siveness to citizens interests in Santiago and most integrity items in Buenos Aires. By
counting the number of inconsistent items, which are not reported, Rubric 3 is the least
consistent of all the rubrics.
Again, the focus groups bear out the parameters of this rubric in citizens’ own
words. As a 40 year-old woman from working-class Vicente Lo´pez in Gran Buenos
Aires witnesses, personal experiences can destroy faith in the inner-workings of political
parties.
Corruption – yes! You know why I say this? Because I never got into politics
because it doesn’t interest me, because it’s a filthy mess (porquer´ıa). But
I just met a person from the San Mart´ın Party and she came by to talk
because she knew I had no job. Finally she says, ‘if you want, I will teach
you how to steal. Because politics is like that,’ she says. ‘You don’t have
to be honest or anything,’ she says. ‘If not, you’re never going to have
anything. Have you worked all your life?’ she asked. Yes it’s true I worked
all my life because they only gave me the grocery bonus for three months,
and never again. And she says, ‘and what do you have?’ I have nothing.
I don’t have a house because this one was lent to me, I’m tired of asking
everyone for things . . . she told me ‘[politics] is just that easy.’
One man (age 36, male, Central Santiago) provides an insider’s view of the Socialist
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Party,
Just because the party has a more fluid relationship with society it doesn’t
mean that it’s solved its ‘elite problem.’ The party is still an elitist, monar-
chical party, you get it? [A party] of nobles, say, where this guy was exiled
so he and his nephew get jobs, and the guy finds all that he needs and
finds it fast – right now – he’s got all the connections! . . . I wish they
would grant the possibility of meritocracy, that is, this isn’t meritocracy
but ‘connectionocracy’ (pitutocracia)!
A fellow Socialist male (age 26, Providencia) added, “In general, the political parties
are capable of solving the country’s biggest problems. The issue is how they go about
it; and the political calculus and the realpolitik makes them sincerely cruel, hardened,
let’s say, and they forget their principles.” These snapshots elucidate how some citizens
prioritize perceptions of how parties function internally when forming their judgements
of party trustworthiness.
3.2.3 Correlates of Rubric-Based Party Trust & Distrust
How many subjects actively trust or distrust parties? Not all, to be sure. Some might
simply be “skeptical” (Cook and Gronke, 2005) of parties, or lack fully formed opinions
about them. Others may actively trust or distrust parties according to rubrics orthog-
onal to the shared rubrics identified here. Factor loadings serve to distinguish active
trusters and active distrusters from other subjects. A significant positive factor loading
indicates a strong resemblance between the subject’s implicit rubric of party trustwor-
thiness (i.e. their Q-sort) and the shared rubric (i.e. the latent factor). Conversely, a
significant negative factor loading suggests that the subject’s Q-sort closely resembles
a “mirror image” of the shared rubric (Conover and Feldman, 1986, 103).
Figure 2 displays the distribution of factor loadings by rubric and sample. I iden-
tify “active distrusters” as those with factor loadings ≥ 0.4 and “active trusters” as
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those with factor loadings ≤ -0.4. All the “others” have insignificant loadings. We can
consider 16% of the Santiago participants active trusters according to the competence-
integrity rubric, i.e. they apply Rubric 1 and judge parties as worthy of their trust.
Only 7% of the Buenos Aires sample comes to the same conclusion. In fact, more
than one in three Bonaerenses who employ the competence-integrity rubric qualify as
active distrusters, compared to about one in four Santiaguinos. Roughly twice as many
subjects in the Buenos Aires sample actively distrust parties based on Rubric 2: Re-
sponsiveness and Integrity. And more Bonaerenses have active responsiveness-integrity
trust, though still a low percentage (3.7%). While few subjects derive active trust
or active distrust from the Rubric 3 (integrity-competence), their ranks are the most
equally distributed, separated by just 6.2 and 3.6 percentage points for the Santiago
and Buenos Aires analyses, respectively.
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Table 3.4: Tests of Association: Rubrics of Party Trustworthiness, Santiago
Rubric 1: Rubric 2: Rubric 3:
Competence Responsiveness Integrity
& Integrity & Integrity & Competence
Socioeconomic Status Pearson’s r
Education 0.08 0.03 -0.13
Income -0.30* -0.18 -0.30*
Age -0.18 -0.06 0.02
Gender T-Test
Women (n = 48) 0.141 0.204 0.138
Men (n = 33) 0.032 0.156 -0.037
t -1.17 -0.80 -2.36**
Socialization ANOVA
Post-Frei (n = 7) 0.134 0.213 0.111
Transition (n = 22) 0.198 0.111 0.024
Dictatorship (n = 26) 0.051 0.198 0.099
Pre-Coup (n = 22) 0.031 0.326 0.068
F 0.76 1.49 0.19
Party Identification ANOVA
Alianza por Chile
UDI (n = 4) -0.110 0.191 0.337
RN (n = 5) 0.107 0.112 -0.086
Concertacio´n
PDC (n = 9) 0.017 0.100 0.087
PPD (n = 7) -0.267 0.142 -0.359
PS (n = 11) 0.053 0.188 0.135
Extra-Parliamentary Left
JP (n = 11) 0.235 0.146 0.154
F 1.32 0.14 3.36*
Note: Data from self-administered questionnaire prior to Q-sort.
N = 81. *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05
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Why do citizens who grade parties with similar rubrics and come to such diverging
conclusions about party trustworthiness? A firm answer is beyond the scope of this
research design, but tests of association between participants’ Q-sort factor loadings
and responses to a pre-Q-sort questionnaire (see Tables 3.4 and 3.5) are suggestive.
Two of the three forms of distrust in parties are significantly related to low income
for the Santiaguinos. While we see no relationship between income and party trust
in the Buenos Aires sample, party distrust based on Responsiveness-Integrity (Rubric
2) is high among the educated. Women in the Santiago analysis derive distrust in
parties from the Integrity-Competence (Rubric 3). Their counterparts in Buenos Aires,
however, trust parties more than men when judging parties on Competence-Integrity
(Rubric 1) and Responsiveness-Integrity (Rubric 2). Political socialization may also
influence citizens’ beliefs about parties.10. Among the youngest cohorts Responsiveness-
Integrity (Rubric 2) distrust is highest in both samples. Yet participants from Santiago
socialized ahead of the 1973 coup d’etat hold even higher levels of Responsiveness-
Integrity distrust than youth cohorts, a finding in line with research on eroding party-
base linkages in the post-authoritarian era (Posner, 1999). It does not appear that party
loyalties are driving all our results. Yet, in line with previous research in Latin America
(Davis, Camp and Coleman, 2004), opposition partisans most ideological distant (in
Chile, UDI, in Argentina Propuesta Republicana) from the executive’s party (in Chile,
PS, in Argentina Partido Justicialista, FPV ) seem more receptive to allegations of
political corruption, i.e. a lack of integrity (Rubric 3). To be sure, these first-cut
analyses have very few degrees of freedom. Different brands of party trust and distrust
may covary with a range of characteristics and political attitudes, but more research
would increase our confidence.
10These are based on respondents’ eighteenth birthday. For Chile, I follow Carlin’s (2006) socializa-
tion cohorts. For Argentina, I create cohorts guided by Rock’s (1987) political history.
73
Table 3.5: Tests of Association: Rubrics of Party Trustworthiness, Buenos Aires
Rubric 1: Rubric 2: Rubric 3:
Competence Responsiveness Integrity
& Integrity & Integrity & Competence
Socioeconomic Status Pearson’s r
Education 0.12 0.19† -0.16
Income -0.08 0.16 -0.06
Age -0.18 -0.24* -0.14
Gender T-Test
Women (n = 50) 0.150 0.217 0.026
Men (n = 32) 0.290 0.344 0.055
t 1.62† 1.69* 0.34
Socialization ANOVA
Post-Menem (n = 23) 0.299 0.347 0.104
Transition (n = 36) 0.224 0.284 0.018
Proceso (n = 3) 0.106 0.078 0.200
Rev.Lib. → Isabelita (n = 18) 0.103 0.218 0.009
Pero´n (n = 2) -0.149 -0.272 -0.382
F 1.16 2.08† 0.99
Party Identification ANOVA
Propuesta Republicana
RECREAR, CPC (n = 5) 0.608 0.436 0.250
Unio´n Cı´vica Radical
UCR (n = 1) -0.325 -0.220 -0.699
Partido Justicialista
PJ, FPV (n = 5) 0.306 0.198 0.028
Center-Left
ARI, PSD (n = 5) 0.156 0.240 -0.162
Far Left
PS, PO, PH, MAS, 0.319 0.084 -0.092
MST (n = 8) . .
F 1.31 1.24 2.35†
Note: Data from self-administered questionnaire prior to Q-sort.
N = 82. *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, †p < .10
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Party Trust, Trustworthiness & Political Action
This study is guided by assumption that the democratic consequences of low party
trust in Latin America depend on our conceptualizations of trust and distrust, citi-
zens’ evaluations of party trustworthiness, and how party trust and distrust influence
political behavior. I start by offering a theoretically-grounded conceptualizations of
party trust/distrust and party trustworthiness. Then I rely on Q-sorts to reveal shared
rubrics of party trustworthiness and confirm that the GSS question distorts active dis-
trust. Now I demonstrate the utility of a tripartite conceptualization of party trust for
understanding elite-challenging political action in Latin America, behavior that shores
up accountability and democratic quality.
Political distrust may enrich or endanger the prospects for democracy depending
on whether it translates into political participation and how this citizen behavior is
channelled into institutional change (Norris, 1999a). Thus, distrusting or “critical”
citizens may be “less a threat to, than a force for, reform and improvement of de-
mocratic processes and structures as the third wave continues to flow” (Klingemann,
1999, 32). Research across new democracies (Catterberg, 2003) and both new and es-
tablished democracies (Norris, 1999a) supports the link between low political trust and
elite-challenging political action. Yet, as I have shown, the GSS-style questions these
studies rely on obscure the evaluations and judgements that drive such participation
and misrepresent the depth of active distrust in Latin America. To test the claim that
distrust in representative institutions leads to political action in Latin American we
must examine how citizens judge political parties trustworthiness in terms of integrity,
competence, and responsiveness.
To form my hypotheses, I work backwards from arguments connecting democratic
quality and consolidation to political trust and participation. Hagopian argues that pre-
serving and deepening democracy requires vibrant parties and citizens who can hold
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them accountable through well-functioning institutions rather than supporting antisys-
tem leaders: “[w]hether or not governments perform well, citizens must perceive that
their elected leaders are governing in a clean, transparent, and effective way, and above
all, that their voices are being heard . . . [W]here parties are responsive and accountable
to the preferences of citizens that can associate in civil and political society, democracy
is somewhat inoculated from setbacks.” (2005, 321). Hagopian (2005, 337) claims that
a “dangerous side effect” associated with a loss of confidence in representative insti-
tutions is it reduces political mobilization and the levels of demands citizens make on
government. Filtered through my tripartite conceptualization of party trust, we might
expect the most participatory citizens to be party trusters who deem parties to have
integrity, competence, and responsiveness. But to understand the role of integrity we
must contextualize trust and distrust within a larger institutional context. As Cleary
and Stokes’s Cleary and Stokes (2006) argue compellingly, in much of Latin America
third-party mechanisms of accountability do not exist or function properly. Without
the institutional means to enforce the trust relationship, trust rooted in the belief that
personal qualities like integrity and honesty will induce political actors to act in citizens’
interests is na¨ıve. Moreover, it is associated with clientelism and personalistic politics,
not accountability-extracting participation, and, thus, poor democratic quality.
Therefore, my hypotheses vary across the dimensions of party trustworthiness. The
first hypothesis, derived from Cleary and Stokes (2006) is that citizens who judge po-
litical parties as lacking in integrity are more likely to participate in elite-challenging
activities than citizens who believe parties have integrity. The next two hypotheses,
based on Hagopian (2005), are that citizens who judge parties as competent and re-
sponsive are more likely to participate in elite-challenging activities than citizens who
judge parties and incompetent and unresponsive. In summary, the most active partici-
pants in elite-challenging political actions are those who are not na¨ıve enough to think
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parties will take their interests to heart in the absence of institutional enforcement
mechanisms, but who believe parties will at least listen to their demands and have the
capacity to meet them.
3.2.4 Data & Methods
I operationalize the three dimensions of party trustworthiness and compare their ability
to predict elite-challenging political actions in Latin America to the omnibus GSS party
trust measure. This should illuminate how party trust and distrust affect political
participation and, thereby, democratic quality. Elections offer one way to hold parties
accountable, but in Latin America their efficacy and equality are blurred by clientelism
and falling participation. Thus, elite-challenging political actions – such as petitioning,
boycotting, attending lawful demonstrations, joining unofficial strikes, and occupying
buildings or factories – are vital to expressing citizen demands for accountability and
preferences for institutional reforms that can deepen democracy (Norris, 1999a).
To operationalize and test of my tripartite conceptualization of party trust/distrust
in Latin America, I employ the 2004 LB survey data set. Using two survey questions,
I create three independent variables that tap the party trustworthiness dimensions
described above. Admittedly, these measures are imperfect, for they do not permit a
full replication of citizens’ party trustworthiness rubrics. But they act as decent proxies
for citizen assessments of party trustworthiness.
The first measure taps (P33) party integrity: “Which of the following factors, if any,
are the most important in determining how much trust you have in public institutions?
Name up to three. (h) If they keep their promises.” Although this question does not
mention political parties explicitly, the question regarding political parties that I use
to measure party competence and party responsiveness (P31) falls two questions prior.
And arguably, political parties give their word, e.g. campaign platforms and slogans,
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pledges by their legislators and executives, and public commitments tendered by party
presidents, at least as often and as publicly as any other institution. To better ensure
that we tap perceptions of political parties, the models include a common trust in formal
regime institutions (congress, the presidency, the bureaucracy, and the judiciary) scale
for control.
I gauge perceived party competence and responsiveness by combining responses to
the following question (P31): “Political parties fulfill a series of functions in a democ-
racy. Thinking of these or of the parties you have voted for in the last elections, which of
the following things have these parties done in (country)? (a) propose the best solutions
to problems, (b) interpret what the people want, (c) defend my interests, (d) recruit
the best candidates for elections, (e) listen to what I need to say (f), none of these.”
Several of these responses figure prominently in the trustworthiness rubrics revealed in
the Q analysis. I sum positive responses to (a) and (d) into a party competence scale
(range 0-2, mean Argentina = 0.54, mean Chile = 0.41, mean Latin America = 0.59).
For party responsiveness, I sum positive responses to (b), (c), and (e) (range 0-3, mean
Argentina = 0.32, mean Chile = 0.51, mean Latin America = 0.51).
The dependent variable is the political action scale (Barnes, Kaase and et al., 1979)
fashioned by summing respondents’ positive responses to having ever “signed a peti-
tion”, “taken part in a public demonstration”, “stopped buying a particular product
for ethical, environmental or political reasons”, and “participated in illegal protests”
into a five-point scale (0-4). This measure is the focus of a many studies of political
culture, citizen participation, and the quality and stability of democracy (Norris, 1999a;
Catterberg, 2003; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005).
Following previous models (Norris, 1999a; Catterberg, 2003), the models below con-
trol for cultural, psychological, and resource-oriented predictors of political participa-
tion. Key cultural controls I controls include what Inglehart and Welzel (2005) label
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“overt” and “intrinsic” support for democracy. The overt measure is Churchillian
democratic support, and asks respondents their agreement with following statement:
“Democracy may have problems, but it is still the best form of government”; responses
range from totally disagree (0) to fully agree (3). To tap intrinsic support for democ-
racy, I use four measures that closely match Inglehart and Welzel’s (2005) proxies: life
satisfaction, interpersonal trust, preferences for living in a society free society over an
orderly one, and support for public discussion of political matters. Finally, I include
a series of socioeconomic and psychological controls linked to the resource theory of
political participation (Verba, Schlozman and Brady, 1995): education, employment
status, age, gender, marital status, political interest, and self-identification with the
Left-Right ideological spectrum.
Like all measures, these measures have drawbacks and advantages. Nonetheless,
the wide coverage of the LB surveys allows a general, if rough, test of the utility of my
three-dimensional conceptualization of party trust for understanding elite-challenging
activism. Since the political action scale is an ordinal dependent variable, I estimate
ordered logistic regressions. Table 3.6 presents two sets of models of political action
in Chile, Argentina, and the rest of Latin America.11 The first set includes a GSS-
style party trust measure ranging from “no” trust in parties (0) to “a lot” (3) of
trust in parties. The second set substitutes my proposed three dimensions of party
trustworthiness. To maximize observations for the Argentina and Chile models, missing
values are imputed12
11Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
12The imputation model creates 5 multiple imputed datasets using the chained equations techniques
(Royston, 2005). Equations contain each of the measures in regression analyses (see below), though
ideology was broken into Left, Right, Center, and No Identification. Assuming the data are missing at
random (MAR), which should hold here (King et al., 2001), missing data for each variable is imputed
with with the appropriate regression model (i.e. OLS for interval variables, logit for binary variables,
multinomial logit for categorical variables, and ordered logit for ordinal variables). Since the normality
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3.2.5 Results
The results largely support my claims that understanding the linkages between trust in
representative institutions, political participation, and democratic quality hinges on a
more fine-grained conceptualization of party trust and distrust. As predicted, based on
previous literature, the performance of the three dimensions of party trustworthiness
is not uniform. The cases of Argentina and Chile show that not all of these dimensions
function consistently. In Argentina, the integrity and responsiveness hypotheses cannot
be rejected, but political action is independent from one’s perception of party compe-
tence. In Chile, while perceived party competence and responsiveness drive political
action, assessments of party integrity are not consistently related. So while the Q-sorts
showed that integrity and competence contribute to party trust and distrust in Chile
and Argentina, their influence on political action is quite different in these cases. For
the rest of region, on average, citizens who view parties as lacking in integrity other-
wise competence and responsive the most likely to engage in elite-challenging political
action. A common thread across the analyses is that citizens who feel parties pay
attention to their demands participate more routinely.
The second set of models indicates that, overall, the GSS party trust measure is a
poor predictor of political action in models with the exact same specifications. Even
after adjusting for the extra parameters, the models with three dimensions of party
trustworthiness indicators fit the data slightly better than those with the GSS party
trust measure, according to a McFadden’s pseudo-R2 (Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985).
Thus, the three dimensions of party trustworthiness outperform the GSS party trust
measure for predicting elite-challenging political action. These findings are consistent
assumption on the posterior distribution of non-continuous regression coefficients may not be valid, I
rely on bootstrapping techniques that relax the normality assumption and produce robust estimates
for non-continuous variables (Li, Raghunathan and Rubin, 1991).
80
Table 3.6: Party Trust, Party Trustworthiness and Political Action, 2004
Argentina Chile Rest of Latin America
β β β β β β
(s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.)†
Trust in Parties (GSS) -.084 .020 .037
(.095) (.098) (.041)
Trustworthy: Integrity -.429* .366 -.369**
(.261) (.311) (.131)
Trustworthy: Competence .116 .367*** .119*
(.105) (.095) (.051)
Trustworthy: Responsiveness .254** .196** .196***
(.100) (.080) (.042)
Trust in Regime Institutions .013 -.013 -.052 -.065** .007 .005
(.026) (.024) (.032) (.028) (.010) (.012)
Support for Democracy .193* .227** .090 .070 .064 .062
(.095) (.095) (.097) (.098) (.086) (.084)
Freedom > Order .185 .173 -.135 -.165 .070 .079
(.126) (.126) (.130) (.131) (.084) (.083)
Life Satisfaction -.030 -.051 -.081 -.064 -.033 -.041
(.075) (.076) (.083) (.084) (.035) (.036)
Public Discussion Good .149 .152 .345* .374** -.014 -.015
(.138) (.139) (.150) (.151) (.084) (.084)
Interpersonal Trust .440** .461** .484*** .482*** .266* .254*
(.156) (.156) (.153) (.154) (.122) (.118)
Political Interest .345*** .318*** .408*** .364*** .249*** .240***
(.065) (.064) (.077) (.078) (.029) (.030)
Ideological Identification .304* .283 .535*** .414** .216* .163
(.185) (.185) (.164) (.166) (.130) (.128)
Education .123*** .125*** .102*** .101*** .075*** .077***
(.021) (.021) (.021) (.021) (.010) (.009)
Employed .462*** .439*** -.056 -.056 .216*** .215***
(.132) (.131) (.132) (.132) (.053) (.052)
Woman .133 .108 -.048 -.046 -.195*** -.195***
(.128) (.128) (.130) (.131) (.053) (.057)
Age .011** .011** .003 .001 .010*** .010***
(.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.001) (.001)
Married .210* .232* .030 .034 -.034 -.036
(.126) (.127) (.128) (.128) (.050) (.047)
Cutpoint 1 3.61*** 3.63*** 2.53*** 2.55*** 2.43*** 2.53***
(.429) (.434) (.419) (.424) (.563) (.560)
Cutpoint 2 5.36*** 5.39*** 3.94*** 4.00*** 3.82*** 3.93***
(.448) (.453) (.429) (.434) (.546) (.541)
Cutpoint 3 6.58*** 6.63*** 5.23*** 5.23*** 4.99*** 5.10***
(.466) (.471) (.444) (.450) (.557) (.561)
Cutpoint 4 8.04*** 8.09*** 6.54*** 6.60*** 6.52*** 6.63***
(.515) (.520) (.489) (.494) (.526) (.530)
Log-likelihood -1162.26 -1156.88 -1186.68 -1173.05 -11945.06 -11935.72
Adj. Pseudo-R2McF .054 .056 .044 .054 .028 0.032
N 1200 1200 1200 1200 12300 12345
Note: Surveys are population-weighted.
†Robust, cluster-corrected standard errors.
*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05 (one-tailed test)
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with the main contentions of this study.
3.3 Conclusion
This study conceptualizes, measures, and tests the implications of political party trust,
distrust, and trustworthiness. My theoretical conceptualization grounds party trust and
distrust in perceived trustworthiness. Locating the domain of trust as political represen-
tation implies three logical dimensions of party trustworthiness: integrity, competence,
and responsiveness. Q-sorts analyses, supported by focus groups, reveal three latent
rubrics of party trustworthiness – integrity and competence, responsiveness and in-
tegrity, and political process – among 81 subjects from Santiago, Chile and 82 subjects
from Buenos Aires, Argentina. The rubrics highlight distinct priorities and criteria
upon which citizens base their trust and distrust in parties. Models political action
show that the three party trustworthiness dimensions outperform the GSS measure of
party trust. The GSS measure performs poorly because it obscures the dimensionality
of trust and ignores active distrust. Consequently, a tripartite conceptualization is not
only a conceptual improvement over the GSS measure, but also a better way to gauge
the influence of citizen evaluations of political parties on the process of democratization
in Latin America.
The study answers the recent scholarly call to specify the domain of trust (Cleary
and Stokes, 2006; Levi and Stoker, 2000). I name political representation as the do-
main of trust which suggests, in a somewhat functionalist manner, three dimensions of
trustworthiness. One could imagine a different domain of trust in parties, say for the
delivery of patronage and particularist benefits, as Stokes (2005) does implicitly. As
Levi and Stoker (2000) urge, specifying the domain could lend theoretical and empirical
clarity to measures of trust in other institutions and actors, e.g. trust in the president
in the domain of Commander in Chief, or the executive branch in the domain of policy
82
and legislation implementation.
Conceiving of trust/distrust in parties in terms of party trustworthiness opens a
wide range of empirical questions. As independent variables, scholars may further
explore the behavioral and attitudinal consequences of citizen perceptions of party
trustworthiness. Particularly, it can provide a clearer profile of Latin America’s “critical
citizens” and how their patterns of political behavior influence democracy in the region.
As dependent variables, party trustworthiness may signal the cultural conditions of
party-system evolution and/or collapse in Latin America. In both instances, over-time
and cross-national studies may be particularly rewarding.
Q-sorts analyses helped illuminate the previously unknown rubrics of party trust-
worthiness i.e. rationales for party trust and distrust. Considering the vast dissimi-
larities between Chile and Argentina vis-a`-vis the party system, historical modes of
representation, and party/coalition survival, just to name a few arenas, the results of
the Q analysis are surprisingly similar. Therefore, the three rubrics of party trustwor-
thiness may in fact generalize beyond these two capitals, and this could be a fruitful
trajectory for future investigation.
Regression analyses suggest the effects of perceived party trustworthiness on polit-
ical action vary across the dimensions and cross-nationally. My survey-based opera-
tionalization of three-dimensional party trustworthiness is crude. Nevertheless it out-
performs the widely-cited GSS-style measure of trust in political parties when it comes
to understanding elite-challenging political action. If future surveys include more items
tapping party trustworthiness, a hierarchical cluster analysis could give us a better
sense of (1) how well the rubrics of trustworthiness found in the Q-analysis hold in the
general population(s), (2) whether other rubrics also exist, and (3) how pervasive these
rubrics are throughout the country/region. Therefore, the incorporation of more indi-
cators of the dimensions of political party trustworthiness into public opinion surveys
83
would facilitate more explicit investigations of the consequences of trust in parties for
political accountability and institutional reform.
In conclusion, this study offers a conceptualization of trust and distrust in parties
that maps onto citizen criteria for trusting parties as expressed in Q-sorts and surveys.
Beyond its conceptual contributions, casting party trust and distrust as perceived party
trustworthiness helps understand why citizens take political action. Democratic theory
suggests political institutions would could eventually adapt to citizen demands, though
this remains an empirical question. Overall, this research advances our understanding of
the roles of party trust and distrust in democracy’s unclear trajectory in Latin America
and, perhaps, elsewhere.
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Chapter 4
Sorting Out Democratic Support in
Chile and Argentina: An
Anthro-pological-Behavioral
Approach
If democracy depends on a democratic citizenry (Lipset 1959, 1981; Almond & Verba
1963, 1980; Easton 1965, 1975; Muller & Seligson:1994, Linz & Stepan 1996, Diamond
1999, Norris 1999b, Seligson 2001, Inglehart & Welzel 2005), the modest public support
for democracy, non-trivial levels of support for authoritarianism, and broad support for
populist governance in new Latin American democracies (Payne, Zovatto and Dı´az,
2007; Seligson, 2007; UNDP, 2004; Inglehart et al., 2004) would appear ominous. But
scholars have not jumped to conclusions. One reason is that citizens’ conceptions of
democracy vary so widely (Carrio´n, forthcoming; Baviskar and Malone, 2004; Moreno,
2001) that responses to survey items containing the word “democracy” defy easy inter-
pretation. Another is that scholars disagree on how to interpret citizens who claim to
prefer democracy but also hold values in conflict with democratic principles (UNDP,
2004). Is this dissonance merely an expression of social desirability (Inglehart, 2003), or
part of a coherent mixed belief system (Schedler and Sarsfield, 2007)? Lastly, aggregate
levels of democratic support do not correlate with indicators of democratic stability and
quality in Latin America (Hagopian, 2005). Crafting valid measures of democratic sup-
port, then, is central to a more comprehensive understanding of its implications for
democracy.
Where shall we start? Scholars have presented several ways to make survey-based
measures of democratic support more meaningful (Carrio´n, forthcoming; Schedler and
Sarsfield, 2007; Seligson, 2005; Inglehart, 2003).1 But surveys remain the default
method. Given the high costs of surveys, the lack of consensus on “best practice”,
and access to non-survey techniques, this is a surprising default position. It may reflect
a widening gap between “anthropological” and “behavioral” approaches to political cul-
ture (Coppedge, N.d.). I argue that bridging this gap could ultimately improve survey
measures of democratic support.
Because these two schools of thought hold distinct conceptions of political culture,
they rely on distinct methods of inference. As Coppedge explains, the anthropological
approach sees political culture as a rather static set of routinized and unquestioned
attitudes and behaviors. Hence understanding political culture implies verstehen, or an
inductive interpretation based on a deep, intimate knowledge of the target culture. For
example, Wiarda (2004) claims Latin American culture is permeated by the hierarchical
organization and teachings of the Catholic Church and thus inimical to democracy.
Critics object that this approach cannot explain change (see Eckstein 1988); they reject
the presumption of cultural homogeneity that ignores sub-groups (Knight, 2001); and
they resist placing faith in “experts” whose results are difficult to replicate (Coppedge,
1See also papers presented at Candidate Indicators for the UNDP Democracy Support Index (DSI),
Center for the Americas at Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN, May 5-6, 2006, http://sitemason.
vanderbilt.edu/lapop/LAPOPUNDPWorkshop.
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N.d.).
By contrast, the behavioral approach views culture as the aggregation of individual
attitudes and (often) behaviors whose existence, stability, coherence, and distribution
are not assumed but rather tested objectively, typically via surveys or experiments. For
example, Almond and Verba (1963) draw inferences about political culture from survey
items designed to tap pre-defined orientations to pre-defined political objects. They
use this data to create typologies of culture. Some scholars are dubious: “Almond and
Verba may have misinterpreted the beliefs people hold by not accurately categorizing
their beliefs of by missing other orientations altogether” (Theiss-Morse, 1993, 357).
Indeed the behavioral approach forces a tradeoff between objectivity and precision. In
surveys and experiments “the concreteness of the response is bypassed in favor of the
‘objective’ meaning of the scale. The individual’s independent point of view, in effect,
is considered to be dependent on the prior meaning of the scale” (Brown, 1980, 4). In
the context of this study, a high score on a democratic support item or index would
qualify the respondent as supportive of democracy, “in the same sense, presumably,
that he has a temperature or a headache” (Brown, 1980, 2).
Is there any feasible way to marry the anthropological approach’s rich, holistic
understanding of culture with the behavioral approach’s more reliable measurement
techniques to produce a more valid survey-based measure of democratic support? I
believe so. My central claim is that support for or rejection of “democracy” must
be understood within a larger profile of orientations to democracy and its core compo-
nents. After positing a working conceptualization of a “democrat,” I propose to measure
“multidimensional profiles of democratic support” that incorporate three types of ori-
entations to democracy and three distinct objects of support. Enlisting the help of over
130 participants in Santiago, Chile and 120 participants in Buenos Aires, Argentina,
I demonstrate how Q-sort methodology can incorporate data from interviews, focus
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groups, and surveys into seven profiles of democratic support. My support profiles
analysis informs survey-based measures of democratic support on two scores. First, it
tells us which orientations to democracy and democratic freedoms cohere into system-
atic support profiles and the relative weight of these orientations. Second, it indicates
survey items that best tap orientations that distinguish one support profile from an-
other as well as orientations held in consensus by all profiles. By taking seriously Juan
Linz’s remark, as paraphrased by Coppedge, that “[a] well-designed survey implements
verstehen: it anticipates all the likely answers and offers respondents choices that they
can agree with whole-heartedly” (N.d., 5), democratic support profiles can guide future
survey measures of democratic support and, ultimately, help understand its influence
on democracy.
4.1 Profiles of Democratic Support
Let me begin by defining some key terms and connecting them to my measurement
approach and theoretical framework. By democracy I mean a political system with
procedures in place to foster open contestation, public participation, and government
responsiveness (Dahl, 1971, 1-9). A multidimensional support profile is a set of orien-
tations to three classes of objects implied by procedural democracy. Object in the first
class pertain to the regime itself - democracy and its authoritarian alternatives. Objects
in the next two classes of objects refer to the essential political rights and procedures
(voting, running for office, free and fair elections) and the civil liberties (expression,
association, alternative sources of information) that undergird procedural democracy.
Thus profiles of support for democracy consist of general orientations and inclinations
to democracy as a regime and the core principles, norms, and procedures that embody
the democratic procedural minimum. Two people with the same democratic support
profile hold very similar orientations to democracy.
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Liberal – Committed – Unconditional
Illiberal
Conditional
Uncommitted
(2)
(1)
(3)
Figure 4.1: Dimensions of Support for Democracy
Which orientations matter? A profile of support for democracy includes orienta-
tions to the objects mentioned above that fall along three continua (see Figure 4.1):
(1) liberal ↔ illiberal, (2) unconditional ↔ conditional, and (3) committed ↔ uncom-
mitted. Whereas a liberal orientation suggests a firm preference for democracy or its
concomitant rights and liberties, illiberal orientations reject them outright. Indelible or
unconditional orientations contrast with support for procedural democracy only under
certain conditions. Committed orientations to a democratic regime and its principles
are the antitheses of indifferent or uncommitted stances on them. Thus, orientations
to any of the objects associated with procedural democracy that can be located in the
three-dimensional space depicted in Figure 4.1 pertain to a profile of democratic sup-
port; orientations outside this space are not considered part of the profile of democratic
support.
As an illustration, recall Linz’s (1978) argument that on the eve of democratic
breakdown elites and citizens are either loyal, semi-loyal, or disloyal to the regime.
View through the lens of my conceptualization, the object of support in question is
the democratic regime. Loyalists hold liberal (not illiberal) orientations to democratic
governance. Insofar as they resist the conditions that brought the regime to the brink
89
of collapse, loyalists’ orientations prove unconditional. The position of the disloyalists
is clearly conditional. Finally, the loyalists are committed to the democratic regime
though their semi-loyalist counterparts are not, which, as Linz argues, makes semi-
loyalists susceptible to disloyalists bent on altering the status quo. Profiles of support
for democracy do not stop with the “regime” object. Rather they encompass lib-
eral/illiberal, unconditional/conditional, and committed/uncommitted orientations to
the full range of objects associated with procedural democracy.
This conceptualization of profiles of democrat support implies that an ideal-type
“democrat” is a citizen who exhibits liberal, unconditional, and committed orientations
not only to democracy in the abstract, but also to its essential political rights and pro-
cedures and civil liberties. An ideal-type “non-democrat” living in a non-authoritarian
context espouses illiberal, conditional, and uncommitted orientations to democracy and
its concomitant rights and freedoms. Ambivalent support profiles feature a mix of ori-
entations to democratic governance and political and civil freedoms. Multidimensional
support profiles grounded a prior in a procedural definition of democracy not only
sharpen our definitions of a “democrat,” “non-democrat,” and an “ambivalent”. They
also neutralize thorny validity and conceptual issues facing extant measures of support
for democracy that employ the word democracy, the so-called “d-word”.2
The Achilles heel of “d-word” survey questions is that citizens define democracy
in their own contested, vacuous, or pejorative way. An innovative qualitative research
design can measure how democracy is performing relative to citizens’ conceptions of
democracy and distinguish patterns of democratic legitimization (Powers, 2001). Repli-
cating this rich understanding via surveys is onerous. Analysts ask open-ended survey
2See Carrio´n (forthcoming), Schedler and Sarsfield (2007), (UNDP 2004), and papers presented
at Candidate Indicators for the UNDP Democracy Support Index (DSI), Center for the Americas at
Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN, May 5-6, 2006 (http://sitemason.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/
LAPOPUNDPWorkshop).
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questions about what democracy means. Convergence on the definitions increases our
confidence to the comparability of “d-word” questions, but coming to this conclusion
requires boiling the responses down to a few core categories. Close-ended questions
economize this task by offering respondents a menu of definitions. However, the ease
of choosing from a menu of close-ended response may artificially shrink the ranks of
respondents with vacuous support for democracy, i.e. claiming to prefer democracy
without being able to characterize or conceive of democracy in concrete terms. Such
“non-attitudes” (Converse, 1964) are common where few citizens are politically so-
cialized under democracy (Mishler and Rose, 2001; Bratton, 2002; Miller, Hesli and
Reisinger, 1997). Thus, Coppedge urges scholars to “define our concepts on our own
terms and design questions that ask respondents about their support for our version
of democracy” (N.d., 32).
Taking this cue, I begin with a liberal-rights definition of democracy. Then I define
a “democrat” as a citizen with a support profile dominated by liberal, unconditional,
and committed orientations to democratic governance, political rights and procedures,
and civil liberties. Citizens whose support profiles do not meet this benchmark are
not, by this definition, democrats. Grounding measures of democratic support in an a
priori definition constitutes an advance over extant measures. Theoretically, however,
one could select a republican, direct, social, deliberative, or communitarian definition
of democracy. In this case, the objects, orientations, and ideal-type “democrat” would
fit the preferred conceptualization. Such studies would look very different indeed and
provide distinct sets of implications.
Others may prefer a maximal definition that includes aspects of the rule of law
(broadly construed) or social rights. But a liberal-rights based definition is preferable
because it clearly delineates the “procedures that make democracy possible” (Schmit-
ter and Karl, 1991) from the institutions and inputs and outputs that vary across
91
democratic systems. Gauging support for social democracy would force us to consider
not only citizens’ preferences for redistribution and welfare but also the frequency and
manner in which they voice these preferences. Turning these preferences into policy
is predicated on citizens and elites deepening their participation in and pursuing so-
cial rights through formal democratic procedures (Huber, Rueschemeyer and Stephens,
1997; O’Donnell, 2001; UNDP, 2004). So without a baseline of democratic procedures,
these preferences and actions have a diminished impact on policy outputs. Since the
spread of baseline democratic procedures in Latin America has been uneven and non-
linear (Hagopian, 2005; Altman and Pe´rez-Lin˜a´n, 2002; Diamond, 1999), procedural
democracy is seen as a necessary but insufficient condition for more profound forms of
democracy. Testing whether the consolidation of procedural democracy owes to mass
democratic support requires, at a minimum, that measures at both levels tap the same
construct.
Depending on how one defines the rule of law gauging support for it may shift the
focus from democracy as a regime of governance to institutional and political variation
across regimes. On one hand support for the rule of law, as it regards to procedural
minimal conditions (e.g. free and fair elections), is implicit in my conceptualization of
support for procedural democracy. On the other hand, denunciations of (or allowance
for) official breaches of the rule of law that are unrelated to procedural minimal condi-
tions (e.g. preferential treatment in the awarding of government contracts) are treated
as separate. Ridding such actions from the polity are likely to require not only proce-
dural minimal conditions but also a variety of institutions whose strength and functions
tend to vary across democratic regimes. Therefore one would need to account for pref-
erences for, beliefs about, and affect towards institutional arrangements. This would
blur the theoretical distinction between regime principles and regime institutions as
objects of political support (Norris, 1999b; Easton, 1975).
92
Another conceptual problem that bedevils “d-word” measures is that conflicting
and contradictory orientations to democracy. As many as 30-60% of Latin Americans
who say they prefer “democracy” would also endorse coups d’etat under various cir-
cumstances; would support the president acting above the law, restoring order by force,
and controlling the media; and see parties and congress as dispensable (UNDP, 2004).
To weed out these “questionnaire democrats” (Dalton, 1994) who “pay lip-service to
democracy” (Inglehart, 2003), scholars either approximate democratic support with
items tapping support for democratic rights and norms (e.g. Gibson, Duch and Tedin
1992), or de-link support for democratic governance from rights and norms (e.g. Ingle-
hart 2003). But these tacks ignore theoretically relevant ambivalent support profiles
that potentially lie below the surface. Some citizens might support a regime that has
taken up the banner of “democracy” but regularly curbs free contestation and participa-
tion. Others simply embrace concrete rights and liberties more strongly than abstract
notions of “democracy”. Carnaghan’s (2007) novel coding of in-depth interviews finds
mixed democratic support in Russia, but this quantification obscures the exact orienta-
tions are in conflict with liberal democracy. By displaying orientations that include the
“d-word” in an array of orientations to political and civil freedoms, multidimensional
democratic support profiles clarify ambivalent orientations and detect coherent belief
systems that other approaches might have dismissed as social desirability.
Extant measurement approaches often distort the theoretical linkage between con-
ditional and unconditional orientations to democracy. Conditional orientations reflect
instrumental rationality – support for democracy as a means to an end. Uncondi-
tional orientations demonstrate an intrinsic rationality – support for democracy for
democracy’s sake (Bratton and Mattes, 2001; Sarsfield and Echegaray, 2006). Legiti-
macy theorists argue that instrumental (conditional) orientations to democracy become
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intrinsic (unconditional) orientations to the extent the current democratic regime out-
performs the preceding authoritarian regime in terms of economic and political stability
(Lipset 1959, 1981; Easton 1965, 1975, Mishler & Rose 2001, Bratton & Mattes 2001).
Qualitative research on new democracies suggests unconditional orientations to demo-
cratic norms, procedures, rights, civil liberties may develop piecemeal and at varying
rates (Carnaghan, 2007; Powers, 2001). Measuring support for democracy requires an
instrument that captures orientations to democratic governance and political and civil
freedoms at distinct points along the unconditional-conditional spectrum. Multidimen-
sional profiles of democratic support can be designed for this purpose.
In sum, the lack of convincing measures of democratic support hinders the construc-
tion of testable theories connecting mass support for democracy with democratic sta-
bility and quality. I propose multidimensional profiles of democratic support grounded
in an a priori definition of a democrat based on liberal, unconditional, and committed
orientations to procedural democracy (Dahl, 1971). Any citizen’s support profile can
be judged against this standard. Conceiving of democratic support as a multidimen-
sional profile neutralizes some of the trickiest validity problems facing extant measures.
Incorporating conditionality accounts for the distinct rationalities underpinning demo-
cratic support. Finally, this conceptualization underscores the need of a measurement
technique that can reveal the number and nature of multidimensional democratic sup-
port profiles. The next section describes my multi-method research design that seeks
to improve survey measures with a comparative anthropological-behavioral study of
democratic support.
4.2 Data & Methods
Measuring democratic support via multidimensional profiles obliges us to employ mea-
surement instruments and techniques equipped to handle data on multiple dimensions.
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I detect profiles of democratic support in Chile and Argentina by combining inputs from
surveys, focus groups, and interviews into a comparative Q-methods research design.
Q methodology was developed by physicist-psychologist William Stephenson (1953)
to understand subjective orientations, attitudes, and perspectives from the point of
view of the subjects, as opposed to the researcher. The goal of Q methodology is to
identify systematic perspectives shared by the subjects being observed (Brown, 1980;
McKeown and Thomas, 1988). For instance, Drzyek and Holmes (2002) examine de-
mocratic discourses in post-Communist societies and link them to four distinct paths
to democratization. Theiss-Morse (1993) connects distinct conceptions of citizenship
to diverging modes of political participation in the United States. Zechmeister (2006)
shows that different connotations of Left-Right ideological labels reflect political sophis-
tication and respond to elite packaging in Argentina and Mexico. Thus Q-methods help
merge the deductive-objective “behavioralism” and the inductive-interpretive rationale
of the “anthropological” approach into measures of democratic support.
How does Q methodology work? It all starts with a Q-sort: a participant physically
rank-orders a set of statements about a concept written on small cards along a spectrum,
conventionally from agree to disagree. A finished Q-sort represents a free construction
of the Q-sorter’s subjective perspective on a concept and is, thus, more akin to an in-
depth interview than an opinion survey (Brown, 1980). Multiple Q-sorts are compiled
and factor-analyzed to identify latent constructs upon which participants, not variables,
load. This factor analysis is often called “inverted” because a Q-sorts data set is the
inverse of a survey data set. For a survey data set that places items in columns and
subjects in rows, confirmatory factor analysis shows which items tap a latent variable.
Q data sets, however, place subjects in columns and items in rows. The factor analysis,
now “inverted” and exploratory, determines which subjects tap a latent variable or
“shared conception.” The letter q is meant to distinguish these “person correlations”
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from Pearson’s r -based “trait correlations.”
How can Q-methods detect multidimensional democratic support profiles? Partici-
pants from Santiago and Buenos Aires express their support for democracy in Q-sorts.
Inverted factor analyses of the Q-sorts for both cases reveal the latent profiles of de-
mocratic support shared among the participants. A participant adheres to a shared
support profile to the extent that her own Q-sort resembles it, as measured by her Q-
sort’s factor loadings. Analyzing the factor scores associated with the sorted statements
highlight the orientations that carry the most relative weight within a given profile, are
unique to a given profile, and for which there is virtual consensus across all profiles.
Considering the radically different experiences with democracy and authoritarianism in
Chile and Argentina, any common findings may generalize beyond these cases. Ideally,
the support profiles observed here will shed light on the nature of democratic belief sys-
tems and, ultimately, how best to measure them with survey methods. Now I discuss
the Q-sample, the P-sample, and on-site procedures in detail.
4.2.1 Structuring the Q-Sample
The Q-sample is the central measurement instrument in Q methodology. It contains the
statements that participants Q-sort. While survey samples draw from the population
of respondents, Q-samples draw from the universe of perspectives on the concept under
analysis. My Q-sample draws from a universe of survey sources, focus groups, and
interviews. I sampled items purposefully in order to tap the objects and orientations
of democratic support implied by my definition of a “democrat.” The Santiago and
Buenos Aires Q-samples share a common core of the 36 items adapted from question-
naires of the most widely cited surveys of political culture in Latin America, Chile, and
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Argentina3. The sample includes three items tapping each of the twelve combinations of
four orientations (liberal, illiberal, conditional, uncommitted) to three objects (demo-
cratic governance, political rights/procedures, civil liberties). For example, a “liberal”
orientation to the object of “democratic governance”, item #1 reads, “Democracy is
preferable to any other form of government.” Combining “contingent” views with “po-
litical rights,” #17 says, “For the common good, sometimes you have to suspend the
right to run for public office for people with extremist ideas.” As an “illiberal” view on
“civil liberties”, item #31 states: “in general the government should limit the right to
form associations.” Blending “indifference” with “democratic governance”, #12 reads,
“I wouldn’t care if the military came to power again.”
I adapt 12 additional items from focus groups and interviews conducted in Santiago
(August-November 2005) and Buenos Aires (April-June 2006) to form Q-sub-samples.
Many items are verbatim from the transcripts to preserve their authentic meanings.
Some of the items are not ideally worded or ambiguous and thus, operationalizing them
for survey research would require careful revamping. I formed focus groups from pre-
existing groups for methodological and practical reasons. Pre-existing groups simulate
a “‘natural’ setting for discussion” which generates better data (Bloor et al., 2001, 35),
and reduce attrition by relying on a group’s regular schedule and venue. In addition,
pre-existing groups ease purposive sampling which helps to maximize the similarity of
opinion within the group, and maximize the diversity of opinion across groups. A one-
shot random sample provides no such control, and since the total number of participants
is relatively small (≈ 40), obtaining a truly representative random sample is impossible.
Moreover, randomly sampled focus-group participants may share so few beliefs that it
3Questionnaires sampled include surveys by LAPOP/AmericasBarometer, the World Values Survey,
Latinobaro´metro; Chilean sources include Centro de Estudios de la Realidad Contempora´nea (CERC),
Instituto de Estudios Pu´blicos of Universidad Andre´s Bello; Argentine sources include Centro de
Estudios de Opinio´n Pu´blica (CEDOP-UBA), and various surveys cited in Catterberg (1991) and
Mora y Araujo (1991).
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obstructs meaningful discussion and interaction (Morgan, 1997, 35-45). Nevertheless,
my focus groups participants varied considerably in terms of age, gender, socioeconomic
status, ideology, and orientations to democracy.4
For Santiago, the first group was formed by upper-class middle-aged and elderly
members of the arch-conservative ultra-nationalist Corporacio´n por la Defensa de la
Soberan´ıa. The second was comprised of four middle-aged syndicalists, each of whom
are ex-militants of the political parties in Salvador Allende’s Popular Unity coalition,
but who now identify with left-wing splinters of the Socialist Party (PS), Communist
Party (PC), and United Popular Action Movement (MAPU). A third group incor-
porated five law students from the middle-class Universidad Nacional Andre´s Bello.5
The fourth group included six upper-class students from the schools of business and
government at Universidad Adolfo Iban˜ez.
The first Buenos Aires focus group drew from young and middle-aged members
of the Corriente Clasista y Combativa (CCC) piquetero movement from the western
localities (Gonza´lez Cata´n, Laferrere) of La Matanza. A second group consisted of ten
lower-class vocational school students from the districts of Vicente Lo´pez and General
San Mart´ın, in Buenos Aires Province. The third focus group was formed by four elderly
and working-class members of the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo–Linea Fundadora, the
more moderate of the two mothers groups. A final group included four members of
Argentina Solidaria, a group of middle-class youth who run soup kitchens in several
shantytowns that ring Buenos Aires.
Since focus groups may not be ideal for investigating sensitive topics (Morgan,
4Special thanks to Andre´s Madrid for video-taping the focus groups and to Rau´l Olgu´ın for tran-
scribing the Santiago groups, and to Mar´ıa Jose´ Chaco´n for doing both of these tasks in Buenos Aires.
In addition, I am indebted to many other individuals in both cities who aided my recruitment efforts.
5While the directors and leadership of this university have a conservative reputation, the partici-
pants exhibited a mix of ideological stances and were at varying phases of political socialization.
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1997; Bloor et al., 2001), such as military coups and political and civil intolerance,
I conducted a series of interviews with subjects with less-than-liberal orientations to
democracy. The interviews probed the same topics of the focus groups, but followed a
less strict question schedule than the focus groups. Notes were taken by hand in order
to foster a more congenial atmosphere. The interviewees in Santiago were an upper-
middle class business man from the wealthy borough of Las Condes; a man who is
an ex-militant of the fascist anti-Marxist pro-coup group, Frente Nacionalista Patria y
Libertad ; a leader in Chile’s conservative Catholic organization, Accio´n Familia; and a
man who prior to the 1973 coup was a militant in the Partido Nacional and a journalist
for the conservative U.S.-backed pro-coup newspaper, El Mercurio. In Buenos Aires I
interviewed a leader of the working-class coalition, Central de los Trabajadores (CTA);
a leader of pro-democracy group of ex-military officers, Centro de Militares para la
Democracia (CEMIDA); a middle-class young woman from Villa Ballester employed in
the state health care system; an upper-class 40 year-old woman from Recoleta; and a
leader of a Falkland Islands War veterans group.
4.2.2 Recruiting the P-Sample & On-Site Procedures
After structuring the Q-sample, the next step was to recruit a new, non-overlapping
sample of participants, a P-sample, to perform the Q-sorts. The Santiago P-sample had
73 participants and Buenos Aires P-Sample numbered 63. Participants were offered
refreshments and, if necessary, transportation costs for their participation. Unlike
survey research, Q-methods do not require a large number of participants, and they
need not be randomly selected. Rather, in line with best practices for small-n methods
(King, Keohane and Verba, 1994), Q prioritizes maximizing the diversity of perspectives
by recruiting participants who are likely to view the concept distinctly. So while the
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participants come from contrasting backgrounds,6 we cannot speculate on how pervasive
the support profiles are in the population or whether other profiles exist since they are
not a representative sample.
Figure 2: Quasi-Normal Q-Sort Distribution, 48 Items 
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Figure 4.2: Quasi-Normal Q-Sort Distribution, 48 Items
On site, participants first completed a short questionnaire about political support
and demographics. Next they sorted the 48 statements (Q-sample items) typed on small
laminated cards into three categories: agree, disagree, and no strong feeling either way
(Brown, 1980). Subjects then ranked the statements by sorting them into eleven ordinal
categories ranging from –5 (“least agree”) to +5 (“most agree”) conforming to Figure
4.2, where 0 is neutral.7 Participants place the three items they most agree with under
6E.g., state employees, professionals, students, middle-class families, shanty-town dwellers, party
militants, academics, blue-collar workers, mothers and women’s associations, neighborhood associ-
ations, NGOs, a nationalist group, and a homosexual rights movement. See Appendix for more
information on the P-sample.
7The quasi-normal distribution of Figure 4.2 guarantees that the Q-sorts will not be unduly skewed
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+5, the next four under +4, and so on. The research team recorded the Q-sort and
analyzed the data off-site.
4.3 Analysis & Results
To guide the reader to a substantive interpretation of the results, I review the essential
technical aspects of the analysis. Next I describe the clusters of orientations that make
up the seven support profiles. Last I identify “defining” and “consensus” orientations
which are key to improving survey-based measures.
At bottom, the results come from an exploratory factor analysis of Q-sorts and the
researcher’s interpretation of extracted factors. I mitigate researcher bias by employing
some statistical guidelines. I use varimax, not hand, rotation. The first criterion for
factor extraction is a scree test. Then extracted factors must explain at least 5% of
the rotated variance, 10% of subjects must load ≥ |0.4|, and the solution must explain
at least 50% of the total variance. Eigenvalues (which equal the sum of squared factor
loadings for each factor) are a common extraction criterion in r -based factor analysis.
But aggregating across numerous variates, as done here, may inflate them artificially
(Brown, 1980, 40-43). Thus, the percentage of variance explained by a factor (which
equals the eigenvalue ÷ n subjects sorting) helps ground the information eigenvalues
provide.
The Santiago Q-sorts analysis (n = 73) reveals four factors, or support profiles:
democrat, delegative, instrumental, and non-democrat. The solution explains 54% of
the total variance, breaking down by factor (and eigenvalue) as follows: Democrat =
31.5% (23.0), Delegative = 8.5% (6.2), Instrumental = 6.9% (5.0), Non-Democrat =
6.7% (4.9). Nine participants do not have a significant loading on any of the four
or otherwise difficult to compare, but does not significantly alter the results (Brown, 1980).
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factors. The Buenos Aires Q-sorts analysis (n = 63) suggests three profiles: popular,
exclusionary, and delegative. The solution explains 60% of the total variance, broken
down by factor (and eigenvalue): Popular = 27.7% (17.5), Exclusionary = 18.4% (11.6),
Delegative = 13.8% (8.7). Three participants do not have a significant loading on any
of the three factors. The names of these support profiles reflect my interpretation of
the results in Tables 4.1-4.8.
Each item in Tables 4.1-4.7 has two entries: normalized (z) factor scores and, for
the sake of comparison, their score as it transposes to the 11-point scale (-5 to +5)
used in the Q-sort. Essentially, “the factor scores represent weighted combinations of
the placement of statements in each individual’s Q-sort and thus reflect ideal typical
patterns” (Theiss-Morse, 1993, 363). In calculating the factor scores, the raw data in
each Q-sort are weighted to allow participants with higher factor loadings to contribute
more.8 Then the raw Q-sorts data are multiplied by their corresponding factor weight,
summed across each item, and normalized (mean = 0, s.d. = 1). I report these in the
far right-hand column. Next these z-scores are transposed to scores on the 11-point
Q-sort scale, reported in the far left-hand column. This last step is not necessary, but
transposed z-scores “are usually reported since they conform to the format in which
the data were originally collected” (Brown, 1980, 243).
In Tables 4.1-4.7 I report the fourteen most “dominant” and “defining” orientations
for each support profile. Dominant orientations carry the most weight relative (+5’s,
+4’s, –4’s, –5’s) to other orientations in the support profile. These orientations are
deeply held. An orientation is defining if its z-score is more than one standard deviation
from the average of the other profiles’ z-scores for that item. We can consider defining
orientations (entries underlined in the tables) unique to a given profile, either in terms
8Based on w = f/(1− f2), where w is the factor weight and f is the factor loading (Brown, 1980,
241-2).
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of intensity (e.g. +2 versus +5) or direction (i.e. positive or negative). Most, but not
all, of the dominant orientations are also defining orientations. The last set of results,
in Table 4.8, are orientations that amount to virtual consensus across the profiles. To
declare an orientation “consensus”, its z-scores across all profiles must be within one
standard deviation of each other. Some items, also in Table 4.8, generate consensus
in one case and unique orientations in the other. In terms of the overarching goal of
improving survey-based measures, this analysis helps separate the wheat from the chaff
among the myriad indicators of democratic support.
4.3.1 Democratic Support Profiles: Santiago, Chile
As Table 4.1 shows, Chilean democrats are defined by ideal-typical orientations to
democratic governance: liberal (items #1, 2, 37, 7, 9. 39), unconditional (#3, 4, 38),
and committed (#12). This pattern largely holds for orientations to the political rights
and civil liberties embodied in polyarchy, most intensely the rights to vote (#13), run
for office (#14), and human rights (#48). To this point, Chilean democrats resembles
similar clusters of liberal beliefs in Mexico (Schedler and Sarsfield, 2007), Argentina
(Powers, 2001), Russia (Carnaghan, 2007), Belarus, Romania, and Bulgaria (Dryzek
and Holmes, 2002). Yet even as they profess support for the participation of “extremist
parties” (#3), they express intolerance towards Marxist parties (#43) and neo-nazis
(#47). Therefore, even the most democratic Chileans in our sample place boundaries
on democracy.
Delegative support calls for strong leaders to “bring the country along” in times of
crisis (#38). It is unclear whether this would entail the maintenance or destruction
of democratic institutions and freedoms. Strong liberal (# 1, 2), unconditional (#4,
5), and committed (#11, 12) orientations to democratic governance within the profile
suggest hyper-presidentials would support institutional channels to political change.
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Table 4.1: Democratic Support Profile: Santiago, Chile Sample
Transposed Normalized
Factor Score Democratic Governance Factor Score
+5 3. Under no circumstance could there ever be sufficient reason for a 2.15
coup d’etat. (unconditional)
+5 1. Democracy may have problems, but it’s better than any other form 1.58
of government. (liberal)
+5 2. Democracy is preferable to any other form of government. (liberal) 1.56
+4 37. “After the trauma of the coup and the military government, a 1.55
political maturity has been reached. Now I think things can be
resolved in other ways that do not imply military intervention.”(liberal) –0.92
–3 4. In certain circumstances an authoritarian government could be
preferable to a democratic government. (unconditional)
–4 38. “In moments of crisis you need someone to take power and bring –1.08
the country along.” (unconditional)
–4 12. I wouldn’t care if the military came to power again. (committed) –1.43
–4 7. Things cannot be resolved. Our country needs a government with –1.57
a heavy hand. (liberal)
–5 9. We would be better off if the military were governing the country. –1.62
(liberal)
–5 39. “I wouldn’t have any problem if the Armed Forces governed –1.74
because democracy has given me awful experiences.” (liberal)
Political Rights & Procedures Values
+4 13. Except for those excluded by the Constitution, all Chileans deserve 1.31
the right to vote, even those who protest against the government.
(liberal)
+4 14. Any citizen of voting age should be allowed to run for public 1.23
office. (liberal)
+3 15. All political parties, including extremist ones, should be permitted 1.12
to participate in national elections. (liberal)
+3 43. Marxist parties should be prohibited from participating in national 1.12
elections. (illiberal)
–2 16. When the country lacks order the right to vote can be restricted. –0.75
(unconditional)
Civil Liberties
+2 47. “They shouldn’t let neo-nazis express themselves publicly.” 0.80
(illiberal)
–5 48. “Respecting the human rights of all Chileans is not essential –1.84
these days.” (committed)
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But illiberal orientations to political rights and procedures (#13-15) and lack of com-
mitment to human rights (#48), media freedom (#36), protest rights (#35), free asso-
ciation (#34, 31) reduces these orientations to mere platitudes. The delegative profile
exemplifies support for a fragile institutional order that rests on the whim of caudillo-
style leaders. While few would classify Chile as a “delegative democracy” – a regime in
which citizens delegate extensive power to elected executives who ignore institutional
checks and balances and govern as they wish (O’Donnell, 1994) – some Chileans support
this sort of governance.
An instrumental profile maintains conditional support for authoritarianism (#4),
especially to resolve economic problems (#5). Since instrumentals support some polit-
ical rights (#13, 43) and civil liberties (#32, 34-36) and reckon Chile has seen the last
of military intervention (#37), it is tempting to associate these beliefs with political
learning and a general acceptance of democratic rules of the game. Yet their acceptance
of military rule (#39) and willingness to limit public protests (#29) and press freedom
(#30) during times of crisis may signal more than simple “nostalgia” (Huneeus and
Maldonado, 2003). Indeed, instrumentals grant legitimacy to Pinochet’s protracted
military regime (#9). If many Chileans supported “intervention as only a temporary
measure” (Bermeo, 2003, 167) rather than “the institutionalization of military dictator-
ship in 1973” (166), instrumental support today certainly has a more ‘tried-and-true’
flavor.
Non-democrats believe crisis situations call for strong leaders (#38), but feign no
support (#1, 2) or commitment to democracy (#11, 40). Moreover, they favor the
mano dura (#7), accept coups d’etat (#3), and would proscribe Marxists parties (#43)
and, in some circumstances, other extremists (#17) from electoral competition. In
the present context of democracy, non-democrats cling to a variety of civil liberties
(#26, 27, 30, 31). But support for these negative rights may reflect a determination
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Table 4.2: Delegative Support Profile: Santiago, Chile Sample
Transposed Normalized
Factor Score Democratic Governance Factor Score
+5 38. “In moments of crisis you need someone to take power and bring 1.88
the country along.” (conditional)
+4 2. Democracy is preferable to any other form of government. (liberal) 1.26
+4 1. Democracy may have problems, but it’s better than any other form 1.03
of government. (liberal)
–3 37. “After the trauma of the coup and the military government, a –0.82
political maturity has been reached. Now I think things can be
resolved in other ways that do not imply military intervention.”(illiberal)
–4 11. For me there isn’t a big difference between democratic governments –1.03
and dictatorships. So the type of regime doesn’t really matter to me.
(committed)
–4 12. I wouldn’t care if the military came to power again. (committed) –1.04
–4 5. I would support an authoritarian government if it resolves economic –1.14
problems. (unconditional)
–5 4. In certain circumstances an authoritarian government could be –1.20
preferable to a democratic government. (unconditional)
Political Rights & Procedures
+3 22. It’s all the same whether or not the great majority have the right 0.84
to vote or only a few people. (uncommitted)
–1 13. Except for those excluded by the Constitution, all Chileans deserve –0.40
the right to vote, even those who protest against the government.
(illiberal)
–2 14. Any citizen of voting age should be allowed to run for public –0.62
office. (illiberal)
–4 15. All political parties, including extremist ones, should be –1.03
permitted to participate in national elections. (illiberal)
–5 43. Marxist parties should be prohibited from participating in national –2.21
elections.” (liberal)
Civil Liberties
+5 48. “Respecting the human rights of all Chileans is not essential 3.20
these days.” (uncommitted)
+4 36. It wouldn’t worry me if the government censored the 1.00
communications media that criticize it. (uncommitted)
+2 35. Public protest is not a necessary right for our society. 0.53
(uncommitted)
+2 34. The right to form associations is not crucial for our country. 0.58
(uncommitted)
+1 31. In general, the government should limit the right to form 0.39
associations. (illiberal)
–3 46. I respect gay people. But it would bother me if they showed their –0.76
love in front the children. (unconditional)
–5 47. “They shouldn’t let neo-nazis express themselves publicly.” –1.54
(liberal)
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Table 4.3: Instrumental Support Profile: Santiago, Chile Sample
Transposed Normalized
Factor Score Democratic Governance Factor Score
+5 4. In certain circumstances an authoritarian government could be 2.02
preferable to a democratic government. (conditional)
+5 37. “After the trauma of the coup and the military government, a 1.99
political maturity has been reached. Now I think things can be
resolved in other ways that do not imply military intervention.”(liberal)
+4 5. I would support an authoritarian government if it resolves economic 1.38
problems. (conditional)
+3 9. We would be better off if the military were governing the country. 0.67
(illiberal)
+2 39. “I wouldn’t have any problem if the Armed Forces governed 0.51
because democracy has given me awful experiences.” (illiberal)
+2 12. I wouldn’t care if the military came to power again. (uncommitted) 0.50
Political Rights & Procedures
+4 13. Except for those excluded by the Constitution, all Chileans deserve 1.17
the right to vote, even those who protest against the government.
(liberal)
+1 18. In times of national crisis it’s alright to prohibit a political 0.36
party from participating in national elections. (conditional)
–5 43. “Marxist parties should be prohibited from participating in national –2.45
elections.” (liberal)
Civil Liberties
+5 46. I respect gay people. But it would bother me if they showed their 1.66
love in front the children.(conditional)
+4 29. In times of crisis, I would approve of a law that prohibited public 1.35
protests. (conditional)
+3 30. In the case of a social emergency I would approve of the 0.73
government censoring the media. (conditional)
–2 26. I approve of people participating in legal public protests. (illiberal) –0.56
–3 27. I don’t approve of the government censoring the media that –0.91
criticizes it. (illiberal)
–3 36. “It wouldn’t worry me if the government censored the –0.74
communications media that criticize it. (committed)
–4 32. I don’t approve of people participating in manifestations under –1.14
any circumstance. (liberal)
–4 34. The right to form associations is not crucial for our country. –1.53
(committed)
–5 35. Public protest is not a necessary right for our society. (committed) –1.60
–5 47. “They shouldn’t let neo-nazis express themselves publicly.” –1.83
(liberal)
107
to prevent a tyranny of the Left and may be withdrawn given the right conditions
(#16, 17). Non-democrats remain unconvinced that Chile has seen the last of military
intervention (#37).
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Table 4.4: Non-Democrat Support Profile: Santiago, Chile Sample
Transposed Normalized
Factor Score Democratic Governance Factor Score
+5 38. “In moments of crisis you need someone to take power and bring 2.68
the country along.” (conditional)
+4 7. Things cannot be resolved. Our country needs a government with 1.01
a heavy hand. (illiberal)
+2 11. “For me there isn’t a big difference between democratic governments 0.42
and dictatorships. So the type of regime doesn’t really matter to me.”
(uncommitted)
+2 40. “I have to work to survive. I don’t care if the government is 0.55
democratic or military if it’s not going to change my conditions.”
(uncommitted)
–2 37. “After the trauma of the coup and the military government, a –0.74
political maturity has been reached. Now I think things can be
resolved in other ways that do not imply military intervention.”(illiberal)
–3 2. Democracy is preferable to any other form of government. (illiberal) –0.91
–4 1. Democracy may have problems, but it’s better than any other form –1.17
of government. (illiberal)
–4 3. Under no circumstance could there ever be sufficient reason for a –1.60
coup d’etat. (conditional)
Political Rights & Procedures
+5 43. “Marxist parties should be prohibited from participating in national 2.10
elections.” (illiberal)
+4 17. For the common good, sometimes you have to suspend the rights of 1.07
persons with extremist ideas from running for publicly elected offices.
(conditional)
+3 19. Besides those excluded by law, there are other groups and kinds 0.96
of people that should not be able to vote. (illiberal)
+3 16. When the country lacks order the right to vote can be restricted. 0.92
(conditional)
–3 23. It doesn’t matter to me if certain people are restricted from their –1.07
right to run for office. (committed)
Civil Liberties
+5 27. I don’t approve of the government censoring the media that
criticizes it. (committed)
+4 26. I approve of people participating in legal protests. (liberal) 1.05
0 47. “They shouldn’t let neo-nazis express themselves publicly.” (neutral) 0.18
–4 31. In general, the government should limit the right to form –1.10
associations. (liberal)
–5 48. “Respecting the human rights of all Chileans is not essential 3.20
these days.” (committed)
–5 30. In the case of a social emergency I would approve of the –2.01
government censoring the media. (unconditional)
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Table 4.5: Popular Democratic Support: Buenos Aires, Argentina Sample
Transposed Normalized
Factor Score Democratic Governance Factor Score
+5 3. Under no circumstance could there ever be sufficient reason for a 1.64
coup d’etat. (unconditional)
+2 8. There are other forms of government that could be as good as or 0.86
better than democracy. (illiberal)
–4 7. Things cannot be resolved. Our country needs a government with –1.48
a heavy hand. (liberal)
–5 9. We would be better off if the military were governing the country. –1.52
(committed)
–5 50. “If I had to choose between a civil war or a military coup, –1.80
I would no doubt prefer the latter.” (unconditional)
Political Rights Values
+5 56. “When you go to vote, your vote is worthless because you already 2.37
know who will win before you vote.” (uncommitted)
+4 15. All political parties, including extremist ones, should be permitted 1.26
to participate in national elections. (liberal)
+2 55. “People who are managed by a political puntero should not have 0.54
the right to vote.” (illiberal)
+2 22. It’s all the same whether or not the great majority have the right 0.39
to vote or only a few people. (uncommitted)
–3 16. When the country lacks order the right to vote can be restricted. –1.02
(unconditional)
Civil Liberties Values
+5 57. “Argentina should safeguard human rights.” (liberal) 1.74
+2 36. “It wouldn’t worry me if the government censored the 0.58
communications media that criticize it.” (uncommitted)
+3 60. “It doesn’t bother me if the president pressures the media to 0.94
have an officialist tendency.” (uncommitted)
+1 33. I approve of the government censoring the communications media 0.28
that criticize it. (illiberal)
–3 35. Public protest is not a necessary right for our society. (committed) –1.01
–4 59. “Our nation’s priorities should be to maintain order before –1.42
worrying about human rights.” (committed)
–5 58. “It’s your right to protest as long as you don’t block –1.96
the highway.” (unconditional)
4.3.2 Democratic Support Profiles: Buenos Aires, Argentina
As I discuss in the following section, the profiles of support in the Buenos Aires analysis
held a host of consensus orientations to democratic governance, procedures, rights, and
liberties (see Table 4.8). In addition to these orientations, Argentines with popular sup-
port parallel the description of the “popular, justice-based democracy” legitimization
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pattern Powers (2001) identifies among working-class Argentines. Such citizens do not
consider a military regime “an acceptable alternative to imperfect institutions” (193)
and advocate grassroots participation as a way to “work within the existing regime to
participate in electoral politics and nonviolent social movements as a means to making
small gains in social justice” (Powers, 2001, 193). Here, the popular support pro-
file holds orientations that are more anti-military (#9, 50) than pro-democracy (#8).
Popular democratic supporters perceive their votes to mean little (#56), but uncondi-
tionally favor elections (#16), champion equal participation rights for extremists (#15),
defend human rights (#57, 59), and remain committed to protest rights (#35, 58). In
fact, based on responses to the pre-Q-sort questionnaire, factor loadings on the popular
support profile are significantly correlated with activity levels for signing petitions (r =
.44), boycotting (r = .45), protesting (r = .56), unofficial striking (r = .51), occupying
buildings (r = .41), and road-blocking (r = .32). Over time, these citizens’ adhesion
to democracy could be undermined by “the belief that liberal democracy is structured
and supported by elites so that certain people are left out permanently” (Powers, 2001,
193).
The exclusionary support profile exposes the on-the-ground challenges of cultivating
democratic support in Argentina. First, exclusionary support entertains political rights
and procedures on a conditional or “exclusive” basis (#15-18). Indeed, there is strong
support for proscribing Leftist parties (#55). Second, exclusionary support draws the
boundaries of free expression at blocking the highway (#58, 35). This echoes a common
response of middle-class Argentines to the piquetero movement whose modus operandi
is to block major traffic arteries to demand social and economic rights. Critics view
piqueteros as criminals or object that roadblocks place citizens in harm’s way and
impinge on the right to circulate freely. Third, if forced to choose between a civil war
and a military coup, exclusionary supporters would select the coup (#50), but they
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Table 4.6: Exclusionary Support Profile: Buenos Aires, Argentina
Transposed Normalized
Factor Score Democratic Governance Factor Score
+4 50. “If I had to choose between a civil war or a military coup, 1.04
I would no doubt prefer the latter.” (conditional)
–4 9. We would be better off if the military were governing the country. –1.36
(liberal)
–1 3. Under no circumstance could there ever be sufficient reason for a -0.05
coup d’etat. (conditional)
–4 10. To people like me it doesn’t matter if we have a democratic –1.50
or undemocratic regime. (committed)
–5 52. “We were better off with the military, there wasn’t so much crime. –1.74
At least they provided works (obras).” (liberal)
–5 11. For me there isn’t a big difference between democratic governments –1.75
and dictatorships. So the type of regime doesn’t really matter to me.
(committed)
Political Rights & Procedures
+5 54. They should prohibit the participation of Leftist political parties 1.58
in national elections. (illiberal)
+3 18. In times of national crisis it’s alright to prohibit a political 0.72
party from participating in national elections. (conditional)
+2 16. When the country lacks order the right to vote can be restricted. 0.70
(conditional)
+2 55. People who are managed by a political puntero should not have 0.54
the right to vote. (illiberal)
–2 15. All political parties, including extremist ones, should be permitted 1.26
to participate in national elections. (illiberal)
Civil Liberties
+5 58. “It’s your right to protest as long as you don’t block 2.26
the highway.” (conditional)
+1 57. “Argentina should safeguard human rights.” (liberal) 0.40
+3 35. Public protest is not a necessary right for our society. (uncommitted) 0.80
–5 60. “It doesn’t bother me if the president pressures the media to –3.52
have an officialist tendency.” (committed)
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Table 4.7: Delegative Support Profile: Buenos Aires, Argentina
Transposed Normalized
Factor Score Democratic Governance Factor Score
+4 49. “I don’t think there will be another coup d’etat en Argentina 1.51
because the people are conscientious of how tragic military
governments are.” (liberal)
+2 7. Things cannot be resolved. Our country needs a government with 0.66
a heavy hand. (illiberal)
0 9. We would be better off if the military were governing the country. 0.10
(neutral)
–4 50. “If I had to choose between a civil war or a military coup, –0.71
I would no doubt prefer the latter.” (unconditional)
–5 8. There are other forms of government that could be as good as –1.80
or better than democracy. (committed)
Political Rights & Procedures
–4 54. “They should should prohibit the participation of Leftist –1.60
political parties in national elections.” (liberal)
–5 55. People who are managed by a political puntero should not have –2.60
the right to vote. (liberal)
–5 56. “When you go to vote, your vote is worthless because you already –3.13
know who will win before you vote.” (committed)
Civil Liberties
+5 58. “It’s your right to protest as long as you don’t block 1.51
the highway.” (conditional)
+5 60. “It doesn’t bother me if the president pressures the media to 2.07
have an officialist tendency.” (uncommitted)
+4 57. “Argentina should safeguard human rights.” (liberal) 1.07
–4 33. I approve of the government censoring the communications media –1.13
that criticize it. (illiberal)
do not favor long-term military solutions to shortcomings in democratic performance
(#10-12, 51, 52). In this sense, they match the profile of orientations Bermeo (2003,
219-200) describes prior to the 1976 removal of Isabel Mart´ınez de Pero´n. They also
resonate reasonably well Catterberg’s (1991, 45) “elitist” Argentines who emphasize
the democratic rights over participation. In all, the exclusionary profile reveals the
limits some Argentines would place on the democratic game.
Like the other profiles in Buenos Aires and the corresponding profile in Santiago, this
delegative profile claims to prefer democratic governance. The Buenos Aires delegatives
place a high premium on voting rights (#53, 56 14), even for citizens taking cues from
a political boss (puntero) (#54). Though they reject outright censorship (#33, 36,
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30), delegatives are indifferent to the president pushing an official agenda onto media
outlets (#60). They do not view roadblocks as a legitimate form of expression (#58)
and, like delegatives in Santiago, waﬄe on human rights (#57; 59 is not a defining item
but scores +3 for prioritizing “order” over “human rights”). In some ways, delegatives
look like Catterberg’s (1991, 39-48) “populists”, for whom polyarchy’s participatory
aspects (elections, full suffrage) outweigh its libertarian dimensions (press freedom,
political minority rights). Indeed, they seem to value the populist governing style
of then President Ne´stor Kirchner who commandeered the Peronist political machine
after 2003 (Roberts, 2007). The Kirchner administration also took steps to increase
its leverage over major newspapers and wielded this new influence to de-legitimize
the piquetero movement that at times threatened governability (Svampa and Pereyra,
2003). Kirchner’s team was often accused of intimidating journalists. Not surprisingly,
delegative support and trust in the president, a pre-Q-sort questionnaire item, are
significantly correlated (r = .21).
Three extant survey items produce defining orientations to democratic governance
relatively well in both analyses. The first is item #3, “Under no circumstance could
there ever be sufficient reason for a coup d’etat” (in Chile democrat = +5, delegative =
+1, instrumental = –2, non-democracy = –4; in Argentina popular + +5, exclusionary
= –1, delegative = +1). The second item, #5, posits support for authoritarian govern-
ment on the condition that it “resolves economic problems” (in Chile –3, –5, +5, +3;
in Argentina –3, +1, –2). The third item, #7, states support for heavy-handed (mano
dura) governance (in Chile –4, +3, +3, +4; in Argentina –4, –2, +2). However, some
of the focus-groups/interview items also tended to polarize orientations to democratic
governance. For Chileans, the most discriminating of these is #37: “After the trauma
of the coup and the military government, a political maturity has been reached. Now
I think things can be solved in other ways that do not imply military intervention”
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(+4, –3, +5, –2). For Argentines, the most defining item is #50: “If I had to choose
between a civil war or a military coup, I would no doubt choose the latter” (–5, +4,
–4). Thus the most effective democratic-governance items ask citizens to reflect on the
lessons and legacies of their authoritarian pasts.
For political rights and procedures and civil liberties, the focus-group/interview
items are quite revealing. In the Santiago analysis, orientations to extending free speech
to neo-nazis (#47) delineate the support profiles (+2, –5, –5, 0).9 Orientations to
human rights are more puzzling. One item elicits consensus support for human rights
(#45, “You must respect the human rights of all Chileans”) but another item (#48)
is rejected by delegatives. Given the disputed nature of human rights and historical
memory in Chile, such orientations deserve further research.10 The support profiles
in the Buenos Aires analysis are marked by their orientations to roadblocks as a form
of protest (#57), competing priorities of order and human rights (#59, 57), and the
President pressing an official agenda on the media (#60). Finally, profiles in both
cases differ wildly in their beliefs about political parties of the ideological Left (#43;
55). Support profiles in Chile and Argentina differ on where to set the limits of political
and civil freedom and equality in their post-authoritarian eras.
9Neo-nazi groups in Santiago have stirred public debate by attempting to hold an international
forum in 2000 and engaging in public confrontations with homosexual rights groups.
10During the political transition 18% of respondents did not believe the human rights issues were
real, but rather propaganda (but around 50% for self-identified Rightists and Independents). Another
12% did not know or answer. There was also considerable discord regarding solutions to the problem
once the truth was established (Flisfisch et al., 1987, 105-116). Sixteen years later, 26% of Chileans
believed human rights violations were “isolated cases” as opposed to a “systematic abuse” of authority.
And 37% agreed with the statement, “After thirteen years since the end of the military government we
shouldn’t insist on [solving] the problem of human rights violations during the military government”
(Huneeus, 2003, 174-76).
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4.3.3 Consensus Orientations
How different are these orientations across the profiles? Recall the statistical rules of
thumb that a “consensus” orientation has z-scores across all profiles that are within one
standard deviation of each other. Items that engender consensus orientations cannot
differentiate orientations that belong to one profiles of democratic support from orien-
tations that fit in all profiles. Of equal importance are items that generate consensus
orientations in one case, but defining orientations in another. Such items may be hinder
cross-national comparisons. Towards the ultimate goal of improving survey-based mea-
sures, this analysis helps researcher choose the most effective indicators of democratic
support.
More items generate consensus orientations to democratic governance in Buenos
Aires than in Santiago (see Table 4.8). In fact, many items that elicit defining ori-
entations for the Santiaguinos, uncover a liberal-unconditional-committed consensus
for the Bonaerenses. This pattern is replicated across orientations to political rights
and procedures and civil liberties. Whereas the Argentine profiles reach consensus on
fourteen of these twenty-four orientations, the same items define the Chilean support
profiles. However, for case-specific items, there is a bit more consensus among the
Chilean profiles than the Argentine profiles.
These results give rise to several conclusions. While extant survey measures do a
fairly good job of distinguishing between democratic support profiles in Chile, measures
of support for democracy in Argentina could benefit from a fresh infusion of verstehen.
Whereas four out of twelve focus-group/interview items tapped consensus orientations
across the Santiago profiles, only two of twelve did so in Buenos Aires. Second, there are
some items that poorly differentiate between support profiles in both cases (#20, 21,
24, 25), but only two items fail both to define and to garner consensus. The first is #8:
“There are junctures that require the president to leave congress behind.” The second is
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#28: “It is fine for our government to limit the right to associate for a period of time.”
A final conclusion concerns items representing the most commonly compared survey
measures of democratic support in Latin America, often termed the “Linzian” (#1, 4)
and “Churchillian” (#2). In this Q-sorts analysis, their power to discriminate between
profiles of democratic support varies, from very high in Chile to extremely low very
in Argentina. Beyond casting Juan Linz’s remark that survey questions must capture
verstehen in an ironic light, this finding further questions the cross-case comparability
of these much-maligned measures.
4.4 Discussion & Conclusions
Gauging democratic support or lack thereof may be crucial for determining whether
democracy is here to stay in Latin America, or whether the region is passing through
just another “democratic moment” (Malloy, 1987, 256-57). Yet our knowledge of how
democratic support affects the building, maintenance, and deepening of democracy is
beset by measurement dilemmas. The goal of this study is to point a way out of these
present dilemmas by synthesizing anthropological and behavioral approaches. I conduct
a Q-sorts experiment to measure and analyze multidimensional profiles of democratic
support in Chile and Argentina. This comparative study provides insight into the
nature of democratic support and, as I discuss below, points to ways researchers can
enhance survey-based measures.
One of this study’s most basic but powerful lessons is that any measure of demo-
cratic support must begin with a clear conceptualization of democracy and, thus, a
definition of a democrat. Defining a liberal democrat as one who is unconditionally
committed to democratic governance and the political rights and procedures and civil
liberties of Dahl’s (1971) polyarchy implied three things. First, the concept of demo-
cratic support encompasses three general objects of support. Second, it not only focuses
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on liberal and illiberal orientations to these objects, but unconditional/conditional and
committed/uncommitted orientations as well. Third, an appropriate measurement in-
strument must tap the concept’s multiple dimensions. My a priori definitions helped
to overcome well-known measurement problems: contested conceptions of democracy;
contradictory values; competing rationalities; and mapping onto research at the regime
level. So future measures must start with a definition.
The Q-sorts analysis confirms scholarly skepticism towards measures of democratic
support that rely on the “d-word”. But instead of dismissing mixed support profiles as
social desirability, multidimensional profiles of democratic support help “draw attention
away from the logical meaning of isolated words and phrases . . . to seek their mean-
ing in terms of the ‘flavor added’ by the total milieu of the accompanying behavioral
field” (Brown, 1980, 46). Regarding conflicting values, for example, delegative support
profiles in both Santiago and Buenos Aires combine nominal preference for democracy
with illiberal values on plural political competition, uncommitted orientations towards
media autonomy media, and conflicting values regarding human rights. Along with
exclusionary support, these profiles exemplify how stated support for democracy can
be hollow. Finding delegative support in not only Argentina but also politically stable
Chile, means support for delegative governance may be latent elsewhere, too.
While the results cannot be generalized to the whole populations of Chile or Ar-
gentina, the support profiles have a good deal of face validity. It is not surprising that
many citizens in Chile and Argentina by and large support democratic governance,
political rights, and procedures. Delegative support profiles in Argentina jibe with a
history of Peronism, and is not inconsistent with factions of Allende’s Popular Unity
government. Indeed, delegative support is slightly but significantly higher (0.09, t =
–1.91) among Chileans who identify with a party of the ruling Concertacio´n coalition
compared to the rest of the P-sample. That instrumental democratic support exists
119
in Chile but not in Argentina squares with the diverging records of economic perfor-
mance of past dictatorships in both cases – volatile with a strong finish in Chile and all
downhill in Argentina. Buenos Aires’s exclusionary supporters parallel evidence of “de-
mocrats with adjectives” found in other new democracies (Schedler and Sarsfield, 2007;
Carnaghan, 2007; Dryzek and Holmes, 2002; Powers, 2001), while Santiago’s illiberals
alert us to new diminished sub-types, “authoritarians with adjectives”. Empirically, a
high percentage of participants loaded significantly on the profiles (88% in Santiago,
95% in Buenos Aires).
The analysis of defining and consensus orientations makes three general points that
will benefit future measures. To begin, the most oft-cited measures of democratic
support, commonly referred to as the Linzian and Churchillian questions distinguish
elicit defining orientations in Chile but consensus orientations in Argentina. A reading
of these results based on past research might conclude that support for democracy is
high in Argentina and low in Chile. But other items illuminate pockets of illiberal,
conditional, and uncommitted orientations across the cases, particularly items that
reference justification for a coup (#3), mano dura (#7), participation of Left-wing
parties (#43, 55), public protests (#32, 35), and censorship (#30, 36). Further tests
with P-samples that over-represent citizens with illiberal, conditional, and uncommitted
orientations make help confirm these tentative conclusions.
The second point is that each of the Q-sample items sampled from the focus groups
and interviews was effective either for drawing out distinctions or consensus among the
profiles. Hence future survey-based measures ought to incorporate items that reflect
more subtle interpretations of the lessons learned under democracy and authoritarian-
ism, and how political rights and procedures and civil liberties play out in real life.
The current items are a start, but more research is necessary to hone phraseology and
find items that apply to a wide array of cases. In Chile, perhaps the best place to
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pick up is the topic of leadership in a crisis situation. What do Chileans mean when
they envision a leader who “takes power and brings the country along” (#38; “tomar
el poder y sacar el pa´ıs adelante”)? Given the struggles Left-wing parties have faced
to gain effective representation in both cases, future research should flesh out what
citizens believe these parties’ legitimate role in the political system. Finally, attitudes
towards the media expressed in focus-group/interview items define support for delega-
tive governance. The future of democratic institutions may depend, to some extent, on
citizen support for or rejection of such values.
Finally, survey researchers must decide how best to aggregate these multiple ori-
entations via survey methods. Cluster analysis seems particularly well-suited to the
task. Cluster analysis classifies respondents into clusters who are, vis-a`-vis a set of
measures, maximally similar to others within the same cluster and maximally dissimi-
lar to respondents in other clusters. Similarity is defined in terms of the sum of squared
Euclidean distances from each respondent to the mean of all variables. Like Q-sorts,
cluster analysis generates multidimensional measures that relax the linearity assump-
tions of r -based factor analysis. Schedler and Sarsfield (2007) cluster analyze a series of
variables tapping democratic preferences, values, and norms. They find several types
of “democrats with adjectives” and some non-democrats in Mexico. Q-sorts and ex-
ploratory cluster analysis could be used in conjunction to place external validity checks
on each other. Conventional stopping rules for determining the number of clusters in
the final solution (Calinski, 1974; Duda and Hart, 1973) could bolster the reliability
of such studies and replication studies could then use confirmatory cluster analysis (k-
means) to examine the persistence of support profiles over time. Scholars will have
to grapple which defining and/or consensus items to analyze. Consensus items could
provide a baseline of comparison, but ultimately defining measures are the best way
to differentiate among democratic support profiles. The overall research question is
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likely to designate the right mix of defining and consensus items. If one is interested
in overall levels of support for democracy, consensus items might figure into the mea-
surement instrument. If the goal is to identify citizens by support profile and compare
their behavior, defining items are crucial.
This study provides a conceptual roadmap for improving survey-based measures of
democratic support. More research on democratic support with Q-sorts, focus groups,
or other non-survey methods (experiments, intensive interviews, ethnography, partic-
ipant observation, etc.) could save precious time and resources for national, regional,
and global opinion projects seeking to understand democratic support. Testing the
insights from non-survey studies with survey data ultimately depends on convincing
survey researchers of the merit of the inferences we draw. From there, the task of con-
necting new and improved measures of democratic support to regime-level outcomes
is mammoth. But if scholars could prove that citizens with different profiles of demo-
cratic support behave in ways that bolster or weaken democratic institutions, it would
constitute an important advance towards a greater comprehension of how democratic
culture influences democracy.
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Appendix A
Field Methods: Focus Groups,
Interviews, and Q-Sorts
While in the field in Santiago, Chile (August to December 2005) and in Buenos
Aires, Argentina (March to August 2006), the first phase of my research involved a
series of focus groups and in-depth interviews to better understand how citizens under-
stood democracy and felt towards political parties. These two qualitative methodologies
informed the construction of Q-sort experiment conducted in the second phase of my
fieldwork. This appendix contains detailed information about several aspects of the
focus groups, interviews, and Q-sorts. The first section covers the selection and re-
cruitment of participants; conduct and format of the focus groups; descriptions of the
groups; the pre-group self-completion questionnaire; and a descriptive summary of the
focus group participants. The second section describes the interview methodology and
interviewees. Finally, the third section discusses the recruitment of Q-sort subjects and
presents summary data about them.
A.1 Focus Groups
Focus group interviewing is a qualitative methodology that explicitly uses group inter-
action to produce insights and data that may be inaccessible without group interaction
(Morgan, 1997, 2). My research employs focus groups as a supplementary source of
data for my primary method, Q-sort methodology. Initially I assumed focus groups
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would be the ideal setting in which to study how people understand their relationships
with and form values and attitudes towards democratic political institutions. For the
most part this assumption held. However, I noticed that citizens with less democratic
beliefs were hard to recruit into focus groups. And even when my screening process, a
pre-group self-completion questionnaire, detected authoritarian values in some focus-
group subjects, these subjects were often not keen to voice these values and opinions in
the focus group. Therefore, I relied on in-depth interviews as a way to “over-sample” in
order to produce the necessary data I could later incorporate into the Q-sort exercises.
I conducted a total of fifteen focus groups: eight in Santiago and seven in Buenos
Aires. Four of the Santiago groups and four of the Buenos Aires groups were dedicated
primarily to citizen attitudes towards political parties. Orientations towards democracy
and authoritarianism were the primary focus of four groups in Santiago and three
groups in Buenos Aires. Each of these focus groups built on a core set of focusing
activities that engaged the participants in a debate about the meaning of democracy,
materialist and post-materialist values (Inglehart, 1997), and discrimination towards
minority groups. Below I go into detail about these activities, but here I simply note
that given the conceptual proximity of support for democracy and political parties, a
degree of thematic overlap was not unusual in the focus groups.
A.1.1 Focus Group Conduct and Format
Whereas interviews (in-depth, group, or survey) require a firm control by the inter-
viewer, focus groups facilitators must allow for natural group interaction. Therefore,
I divided my focus groups into structured tasks in the first half, and a much freer
discussion shaped by a series of questions in the second half. I incorporated several
core focusing exercises into each the focus group, regardless of whether the group was
selected for its variation on support for democracy or political party trust. The core
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activities break the ice and engage each participant at the outset, thereby increasing
participation over the duration of the group and providing the facilitator with key in-
sights into the range of beliefs, attitudes, and ideologies within the group. Additional
group-specific questions were formulated beforehand to highlight a particular aspect
of the research topic. I also allowed for questions to arise spontaneously based on the
direction of group interaction. This follows Bloor et al.’s general advice to introduce
just enough structure via focusing exercises to reach the research goals, but not so much
that it stifles group interaction. As the facilitator I can attest that, “sometimes the
facilitator may emerge from a most successful group feeling that she has been holding
a tiger by the tail for the last hour and a half” (Bloor et al., 2001, 48).
Before beginning, I emphasize that there are no ‘wrong answers’ (Bloor et al., 2001).
The first focusing exercise their materialist or post-materialist values. Arranging large
(8 in. × 11 in.) laminated cards on a table, the participants work together to prioritize
(a) maintaining order in the nation, (b) giving people more say in the government,
(c) fighting rising prices, and (d) protecting freedom of speech. If there appears to be
agreement, I ask if all agree or whether any participant would like to modify the order.
If there is disagreement arises, I or my research assistant, eventually help organize the
cards according to one participant’s opinion, and inquire about what changes to the
order other participants might prefer.
Another focusing activity asks the group to consider which of the following phrases
(placed on large laminated cards) are central to their understanding of democracy:
(a) liberty, (b) equality, voting in elections, (c) a form of government, (d) welfare and
progress, (e) respecting the law, (f) human rights, or (g) other. After several minutes
of discussion, I ask whether anything is missing from the definition and, if so, discuss
further. While the list does not include any pejorative conceptions, it nevertheless
generates subjective understandings of democracy. This knowledge helps detect fruitful
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pathways for subsequent discussions about support for democracy and the normative
implications of democratic procedures and institutions.
The third core focusing activity attempted to uncover political tolerance levels and
to engender discussion over political rights and civil liberties. I begin by holding up
large laminated cards displaying the name of a minority or discriminated group. These
groups included women, gays, lesbians, citizens with low education levels, Jews, the
military, police officers, drug addicts, people with AIDS/HIV, youth/students, blacks,
Chinese, political extremists, Communists, neo-nazis, indigenous, Bolivians. Additional
minority groups were incorporated depending on the country.1 Then I ask which of
these groups suffer the most discrimination. Then, going through the cards again, I
ask whether these groups deserve more or less voice in politics. With an eye to groups
that generate debate in the first two rounds of questioning, I probe whether these
groups deserve the rights to vote, free association, and free expression.
In focus groups that tapping participants’ feelings about political parties, I employed
one of two additional focusing exercises. The first poses the question, “Political parties
everywhere have problems of greater and lesser severity. How big of a problem are
the following issues for political parties in Chile?” Sixteen issues are presented on large
laminated cards: good faith; capacity to confront the big problems; corruption; the role
of money; international credit agencies; internal party politics; public opinion polls;
the electoral system; understanding the problems of the common people; elections;
coalitions; lack of new faces; true alternatives; campaign promises; availability and
accessability; the role of the media. Following this activity I foster group interaction
over how these problems affect individuals’ or the group’s relationship with parties.
The second activity, which is less conducive to lively discussion than the first, features
1In Chile, I inquired about the poor, punkies, peasants, evangelicals, alcoholics, the handicapped,
“momios” (Right-wing, conservatives), “rotos” (Left-wing, Socialists/Communists), and Peruvians.
In Argentina, I included the rich, Brazilians, and Paraguayans.
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twenty-one phrases about political parties2 to which group members responded true or
false in concert. I give discrepancies additional attention.
Focus groups ranged in duration from about an hour and a half to two and a
half hours. Native-speaking research assistants videotaped and transcribed each focus
group. In Santiago, my Andre´s Madrid, then an M.A. student of political science at
the Universidad Cato´lica de Chile was my cameraman. Subsequently, Rau´l Olgu´ın,
who holds an M.A. in political history from the Universidad de Chile, transcribed the
Santiago groups from the footage. In Buenos Aires, Mar´ıa Jose´ Chaco´n, then a sociology
student and survey coordinator at the Universidad de Buenos Aires’s Instituto Gino
Germani, videotaped and transcribed each of the focus groups.3 My project benefitted
greatly from their hard work, dedication, and countless insights.
A.1.2 Selection and Recruitment
The inevitable restrictions of time and money prohibited a perfectly representative
sample of the population. Therefore I purposely selected pre-existing groups. Several
factors influenced my purposive selection of pre-existing groups. Primarily, I sought a
range of orientations to and experience with democracy and political parties as well as
variation in terms of age, gender, socioeconomic status, ideology, and geographic loca-
tions in and around Santiago and Buenos Aires. Thus, one set of focus groups sought
2These items are: political parties don’t want to solve the country’s problems; they aren’t able to
solve the biggest problems; the majority are corrupt; they are under the influence of business sectors;
they are under the influence of international credit agencies; they are under the power of the unions;
they have not been able to improve citizens’ social reality; they worry more about the polls than real
problems; they lie very often; they make good decisions most of the time; they listen to civic groups;
they understand the problems of the common people; they only come around when there are elections;
the waste the income that comes from taxes; they lack new faces; they offer real alternatives; they
promise a lot, deliver little; they are not necessary; they are very accessible and available to citizens;
they work for the common good; they do not know how to manage the economy.
3The humidity of winter in Buenos Aires damaged my analog camcorder. Unfortunately, some of
the latter focus-group transcriptions are incomplete despite mine and Mar´ıa Jose´’s feverish note-taking.
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information about citizens’ conceptions of and support for democracy, political rights,
and civil liberties. Another set intended to collect attitudes towards and “confianza”
(trust/confidence) in political parties. As mentioned, I conducted interviews with indi-
viduals whose particular experience with democracy and authoritarianism might have
been obscured in or diluted by social desirability effects.
Pre-existing groups have a number of methodological and practical advantages over
random sampling. Purposive sampling from members of pre-existing groups increased
the likelihood of discovering relatively consistent belief systems and crystalized atti-
tudes as opposed “non-attitudes”, a big risk in survey research (Converse, 1964). Pre-
existing groups can better simulate a “‘natural’ setting for discussion” (Bloor et al.,
2001, 35) which generates higher quality data and interaction. Focus-group specialists
(Morgan, 1997; Bloor et al., 2001) warn that interactions among strangers with widely
disparate viewpoints on sensitive issues may not only be counterproductive from a re-
search standpoint, but also potentially emotionally damaging to subjects. Considering
the often vitriolic nature of discussions of democracy, dictatorship, rights, memory,
and party politics in Chile and Argentina, pre-existing groups provided baseline level
of mutual respect among members that helped avoid any negative effects the focus
group might have on participants. Relatedly, pre-existing groups can be slotted into a
group’s regular schedule and venue. Not only does this further contribute to a ‘natural’
setting, it reduces attrition and costs significantly.
My first step was to arrange a meeting with a leader/officer of the group. There
I would mention my institutional affiliation – crucial for adding legitimacy – and ex-
plain my project, stressing its academic (i.e. non-commercial) value and assuring that I
would take the necessary precautions to protect participants’ anonymity. Additionally,
I offered compensation in the forms of snacks and beverages during the focus group
and, if necessary, transportation costs. When appropriate and/or necessary, I offered a
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small donation to the group as a gesture of goodwill. If the leader accepted, we would
proceed to schedule the focus group. On each occasion, I relied on the group leader to
contact and recruit the focus-group participants from among the membership rather
than recruiting them directly.4 My experience suggested this tack lent my project
transparency that, overall, made it easier to gain participants and win their confidence.
This point is not stressed in the focus-group literature, but it may apply more generally
to scholars conducting focus groups in foreign contexts on sensitive topics.
A.1.3 Santiago Democratic Support Focus Groups
For Santiago, the first group on support for democracy was formed by upper-class
middle-aged and elderly members and friends of the arch-conservative ultra-nationalist
Corporacio´n por la Defensa de la Soberan´ıa (Corporation for the Defense of Sov-
ereignty), or CDS. Their website defines their first principle: “To love the fatherland
and to be willing to defend its sovereignty.” CDS vehemently rejects the 1984 Treaty
of Peace and Friendship between Chile and Argentina regarding the conflict over the
Beagle Channel and Straits of Magellan5 and the way Chile’s administrations (demo-
cratic and dictatorial) have handled border disputes. While CDS welcomes members
from all political and social sectors, civilians and military alike, its current leadership
is dominated by conservatives. Former and founding members include the Leftist Rad-
ical, Exequiel Gonza´lez Madariaga, the late Commander in Chief of the Air Force and
ex-member of the military junta, Gustavo Leigh Guzma´n, and the notorious Army
4Many thanks to the many people who agreed to help with this critical aspect of the project.
5The treaty, mediated by the Vatican and signed by General Pinochet and President, Rau´l Alfons´ın,
ended the Beagle Conflict by relinquishing sovereignty of the islands to Chile but allowing Argentina
maritime rights. The conflict brought the two nations to the brink of war in 1978.
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General Roberto Viaux Marambio.6 The focus group was held September 15, 2005 at
a participant’s residence in Las Condes. Nine participants formed the group, but I was
only able to collect six questionnaires since three came in after I had begun.
The second and third focus groups on democratic support were conducted among
university students. Youth are essential to the project since their political socializa-
tion began roughly a decade after the return of elections in 1988 and half a decade
since Pinochet was imprisoned in London in 1998. The second group incorporated five
middle-class law students from the middle-class Universidad Nacional Andre´s Bello
(October 13, 2005). Though the directors of this private university are political and
economic conservatives, the student participants exhibited a mix of ideological stances.
Participants on October 19, 2005 at the Universidad Adolfo Iban˜ez included six upper-
class students from the schools of business and government. This university is located
amidst mansions that sit on the mountainside overlooking the working-class comuna of
Pen˜alolen. Both focus groups were carried out on campus in a classroom setting.
The final Santiago focus group emphasizing issues of democratic support incorpo-
rated former and current labor leaders (November 9, 2005). These four middle-age
syndicalists are also ex-militants of the political parties in Salvador Allende’s Popular
Unity coalition, but now identify with left-wing splinters of the Socialist Party (PS),
Communist Party (PC), and United Popular Action Movement (MAPU). Each of these
participants had close friends or relatives who were “disappeared” or slain during the
political strife from 1973 to 1978. At least one of them was tortured twice by the mili-
tary government, and currently advocates for other torture victims attempting to claim
their monthly compensation checks from the Chilean government. While participants
6Viaux’s checkered resume´ includes leading the Tacnazo rebellion against President Eduardo Frei
Montalva in 1969, worked closely with CIA officials on the Track II plan to prevent President-Elect
Salvador Allende from taking office, and was privy if not partially responsible for the assassination of
Commander of Chief of Army, General Rene´ Schneider, in October 1970 (Kornbluh, 2003, 16-29).
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of other focus groups filled out a pre-group questionnaire, members of this group were
wary and collectively decided against it.
A.1.4 Buenos Aires Democratic Support Focus Groups
The first Buenos Aires focus group on democratic support drew six members of the
Corriente Clasista y Combativa (Classist and Combative Current), or CCC, from the
western part of La Matanza in the Province of Buenos Aires. The CCC is a working-
class organization formed after widespread mobilizations of newly unemployed workers
in 1994. With ascent of Juan Carlos Alderete as the leader of the unemployed (the
CCC also incorporates employed and retired workers) in the mid- to late-1990s, the
CCC become the principal group of the piquetero movement in Argentina. Politically,
the CCC’s allegiance is with the Partido Comunista Revolucionario, not Peronism,
though it is unclear whether this has helped them resist state cooptation. The piquetero
movement is engaged in road-blocking, recuperating closed factories, and other sorts
of mass mobilizations and thus trigger public debate over civil and human rights in
Argentina. The focus group (May 10, 2006) was conducted prior to a district-wide CCC
meeting held in an abandoned school transformed into a neighborhood headquarters
featuring daycare services, a soup kitchen, and meeting rooms.
A second focus group involved four elderly and working-class members of theMadres
la Plaza de Mayo, Linea Fundadora. The Madres are considered international standard
bearers of human, civil, political, and social rights. In 1977 a group of mothers began to
march in silent weekly protests against the military junta which had “disappeared” their
children. When President Rau´l Alfons´ın offered monthly reparations to the relatives
of these victims, the organization split between those who accepted the money, Linea
Fundadora, and those who rejected it, Asociacio´n. While bothMadres groups functions
NGOs that advocate for justice and human rights, Linea Fundadora remains by far the
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most politically moderate and internally democratic of the two. The focus group took
place at the Linea Fundadora office in downtown Buenos Aires on June 6, 2006.
A final focus group discussing democratic support included four members of Ar-
gentina Solidaria, a group of middle-class youth who run soup kitchens in several
shantytowns ringing Buenos Aires. Again, I sought the points of view of young peo-
ple socialized well after the establishment of electoral democracy. Argentina Solidaria
formed in response to the wave of unemployment and poverty unleashed by the eco-
nomic crisis that culminated in the early 2000s. Since the group’s leaders tended to
meet rather often and informally the focus group convened at the residence of one of
the participants in the capital’s Villa del Parque neighborhood.
A.1.5 Santiago Political Party Trust Focus Groups
The first of the four focus groups designed to get at political party trust in Santiago
involved members of ATTAC. Founded in France in 1998, ATTAC is an international
citizens movement that promotes debate over the neoliberal economic model and glob-
alization and, in particular, the Tobin Tax on speculative financial transactions. The
Chilean chapter aligns itself with the goals of the Porto Alegre World Social Forum,
justice, democracy, and hope. I selected this group because their founding platform
champions direct democracy: “It is urgent to radically deepen democracy; to throw off
the moorings of the dictatorship and to establish a participatory democratic system
in which we citizens regain control of our lives. The citizenry should participate in
and directly decide [solutions to] our greatest problems by way of plebiscite.” Thus I
was interested to hear their critique of political parties, the historically dominant in-
stitutions of interest articulation in Chile. I conducted this seven-member focus group
on September 12, 2005 at the downtown offices of CENDA, a think-tank dedicated to
alternative development.
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To conduct the second political-parties focus group I travelled to the working-class
community of La Granja. The participants were seven (though only six filled out
the questionnaire) leaders of neighborhood associations called juntas de vecinos. This
group seemed well-placed to describe the behavior of political parties since, as social
actors, they interacted frequently with them. By virtue of their leadership positions
they were also able to disclose a variety of citizen interactions with parties in their
neighborhoods. The focus group was conducted prior to a scheduled assembly in the
atrium of gymnasium on the evening of September 26, 2005.
The third and fourth Santiago focus groups sought perceptions of political parties by
citizens who, while maintaining party membership, are relegated to secondary positions
within them. One group consisted of four young members of the Christian Democratic
Youth (Juventud Demo´crata Cristiana), based out of the working-class community of
San Joaqu´ın. Their agenda included attempts to reassert the role of youth within
the party. The other group was formed by members of the Gay and Lesbian Brigade
of the Socialist Party (Brigada Gay-Le´sbica del Partido Socialista). Containing ten
members, eight of whom completed the questionnaire, this focus group took place at
the Socialist Party headquarters near downtown Santiago on September 28, 2005 during
a regularly-scheduled monthly meeting.
A.1.6 Buenos Aires Political Party Trust Focus Groups
In Buenos Aires, the first focus group to discuss perceptions of political parties was
formed from members of the Permanent Assembly for Human Rights (Asamblea Per-
manente por los Derechos Humanos), or APDH. The group pursues truth and justice
for human rights violations committed in Argentina by promoting education and doc-
umentation, organizing citizen activities, proposing legal initiatives to protect human
rights, and lobbying elected officials for legislation to these ends. APDH’s high degree
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of contact with political parties and institutions made it a suitable group. The eight
focus group participants convened during the first hour of a committee meeting on May
18, 2006.
On June 1, I met with ten students from Escuela Camino, a vocational school
serving the working-class districts of Vicente Lo´pez and General San Mart´ın in the
Province of Buenos Aires. Students attend Escuela Camino in order to acquire basic
skills they either did not receive in the public school system or that they need in order
to find work. Unemployment makes many of these citizens targets of clientelism and
party patronage. Indeed, several indicated they currently receive or used to receive a
social plan (e.g. Plan Trabajar or Plan Jefes/Jefas de Hogar) worth 150 pesos ($50)
per month. Often access to these plan is manipulated by political brokers who leverage
them to win political support. Discussion during this engaging session also touched on
the themes of democracy, dictatorship, freedoms, and rights.
A third party-trust focus group in Buenos Aires recruited participants from the
Central de los Trabajadores (CTA). Conceived as a broad working-class coalition, the
CTA is federation of trade unions that broke from the Central General de Trabajadores
(CGT) in 1991. Over one million Argentines are affiliated with the CTA. Not surpris-
ingly, it is an ideologically plural organization, including Socialists, Peronists, Commu-
nists, and Trotskyists. It also places candidates on party lists in national, provincial,
and local elections. The confederation is governed by internal elections. Four members
of the CTA Institute, the educational and policy wing, participated in a focus group
at the institute’s San Telmo location on June 13, 2006.
The last focus group featured young party members participating in a leadership
seminar called PROLID sponsored by the think-tank Centro de Implementacio´n de
la Pol´ıticas Pu´blicas para la Equidad y Crecimiento (CIPPEC). My rationale behind
selecting this group was to receive perceptions about parties from citizens working
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closely with them. One participant worked for Mauricio Macri’s party, Compromiso
para el Cambio, while the other was affiliated with Ricardo Lo´pez Murphy’s Recrear
party. Both are Rightist parties.7 As the facilitator, I was forced to play a somewhat
larger role and to move beyond the scripted focusing exercises since there were only two
participants. Luckily, they were extremely loquacious and interacted well. The focus
group took place on June 14, 2006 at CIPPEC.
A.1.7 Questionnaires and Participants
To check for initial points of divergence on the study topics, I had participants complete
a pre-group questionnaire. As Bloor et al. (2001) note, “it is obviously to the advantage
of the researcher to have some knowledge of these underlying issues in interpreting the
unfolding events of the focus group, to know when there has been silent dissent, or when
the developing discussion has caused a modification of initial viewpoints” (40-41). For
Santiago I have relatively complete information on forty-two participants though closer
to fifty participated in the focus groups. Fairly complete data exists for thirty-four
Buenos Aires participants, though thirty-five actually participated. Tables A.1.7 and
A.1.7 report selected items from the questionnaire to summary key characteristics of
the participants.8
7Incidentally, these two parties joined to the form Propuesta Republicana (PRO) ticket in legislative
elections in 2005 and for successful Macri’s 2007 bid for the Head of the Government of Buenos Aires,
Federal Capital.
8Additions to the Buenos Aires questionnaire included questions about education levels, tolerance,
voting behavior, and presidential approval. The Buenos Aires questionnaire discarded some questions
related only to trust in political institutions for reasons of space.
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Santiago Pre-Group Self-Completion Questionnaire
 
Grupo_________________________            Participante:  
1. Sexo: M/F         2. Edad:_____   
3. Comuna:________________________  4. Ingreso familiar mensual: ________ 
 
5. ¿Cuánta confianza tienes en las siguientes instituciones políticas? 
Mucha  
Confianza 
Bastante
 Confianza
Poca
Confianza
Nada  
Confianza 
La iglésia 
Las fuerzas armadas 
El sistema judicial 
Los medios 
Los carabineiros 
El gobierno nacional 
El gobierno municipal 
El presidente 
El parlamento 
Los partidos políticos 
6. ¿Con cuál de las siguientes frases estás más de acuerdo? 
___ La democracia es preferible a cualquier otra forma de gobierno. 
___ En algunas circunstancias, un gobierno autoritario puede ser preferible a uno democrático. 
___ A la gente como uno, nos da lo mismo un régimen democrático que uno no democrático. 
 
7. Abajo hay varios tipos de sistemas políticos y yo quiero saber lo que piensas sobre cada uno como 
manera de gobernar este país. Por cada uno, dirías que es muy bueno, bueno, malo, muy malo. Marcar  
con X en la celda que corresponde. 
Muy bueno Bueno No bueno Malo
Tener a un líder fuerte que no tenga que  
preocuparse de elecciones ni del parlamento. 
Tener a expertos, más que a políticos que tomen las dec-  
isiones conforme a lo que ellos creen mejor para el país. 
Que gobiernen las fuerzas armadas. 
No me importaría si un gobierno no democrático llegara
a poder si pudiera resolver los problemas económicos.
Que el presidente ponga orden por la fuerza 
 
8. Abajo hay algunas cosas que la gente dicen a veces sobre un sistema político democrático. Favor de 
indicar si estás de acuerdo fuertemente, estás de acuerdo, no estás de acuerdo, o no estás de acuerdo 
fuertemente. Marcar con X en la celda que corresponde.  
De Acuerdo 
Fuertemente
De Acuerdo No de Acuerdo No de 
Acuerdo 
Fuertemente
A veces la mano dura  
no le viene mal al país. 
 
Las democracias son muy indecisas y  
tienen demasiadas rencillas políticas. 
 
Las democracias no son  
buenas para mantener el orden 
 
La democracia puede tener problemas, pero  
es mejor que cualquier otro modo de gobierno. 
 
9. Afiliación religiosa:  Católico            Evangélico             Judío            Islámico  Ateo           Agnóstico              
Otra_________ 
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10. ¿Con que partido te identificas más? Raya al lado del partido que corresponde. 
___Partido Comunista (PC) 
___Partido Humanista (PH) 
___Partido Social (PS)  
___Partido Por la Democracia (PPD)    
___Partido Demócrata Cristiano (PDC) 
___Partido Radical Social Demócrata (PRSD) 
___Renovación Nacional (RN) 
___Unión Demócrata Independiente (UDI) 
___Otro:_________________ 
___No me siento cerca a ningún partido político. 
 
11. ¿Estás inscrito en el registro electoral?   
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Table A.1: Summary of 42 Santiago Focus Group Participants
Freq. % Freq. %
Residence Age Group
Conchal´ı 1 2.44 18-30 19 42.22
El Bosque 1 2.44 31-40 7 15.56
La Florida 1 2.44 41-50 5 11.11
La Granja 6 14.63 51-60 7 15.56
La Reina 1 2.44 61-72 7 15.56
Las Condes 7 17.07
Maipu´ 1 2.44 Gender
Melipilla 2 4.88 Female 25 59.52
N˜un˜oa 3 7.32 Male 17 40.48
Pen˜alolen 1 2.44
Providencia 5 12.20 Electoral Registration
Recoleta 1 2.44 Registered 38 90.48
San Bernardo 1 2.44 Not Registered 4 9.52
San Joaqu´ın 2 4.88
San Ramo´n 1 2.44 Party Identification
Santiago 5 12.20 JP 1 2.38
Vitacura 2 4.88 PH 1 2.38
PS 9 21.43
Religion Affiliation PPD 4 7.14
Catholic 20 47.62 PDC 6 14.29
Evangelical 4 9.52 RN 3 4.76
Naturalist 1 2.38 UDI 7 16.67
Mormon 1 2.38 None 11 26.18
Other 4 9.52
Agnostic 11 26.19 “Confianza” in Political Parties
Atheist 1 2.38 Some + Much 21 50.00
Little + None 21 50.00
Linzian Support for Democracy
“Democracy is always the best form of government.” 33 82.50
“In certain circumstances an authoritarian 7 17.50
government may be preferable to a democratic one.”
“To people like me it doesn’t matter whether we 0 0.00
have an authoritarian or democratic government.”
Churchillian Support for Democracy
“Democracy may have problems but it is better than
any other form of government.”
Strongly agree 20 47.62
Agree 18 42.86
Disagree 3 7.14
Strongly disagree 1 2.38
Note: Tabulations by author based on pre-group self-completion questionnaire.
Age group estimated for five participants for whom no other data is available.
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Buenos Aires Pre-Group Self-Completion Questionnaire
 
Grupo_________________________            Participante:  
1. Sexo: M/F         2. Edad:_____   
3. Residencia:________________________  4. Ingreso familiar mensual: ________ 
 
5. ¿Cuál es el último nivel de educación alcanzado? (Encierra en un círculo): 
Ningún   Primario incompleto              Primario completo  
Secundario incompleto           Secundario completo                    Terceriario incompleto   
Terceriario completo  Universitario incompleto Universitario completo   
Post grado 
 
6. ¿Cuánta confianza tienes en las siguientes instituciones políticas? 
Instituciones Mucha  
Confianza 
Confianza Poca
Confianza
Nada Confianza 
El presidente   
   
El gobierno municipal   
   
El gobierno nacional   
   
El parlamento   
   
Los partidos políticos   
 
7. ¿Con cuál de las siguientes frases estás más de acuerdo? 
___ La democracia es preferible a cualquier otra forma de gobierno. 
___ En algunas circunstancias, un gobierno autoritario puede ser preferible a uno democrático. 
___ A la gente como uno, nos da lo mismo un régimen democrático que uno no democrático. 
 
8. Abajo hay varios tipos de sistemas políticos. Yo quiero saber lo que piensas sobre cada uno como sistema 
para gobernar este país. Respecto de cada uno, dirías que es muy bueno, bueno, malo, muy malo. Marcar 
con X en la celda que corresponde. 
 Muy bueno Bueno No tan bueno Malo 
a un líder fuerte que no tenga que 
e de elecciones ni del parlamento. 
  
tos, más que a políticos que tomen 
onforme a lo que ellos creen mejor 
para el país. 
  
Que gobiernen las fuerzas armadas.   
   
esidente ponga orden por la fuerza   
 
9. Abajo hay algunas cosas que la gente dice a veces sobre un sistema político democrático. Favor de indicar 
si estás de acuerdo fuertemente, estás de acuerdo, no estás de acuerdo, o no estás de acuerdo fuertemente. 
Marcar con X en la celda que corresponde.  
De Acuerdo 
Fuertemente
De Acuerdo No de Acuerdo No de 
Acuerdo 
Fuertemente
A veces la mano dura  
no le viene mal al país. 
 
Las democracias son muy indecisas y  
tienen demasiadas rencillas políticas. 
 
Las democracias no son  
buenas para mantener el orden 
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No me importaría si un gobierno no  
Democrático llegara al poder, si pudiera  
resolver los problemas económicos. 
 
La democracia puede tener problemas,  
pero es mejor que cualquier otro  
modo de gobierno. 
 
10. Afiliación religiosa__________________________;  Practicante? Sí ____   No ____ 
 
11. ¿Con que partido político/alianza política te identificas más? 
________________________________________________________________________ 
___No me siento cerca a ningún partido político. 
 
12. ¿Votaste en las elecciones parlamentarias de 2005? Sí ____  No _____  
¿Por qué partido votó/alianza votaste? _______________________________________ 
 
13. ¿Votaste en las elecciones presidenciales de 2003? Sí ____  No _____  
¿Por qué candidato votaste? ___Carrió   ___Kirchner   ___López Murphy  ___Menem    ___Saa             
________Otro   _____No votaste ____Blanco/Nulo 
 
14. Abajo hay un listado de unos grupos de personas.  Encierra en un círculo todos los que no te gustaría 
tener como vecino de al lado. 
 
personas que han cometido un delito       Inmigrantes              Extremistas políticos   
 
militares      alcohólicos            homosexuales                      discapacitados 
 
neo-nazis        comunistas          policías 
 
15. ¿Haciendo un balance general entre las cosas que le parecen bien y las que le parecen mal, ¿usted se 
inclina más o menos a aprobar o desaprobar la gestión de Néstor Kirchner como presidente? Encierre en un 
círculo:  Aprobar  Desaprobar 
 
16. ¿Cuáles son las principales razones por las que Ud. (aprueba/desaprueba) la gestión de NéstorKirchner? 
_______________________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________ 
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Table A.2: Summary of 34 Buenos Aires Focus Group Participants
Freq. % Freq. %
Residence Age Group
Avellaneda 1 2.94 18-30 18 54.55
Caballito 1 2.94 31-40 6 18.18
Capital Federal 10 29.41 41-50 3 9.09
La Matanza 6 17.64 51-60 3 9.09
Lanus 1 2.94 61-72 3 9.09
La Paternal 1 2.94
San Isidro 2 5.88 Gender
San Mart´ın 6 17.64 Female 23 67.65
Vicente Lo´pez 3 8.82 Male 11 32.35
Villa Urquiza 1 2.94
Villa del Parque 2 5.88 Party Identification
Socialist 6 17.64
Religion Affiliation ARI 4 8.82
Agnostic 4 11.76 Peronism 2 5.88
Atheist 5 14.71 UCR 1 2.94
Catholic 11 32.35 Recrear 1 2.94
Evangelical 1 2.94 CPC 1 2.94
Jehovah’s Witness 1 2.94 None 20 58.82
Protestant 1 2.94
Confianza in Political Parties
Vote Choice: President 2003 Some + Much 21 50.00
Carrio´ 5 15.15 Little + None 21 50.00
Kirchner 8 24.24
Lo´pez Murphy 4 12.12 President Kirchner’s Performance
Other 3 9.09 Approve 12 35.29
Blank/null 4 12.12 Disapprove 4 11.76
DK/NR 9 27.27 DK/NR 18 21.42
Linzian Support for Democracy
“Democracy is always the best form of government.” 29 85.29
“In certain circumstances an authoritarian 3 8.82
government may be preferable to a democratic one.”
“To people like me it doesn’t matter whether we 2 5.88
have an authoritarian or democratic government.”
Churchillian Support for Democracy
“Democracy may have problems but it is better than
any other form of government.”
Strongly agree 11 32.35
Agree 13 38.23
Disagree 4 11.76
Strongly disagree 3 8.82
DK/NR 2 5.88
Note: Tabulations by author based on pre-group self-completion questionnaire.
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A.2 Interviews
Focus groups may not be ideal for investigating socially undesirable topics (Morgan,
1997; Bloor et al., 2001) such as military coups and intolerance. Therefore I conducted a
series of interviews with subjects with less-than-liberal orientations to democracy. The
interviews probed the same topics as the focus groups, but followed a less strict format
than the focus groups. None of the interviewees were focus-group participants, although
my snow-balling sample lead me to seek individuals that may have some relation to the
pre-existing groups from which I recruited focus-group participants. Some interviewees
agreed to complete the same questionnaire as the focus group members. But in the
majority of cases, based on a number of prior and contextual cues, I either did not
ask them or did not insist that they complete the questionnaire. For some the subject
matter was so sensitive and emotional that I took notes taken by hand in order to
foster a more congenial atmosphere. Therefore, I do not report a formal summary of
interview characteristics nor do I have complete transcripts of the interviews. Below, I
provide a sketch of each of the interviewees.
The interviewees in Santiago were an upper-middle class business man from the
wealthy borough of Las Condes; a man who is an ex-militant of the fascist anti-Marxist
pro-coup group, Frente Nacionalista Patria y Libertad ; a leader in Chile’s conservative
Catholic organization, Accio´n Familia; a man who prior to the 1973 coup was a militant
in the Partido Nacional who also worked as a journalist for the conservative U.S.-backed
pro-coup newspaper, El Mercurio; and an executive of Corporacio´n Chilena de Madera
(CORMA), the professional guild of the timber and forestry industry. In Buenos Aires
I interviewed a committee leader coalition, Central de los Trabajadores (CTA); a leader
of pro-democracy group of ex-military officers, Centro de Militares para la Democracia
(CEMIDA); a leader of the occupation of Chilavert printing press in Pompeya; two
leaders of the occupied Hotel Bauen; a middle-class young woman from Villa Ballester
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employed in the state health care system; an upper-class woman from Recoleta; and a
leader of a Falkland Islands War veterans group.
A.3 Q-Sort Methodology
Since the goal of the Q-study was to delineate competing democratic belief systems
and rubrics of political party trustworthiness. In this sense, the focus groups and
interviews informed my construction of the Q-sort methodological exercises carried out
during the second phase of my field research Santiago and Buenos Aires in several
ways. These methods underscored the orientations towards democracy and attitudes
and beliefs about political parties that were most controversial in both cases. That
helped me to decided which dimensions of these concepts I would seek to measure in
the Q-study. When it came to building the core Q-sample of thirty-six phrases, i.e. the
set of items subjects Q-sort, I could match these themes to existing survey items in
the literature, or construct my own survey-style items to include in the Q-sample. The
core set of thirty-six items presented below in Table A.3 Finally, I used twelve items
from the focus-group transcripts and interviews to form a sub-sample of verbatim items
included in a second round of Q-sorting. These twelve items are well documented and
discussed in Chapter 3.
The sequence of events for any Q-sort participant was as follows: (1) a brief in-
troduction to the project; (2) participant completes a pre-Q-sort questionnaire; (3) re-
search team gives instructions on how to complete the Q-sort; (4) participants sort 24
survey-style items on trust in political parties according to a model Q-sort; (5) research
team member records information; (6) research team member gives the participant
12 additional items taken nearly verbatim from the focus groups and interviews and
gives instructions on how to integrate the items into a new 36-item model Q-sort; (7)
research team member records information; (8) participant sort 36 survey-style items
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Table A.3: Factorial Design of Core 36-Item Support for Democracy Q-Sample
A. 4 Orientations (a) Liberal (b) Contingent (c) Illiberal (d) Uncommitted
B. 3 Dimensions (e) Preference for Democracy (f) Political Rights & Procedures (g) Civil Liberties
Q-Sample (N) = (Orientations)(Dimensions)(Replications) = ([A][B])(m)
(A)(B) = (4)(3) = 12 Combinations
(m) = 3 Replications
N = (12)(3) = 36 Statements
Democratic Governance
ae1: Democracy is preferable to any other form of government.
ae2: Democracy may have problems, but it’s better than any other form of government.
ae3: Under no circumstance could there ever be sufficient reason for a coup d’etat.
be1: In certain circumstances an authoritarian government could be preferable to a democratic government.
be2: I would support an authoritarian government if it resolves economic problems.
be3: There are certain junctures which require that the president leave congress behind.
ce1: Things cannot be resolved. Our country needs a government with a heavy hand.
ce2: There are other forms of government that could be as good as or better than democracy.
ce3: We would be better off if the military were governing the country.
de1: To people like me it doesn’t matter if we have a democratic or undemocratic regime.
de2: For me there isn’t a big difference between democratic governments and dictatorships. So the type of
regime doesn’t really matter to me.
de3: I wouldn’t care if the military came to power again.
Political Rights & Procedures
af1: Except for those excluded by the Constitution, all Chileans deserve the right to vote, even those who
protest against the government.
af2: Any citizen of voting age should be allowed to run for public office.
af3: All political parties, including extremist ones, should be permitted to participate in national elections.
bf1: When the country lacks order the right to vote can be restricted.
bf2: For the common good, sometimes you have to suspend the rights of persons with extremists ideas to run
for publicly elected offices.
bf3: In times of national crisis it’s alright to prohibit a political party from participating in national elections.
cf1: Besides those excluded by law, there are other groups and kinds of people that should not be able to vote.
cf2: Homosexuals should not have the right to run for public office.
cf3: The participation of neo-nazi political parties in national elections should be prohibited.
df1: It’s all the same whether or not the great majority have the right to vote or only a few people.
df2: It doesn’t matter to me if certain people are restricted from their right to run for office.
df3: It wouldn’t matter to me if a political party were prohibited from participating in national elections.
Civil Liberties
ag1: Our government has to guarantee all citizens the right to associate.
ag2: I approve of people participating in legal public protests.
ag3: I don’t approve of the government censoring the media that criticizes it.
bg1: It is fine for our government to limit the right to associate for a period of time.
bg2: In times of crisis, I would approve of a law that prohibited public protests.
bg3: In the case of a social emergency I would approve of the government censoring the media.
cg1: In general, the government should limit the right to form associations.
cg2: I don’t approve of people participating in manifestations under any circumstance.
cg2: I approve of the government censoring communications media that criticize it.
dg1: The right to form associations is not crucial for our country.
dg2: Public protest is not a necessary right for our society.
dg2: It wouldn’t worry me if the government censored the communications media that criticize it.
on democratic support according to a model Q-sort; (9) research team member records
information; (10) research team member gives the participant 12 additional items taken
nearly verbatim from the focus groups and interviews and gives instructions on how
to integrate the items into a new 48-item model Q-sort; (11) research team member
records information. When these tasks are complete, the Q-sort exercise is finished.
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Recruitment of Q-study participants, or the “P-sample” took many forms. Note
that none of these participants overlapped with focus group participants or interviewees
in order to avoid bias. Unlike survey research, Q-methods do not require a large
number of participants, and they need not be randomly selected. Instead, Q seeks to
maximize the diversity of perspectives by recruiting participants who are likely to have
distinct views of the concept. Therefore, I and my research team recruited participants
come from contrasting backgrounds. As with the focus group, Q-study participants
were offered refreshments and, if necessary, transportation costs for their participation.
While we recruited 92 participants in Santiago 102 in Buenos Aires. However, the
analyses presented above are based on samples of fewer participants. Several factors
caused these missing data points. Among the most common were (1) the research
team’s illegible handwriting, (2) participants accidentally mixing the small laminated
card from the various Q-samples, (3) participants leaving without completing each of
the Q-sorts, and, extremely infrequently, (4) participants’ inability or unwillingness to
complete one or more of the Q-sorts.
A.3.1 Questionnaires and Participants
As with participants in the focus groups, I administered questionnaires to the partic-
ipants in the Q-study before they engaged in the Q-sorting activities. The purpose
of this was to allow me to compare how well (or poorly) standard questions of demo-
cratic support and political trust correlate with the more nuanced measures formed
in the Q-analyses. Below Tables A.3.1 and A.3.1 describe the sample of participants
who completed Q-sorts in Santiago and Buenos Aires. For reference, I also report the
questionnaire as printed in Spanish. Though the vast majority of the questions are
the same between the two cases, some modifications were added to the Buenos Aires
questionnaire.
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Santiago Pre-Q-Sort Self-Completion Questionnaire
 
Grupo_________________________            Participante:  
1. Sexo: M/F         2. Edad:_____   
3. Comuna:________________________  4. Ingreso familiar mensual: ________ 
 
5. ¿Cuánta confianza tienes en las siguientes instituciones políticas? 
Instituciones Mucha 
Confianza 
Confianza Poca 
Confianza 
Nada Confianza 
El presidente     
El gobierno municipal     
El gobierno nacional     
El parlamento     
Los partidos políticos     
6. ¿Con cuál de las siguientes frases estás más de acuerdo? 
___ La democracia es preferible a cualquier otra forma de gobierno. 
___ En algunas circunstancias, un gobierno autoritario puede ser preferible a uno democrático. 
___ A la gente como uno, nos da lo mismo un régimen democrático que uno no democrático. 
 
7. Abajo hay varios tipos de sistemas políticos y yo quiero saber lo que piensas sobre cada uno como 
manera de gobernar este país. Por cada uno, dirías que es muy bueno, bueno, malo, muy malo. Marcar  
con X en la celda que corresponde. 
Muy bueno Bueno No bueno Malo
Tener a un líder fuerte que no tenga que  
preocuparse de elecciones ni del parlamento. 
Tener a expertos, más que a políticos que tomen las dec-  
isiones conforme a lo que ellos creen mejor para el país. 
Que gobiernen las fuerzas armadas. 
No me importaría si un gobierno no democrático llegara
a poder si pudiera resolver los problemas económicos.
Que el presidente ponga orden por la fuerza 
 
8. Abajo hay algunas cosas que la gente dicen a veces sobre un sistema político democrático. Favor de 
indicar si estás de acuerdo fuertemente, estás de acuerdo, no estás de acuerdo, o no estás de acuerdo 
fuertemente. Marcar con X en la celda que corresponde.  
De Acuerdo 
Fuertemente
De Acuerdo No de Acuerdo No de 
Acuerdo 
Fuertemente
A veces la mano dura  
no le viene mal al país. 
 
Las democracias son muy indecisas y  
tienen demasiadas rencillas políticas. 
 
Las democracias no son  
buenas para mantener el orden 
 
La democracia puede tener problemas, pero  
es mejor que cualquier otro modo de gobierno. 
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9. Afiliación religiosa:  Católico            Evangélico             Judío            Islámico  Ateo           Agnóstico              
Otra_________ 
 
 
10. ¿Con que partido te identificas más? Raya al lado del partido que corresponde. 
___Partido Comunista (PC) 
___Partido Humanista (PH) 
___Partido Social (PS)  
___Partido Por la Democracia (PPD)    
___Partido Demócrata Cristiano (PDC) 
___Partido Radical Social Demócrata (PRSD) 
___Renovación Nacional (RN) 
___Unión Demócrata Independiente (UDI) 
___Otro:_________________ 
___No me siento cerca a ningún partido político. 
 
11. ¿Estás inscrito en el registro electoral?   
 
12. Abajo hay un listado de unos grupos de personas.  Marcar con X todos los que no te gustaría tener como 
vecino de al lado: 
___personas que han cometido un delito      ____inmigrantes   ___extremistas políticos            
___militares              ____alcohólicos ___homosexuales  ___drogadictos                      
___discapacitados  ____neo-nazis      ____comunistas ___fascistas 
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Table A.4: Summary of 92 Santiago Q-Study Participants
Freq. % Freq. %
Residence Age Group
Cerro Navia 1 1.12 18-30 27 30.68
La Florida 2 2.25 31-40 29 32.95
La Granja 9 10.10 41-50 17 19.32
La Reina 3 3.37 51-60 8 9.09
Las Condes 8 8.99 61-76 7 7.95
Macul 2 2.25 Gender
Maipu´ 1 1.12 Female 56 60.87
N˜un˜oa 7 7.87 Male 36 39.13
Pen˜alolen 1 1.12 Electoral Registration
Pirque 1 1.12 Registered 67 80.72
Providencia 4 4.49 Not Registered 16 19.28
Puente Alto 1 1.12 Party Identification
Quilicura 1 1.12 PC/PH/JP/PDI 1 11.96
Quinta Normal 9 10.10 PS 14 15.22
Recoleta 1 1.12 PPD 7 7.61
San Joaqu´ın 1 1.12 PDC 10 10.87
San Ramo´n 21 23.60 RN 5 5.43
Santiago 14 15.70 UDI 5 5.43
Vitacura 2 2.25 None 35 38.04
Religion Affiliation DK/NR 5 5.43
Catholic 40 43.48 Confianza in Political Parties
Evangelical 7 7.61 Some + Much 77 87.50
Other 2 2.17 Little + None 11 12.50
Agnostic 8 8.70 Sometimes mano dura is good for the country.
Atheist 2 2.17 Stongly Agree + Agree 40 43.48
None 16 17.39 Strongly Disagree + Disagree 47 51.09
DK/NR 17 18.48 DK/NR 5 5.43
Linzian Support for Democracy
“Democracy is always the best form of government.” 57 69.51
“In certain circumstances an authoritarian 18 21.95
government may be preferable to a democratic one.”
“To people like me it doesn’t matter whether we 7 8.54
have an authoritarian or democratic government.”
Churchillian Support for Democracy
“Democracy may have problems but it is better than
any other form of government.”
Strongly agree 39 46.43
Agree 28 33.33
Disagree 13 15.48
Strongly disagree 4 4.76
Note: Tabulations by author based on pre-group self-completion questionnaire.
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Buenos Aires Pre-Q-Sort Self-Completion Questionnaire
 
Cuestionario                       Participante:  
1. Sexo: M/F  2. Edad:_____    3. Residencia:________________________ 
4a. Ingreso familiar mensual: ________  4b. Plan Social (ej. Jefes/as)  Sí ____   No ____ 
 
5. ¿Cuál es el último nivel de educación alcanzado? (Marca con X): 
____Primario incompleto   ____Primario completo 
____Secundario incompleto      ____Secundario completo  
____Terceriario incompleto   ____Terceriario completo   
____Universitario incompleto  ____Universitario completo    
____Post grado     ____Ningún 
 
6. Afiliación religiosa__________________________;  Practicante? Sí ____   No ____ 
 
7. ¿Con que partido político/alianza política te identificás más?   Ningún_____ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. ¿Cuánta confianza tienes en las siguientes instituciones políticas? 
Instituciones Mucha 
Confianza 
Confianza Poca 
Confianza 
Nada Confianza 
El presidente     
El gobierno municipal     
El gobierno nacional     
El parlamento     
Los partidos políticos     
 
9. ¿Con cuál de las siguientes frases está usted más de acuerdo? 
___ La democracia es preferible a cualquier otra forma de gobierno. 
___ En algunas circunstancias, un gobierno autoritario puede ser preferible a uno democrático. 
___ A la gente como uno, nos da lo mismo un régimen democrático que uno no democrático. 
 
10. Abajo hay varios tipos de sistemas políticos. Yo quiero saber lo que pensás sobre cada uno como sistema para 
gobernar este país. Respecto de cada uno, ¿dirías que es muy bueno, bueno, no tan bueno, malo? Marcar con X en la 
celda que corresponde. 
 Muy bueno Bueno No tan bueno Malo 
Tener a un líder fuerte que no 
tenga que preocuparse de 
elecciones ni del parlamento. 
 
 
   
Tener a expertos, más que a 
políticos que tomen las decisiones 
conforme a lo que ellos creen 
mejor para el país. 
    
Que gobiernen las fuerzas 
armadas. 
    
     
Que el presidente ponga orden por 
la fuerza 
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11. Abajo hay algunas cosas que la gente dice a veces sobre un sistema político democrático. Favor de indicar si estás 
de acuerdo fuertemente, estás de acuerdo, no estás de acuerdo, o no estás de acuerdo fuertemente. Marcar con X en la 
celda que corresponde.  
 De Acuerdo 
Fuertemente 
De Acuerdo No de Acuerdo No de Acuerdo 
Fuertemente 
A veces la mano dura no le 
viene mal al país. 
    
En la democracia, el sistema 
económico funciona mal. 
    
Las democracias son muy 
indecisas y tienen demasiadas 
rencillas políticas. 
    
Las democracias no son buenas 
para mantener el orden 
    
No me importaría si un gobierno 
no democrático llegara al poder, si 
pudiera resolver los problemas 
económicos.  
    
La democracia puede tener 
problemas, pero es mejor que 
cualquier otro modo de gobierno 
    
 
12. ¿Votaste en las elecciones parlamentarias de 2005? Sí ____  No _____  Blanco/Nulo____ 
¿Por qué partido votó/alianza votaste? _______________________________________________ 
 
13. ¿Votaste en las elecciones presidenciales de 2003? Sí ____  No _____  Blanco/Nulo ____ 
¿Por qué candidato votaste? Carrió____     Kirchner____   López Murphy ____   Menem____    
 ___ Saa        Otro:_________________________________________________________    
 
14. Abajo hay un listado de unos grupos de personas.  Marcar con X todos los que no te gustaría tener como vecino de 
al lado: 
___personas que han cometido un delito      ____inmigrantes   ___extremistas políticos            
___militares  ____alcohólicos     ____drogadictos ___homosexuales                      
___discapacitados ____neo-nazis      ____comunistas ___policías 
 
15. ¿Con qué frecuencia has participado en las siguientes acciones políticas? 
Actividad Política Varias Veces Una vez Nunca 
Firmar una petición    
Participar en un boicot    
Asistir a una manifestación o marcha legal    
Participar en una huelga no oficial    
Ocupar una fabrica o un edificio    
Cortar una ruta o un puente    
Participar en saqueos    
 
16. Marcar con X todos los tipos de organizaciones en las que sos miembro:         ____Deportiva 
____Religiosa      ____Arte/cultural/educacional        ____Sindicato o Gremio      ____Comedor 
____Movimiento Social        ____Partido Político      ____ONG                            ____Profesional 
____Caridad/Solidaridad       ____Asamblea Barrial   ____Sociedad de Fomento 
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Table A.5: Summary of 82 Buenos Aires Q-Study Participants
Freq. % Freq. %
Residence Age Group
Buenos Aires, C.F. 47 57.32 18-30 46 56.10
Almagro/Caballito 4 4.88 31-40 13 15.85
Balvanera/S.Cristo. 2 2.44 41-50 3 3.66
Flores 1 1.22 51-60 14 17.07
Floresta/Liniers 2 2.44 61-76 6 7.32
Montserrat 2 2.44 Gender
Nueva Pompeya 4 4.88 Female 56 60.87
Nun˜ez 1 1.22 Male 36 39.13
Palermo/Recoleta 17 20.73 Vote Choice: President 2003
Villa 31 9 10.98 Carrio´ 17 20.73
V.Crespo/Pat./Agro. 3 3.66 Kirchner 17 20.73
V.Devoto/V.G.Mitre 2 2.44 Menem 3 2.44
Buenos Aires Prov. 35 42.68 Lo´pez Murphy 19 23.17
Almirante Brown 9 10.98 Walsh 3 3.66
Escobar/Pilar 2 2.44 Party Identification
Moro´n 1 1.22 PO/PH/MAS/MST 8 9.76
S.Fernando/S.Isidro 3 3.66 PJ/FPV 4 4.88
San Mart´ın 11 13.41 ARI 5 6.10
Vicente Lo´pez 9 10.98 UCR 2 2.44
Religion Affiliation Recrear/CPC/PRO 5 6.10
Catholic 38 46.34 None 58 70.73
Evangelical 5 6.10 Confianza in Political Parties
Christian Orthodox 5 6.10 Some + Much 65 82.28
Protestant 4 4.88 Little + None 14 17.72
Jewish 3 3.66 Sometimes mano dura is good for the country.
Atheist 1 1.22 Stongly Agree + Agree 64 80.00
None 23 28.05 Strongly Disagree + Disagree 16 20.00
Linzian Support for Democracy
“Democracy is always the best form of government.” 78 96.12
“In certain circumstances an authoritarian 2 2.4
government may be preferable to a democratic one.”
“To people like me it doesn’t matter whether we 2 2.44
have an authoritarian or democratic government.”
Churchillian Support for Democracy
“Democracy may have problems but it is better than
any other form of government.”
Strongly agree 41 51.25
Agree 31 38.75
Disagree 6 7.50
Strongly disagree 2 2.50
151
Bibliography
Almond, Gabriel A. and Sidney Verba. 1963. The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes
and Democracy in Five Nations. Scranton, PA: Princeton University Press.
Almond, Gabriel A. and Sidney Verba, eds. 1980. The Civic Culture Revisited. Boston:
Little, Brown.
Altman, David and An´ıbal Pe´rez-Lin˜a´n. 2002. “Assessing the Quality of Democracy:
Freedom, Competitiveness and Participation in Eighteen Latin American Countries.”
Democratization 9(2):85–100.
Auyero, Javier. 2001. Poor People’s Politics: Peronist Survival Networks and the Legacy
of Evita. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Barnes, Samuel H., Max Kaase and et al. 1979. Political Action: Mass Participation
in Five Western Democracies. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications.
Baviskar, Siddhartha and Mary Fran T. Malone. 2004. “What Democracy Means to
Citizens – and Why It Matters.” Revista Europea de Estudios Latinoamericanos y
del Caribe 76:3–23.
Ben-Akiva, Moshe and Steven R. Lerman. 1985. Discrete Choice Analysis. Cambridge,
Mass: MIT Press.
Bermeo, Nancy. 2003. Ordinary People in Extraordinary Times: The Citizenry and the
Breakdown of Democracy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Bloor, Michael, Jane Frankland, Michelle Thomas and Kate Robson. 2001. Focus
Groups in Social Research. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
Boix, Carles. 2003. Democracy and Redistribution. New York: Cambridge University
Press.
Booth, John A. and Mitchell A. Seligson. 2005. “Political Legitimacy and Participation
in Costa Rica: Evidence of Arena Shopping.” Political Research Quarterly 58(4):537–
550.
Bratton, Michael. 2002. “Wide but Shallow: Popular Support for Democracy in Africa.”
Afrobarometer Working Papers No. 19, www.afrobarometer.org.
Bratton, Michael and Robert Mattes. 2001. “Support for Democracy in Africa: Intrinsic
or Instrumental?” British Journal of Political Science 31(2):447–474.
Brown, Steven R. 1980. Political Subjectivity. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
152
Cain, Bruce E., Russell J. Dalton and Susan E. Scarrow, eds. 2003. Democracy Trans-
formed: Expanding Political Opportunities in Advanced Industrial Democracies. New
York: Oxford University Press.
Calinski. 1974. “A dendrite method for cluster analysis.” Communications in Statistics
3(1):1–27.
Canache, Damarys. 2002. Venezuela: Public Opinion and Protest in a Fragile Democ-
racy. Coral Gables, FL: North-South Center Press.
Carlin, Ryan E. 2006. “The Decline of Citizen Participation in Electoral Politics in
Post-Authoritarian Chile.” Democratization 13(4):632–651.
Carnaghan, Ellen. 2007. Out of Order: Russian Political Values in an Imperfect World.
University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press.
Carrio´n, Julio F. forthcoming. Illiberal Democracy and Normative Democracy: How is
Democracy Defined in the Americas? In Challenges to Democracy in Latin America
and the Caribbean: Evidence from the AmericasBarometer 2006, ed. Mitchell A.
Selgison.
Catterberg, Edgardo. 1991. Argentina Confronts Politics: Political Culture and Public
Opinion in the Argentine Transition to Democracy. Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner.
Catterberg, Gabriela. 2003. “Evalutions, Referents of Support, and Political Action in
New Democracies.” International Journal of Comparative Sociology 44(3):173–198.
Cleary, Matthew R. and Susan C. Stokes. 2006. Democracy and the Culture of Skepti-
cism: Personalism and Institutionalism in Argentina and Mexico. New York: Russell
Sage Foundation.
Collier, David and Steven Levitsky. 1997. “Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual
Innovation in Comparative Research.” World Politics 49(3):430–451.
Conover, Pamela Johnston and Stanley Feldman. 1986. “How People Organize the Po-
litical World: A Schematic Model.” American Journal of Political Science 28(1):95–
126.
Converse, Philip E. 1964. The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics. In Ideology
and Discontent, ed. David E. Apter. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Cook, Timothy E. and Paul Gronke. 2005. “The Skeptical American: Revisiting the
Meanings of Trust in Government and Confidence in Institutions.” Journal of Politics
67(3):784–803.
Coppedge, Michael. N.d. “Approaching Democracy: Research Methods in Comparative
Politics.” Chapter 8, Political Culture and Democratization.
153
Dahl, Robert A. 1971. Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press.
Dalton, Russell J. 1994. “Communists and Democrats: Democratic Attitudes in the
Two Germanies.” British Journal of Politics 24(4):469–493.
Dalton, Russell J. 2004. Democratic Challenges, Democratic Choices. New York: Ox-
ford University Press.
Dalton, Russell J. and Martin P. Wattenberg, eds. 2000. Parties without Partisans.
New York: Oxford University Press.
Dalton, Russell J. and Steven Weldon. 2005. “Is the Party Over? Spread-
ing Antipathy Toward Political Parties.” Public Opinion Pros. Available at
www.publicopinionpros.com.
Davis, Charles L., Roderic Ai Camp and Kenneth M. Coleman. 2004. “The Influence
of Party Systems on Citizens’ Perceptions of Corruption and Electoral Response in
Latin America.” Comparative Political Studies 37(6):677–703.
Denters, Bas. 2002. “Size and Political Trust: Evidence from Denmark, the Nether-
lands, Norway, and the United Kingdom.” Environment and Planning: Government
and Policy 20:793–812.
Diamond, Larry. 1999. Developing Democracy: Towards Consolidation. Baltimore,
MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Dryzek, John S. and Leslie Holmes. 2002. Post-Communist Democratization. New
York: Cambridge University Press.
Duda, Richard O. and Peter E. Hart. 1973. Pattern Classification and Scene Analysis.
New York: Wiley-Interscience.
Easton, David. 1965. A Systems Analysis of Political Life. New York: Wiley.
Easton, David. 1975. “A Reassessment of the Concept of Political Support.” British
Journal of Political Science 5(4).
Eckstein, Harry. 1988. “A Culturalist Theory of Political Change.” American Political
Science Review 82(3):789–804.
Flisfisch, A´ngel, Rodrigo Ban˜o, Norbert Lechner, Hugo Madariaga and Alejandro Vial.
1987. “Informe de Encuesta: Opinio´n Pu´blica y Cultura Pol´ıtica.” Facultad Lati-
noamericana de Ciencias (FLACSO) and Centro de Estudios del Desarrollo (CED).
Fuentes, Claudio A. 2006. Violent Polic, Passive Citizens: The Failure of Social Ac-
countability in Chile. In Enforcing the Rule of Law: Social Accountability ini the
New Latin American Democracies, ed. Enrique Peruzzotti and Catalina Smulovitz.
Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press pp. 134–177.
154
Gamson, William A. 1968. Power and Discontent. Homewood, IL: Dorsey Press.
Gibson, James L., Raymond M. Duch and Kent L. Tedin. 1992. “Democratic Values
and the Transformation of the Soviet Union.” Journal of Politics 54(2):329–371.
Gronke, Paul and Barry Levitt. 2004. “Delegative Democracy and Confidence in Leg-
islatures: Explaining Institutional Authority and Trust in Latin America.” Paper
presented at the XXV Congress of the Latin American Studies Association, October
7-9, Las Vegas, NV.
Hagopian, Frances. 2005. Conclusions: Government Performance, Political Represen-
tation, and Public Perceptions of Contemporary Democracy in Latin America. In
The Third Wave of Democratization in Latin America: Advances and Setbacks, ed.
Frances Hagopian and Scott P. Mainwaring. New York: Cambridge University Press
pp. 319–362.
Hardin, Russell. 2000. The Public Trust. In Disaffected Democracies: What’s Troubling
the Trilateral Democracies?, ed. Susan J. Pharr and Robert D. Putnam. Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press pp. 31–51.
Hardin, Russell. 2004. Distrust: Manifestations and Management. In Distrust, ed.
Russell Hardin. New York: Russell Sage Foundation pp. 3–33.
Held, David. 2006. Models of Democracy. 3rd ed. Stanford, CA: Stanford University
Press.
Hite, Katherine and Paola Cesarini, eds. 2004. Authoritarian Legacies and Democracy
in Latin America and Southern Europe. South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame
Press.
Huber, Evelyne, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and John D. Stephens. 1997. “The Paradoxes
of Contemporary Democracy: Formal, Participatory, and Social Dimensions.” Com-
parative Politics 29(3):323–342.
Huneeus, Carlos. 2003. Chile Un Pais Dividido. Santiago: Catalonia.
Huneeus, Carlos and Luis Maldonado. 2003. “Demo´cratas y nosta´lgicos del antiguo
re´gimen. Los apoyos a la democracia en Chile.” Revista Espan˜ola de Investigaciones
Sociolo´gicas 10(3):9–50.
Inglehart, Ronald. 1997. Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic,
and Political Change in 43 Societies. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Inglehart, Ronald. 2003. “How Solid is Mass Support for Democracy–And How Can
We Measure It.” Political Science and Politics 36(1):51–57.
155
Inglehart, Ronald and Christian Welzel. 2005. Modernization, Cultural Change, and
Democracy: The Human Development Sequence. New York: Cambridge University
Press.
Inglehart, Ronald, Miguel Basa´n˜ez, Jaime Dı´ez-Medrano, Loek Halman and Ruud
Luijkx, eds. 2004. Human Beliefs and Values: A Cross-Cultural Sourcebook Based
on the 1999-2002 Values Surveys. Mexico City: Siglo XXI Editores, S.A. de C.V.
and Fundacio´n BBVA.
Jennings, M. Kent. 1998. Political Trust and the Roots of Devolution. In Trust and
Governance, ed. Valerie Braithwaite and Margaret Levi. New York: Russell Sage
Foundation pp. 218–244.
Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi. 2007. “Governance Matters
VI: Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators 1996-2006.” World Bank Policy
Research Working Paper 4280, July.
Keck, Margaret and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. Activists Beyond Borders. Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press.
Keele, Luke. 2005. “The Authorities Really Do Matter: Party Control and Trust in
Government.” Journal of Politics 67(3):873–886.
King, Gary, James Honaker, Anne Joseph and Kenneth Scheve. 2001. “Analyzing In-
complete Political Science Data: An Alternative Algorithm for Multiple Imputation.”
American Political Science Review 95(1):49–69.
King, Gary, Robert O. Keohane and Sidney Verba. 1994. Designing Social Inquiry:
Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research. Princenton, NJ: Princeton Universitty
Press.
Klingemann, Hans-Dieter. 1999. Mapping Political Support in the 1990s: A Global
Analysis. In Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance, ed. Pippa
Norris. Oxford: Oxford University Press pp. 31–56.
Knight, Alan. 2001. Polls, Political Culture, and Democracy: A Heretic Heretical
Historical Look. In Citizen Views of Democracy in Latin America, ed. Roderic Ai
Camp. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press pp. 223–242.
Kornbluh, Peter. 2003. The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and
Accountability. New York: The New Press.
Kurtz, Marcus. 2004. “The Dilemmas of Democracy in the Open Economy: Lessons
from Latin America.” World Politics 56(1):262–302.
Latinobaro´metro, Corporacio´n. 2006. “Informe Latinobaro´metro 2006.” Corporacio´n
Latinobaro´metro. Available online at www.latinobarometro.org.
156
Levi, Margaret and Laura Stoker. 2000. “Political Trust and Trustworthiness.” Annual
Review of Political Science 3:475–507.
Levitsky, Steven. 2003a. “From Labor Politics to Machine Politics: The Transforma-
tion of Party-Union Linkages in Argentine Peronism, 1983-1999.” Latin American
Research Review 38(3):3–36.
Levitsky, Steven. 2003b. Transforming Labor-Based Parties in Latin America: Argen-
tine Peronism in Comparative Perspective. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Levitsky, Steven and Lucan A. Way. 2002. “The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism.”
Journal of Democracy 13(2):51–65.
Li, Kim-Hung, Trivellore Raghunathan and Donald B. Rubin. 1991. “Large-Sample
Significance Levels from Multiply Imputed Data Using Moment-Based Statistics
and an F Reference Distribution.” Journal of the American Statistical Association
86(416):1065–1073.
Linz, Juan J. 1978. The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown, and
Reequilibration. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
Linz, Juan J. 2002. Parties in Contemporary Democracies: Problems and Para-
doxes. In Political Parties: Old Concepts and New Challenges, ed. Richard Gunther,
Jose´ Ramo´n Montero and Juan J. Linz. Oxford: Oxford University Press pp. 291–317.
Linz, Juan J. and Alfred Stepan. 1996. Problems of Democratic Transition and Consol-
idation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe. Baltimore,
MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1959. “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Devel-
opment and Political Legitimacy.” American Political Science Review 53(1):69–105.
Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1981. Political Man. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University
Press.
Lipset, Seymour Martin and Stein Rokkan. 1967. Cleavage Structures, Party Systems,
and Voter Alignments: An Introduction. In Party Systems and Voter Alignments:
Cross National Perspectives, ed. Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan. New
York: Free Press pp. 1–64.
Luna, Juan P. 2006. Chile and Uruguay: The Evolution of Programmatic and Non-
Programmatic Party-Voter Linkages in Two Institutionalized Party Systems. PhD
thesis University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
Malloy, James M. 1987. The Politics of Transition in Latin America. In Authoritarians
and Democrats: Regime Transition in Latin America, ed. James M. Malloy and
Mitchell A. Seligson. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press pp. 235–258.
157
McKeown, Bruce and Dan Thomas. 1988. Q Methodology. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
Miller, Arthur H., Vicki L. Hesli and William M. Reisinger. 1997. “Conceptions of
Democracy Among Mass and Elite in Post-Soviet Societies.” British Journal of Po-
litical Science 27(2):157–190.
Mishler, William and Richard Rose. 2001. “Political Support for Incomplete Democ-
racies: Realist vs. Idealist Theories and Measures.” International Political Science
Review 22(4):303–320.
Mora y Araujo, Manuel. 1991. Ensayo y Error: La Nueva Clase Pol´ıtica que Exige el
Cuidadano Argentino. Buenos Aires: Editorial Planeta Argentina.
Moreno, Alejandro. 2001. Democracy and Mass Belief Systems in Latin America. In
Citizen Views of Democracy in Latin America, ed. Roderic Ai Camp. University of
Pittsburgh Press pp. 27–50.
Morgan, David L. 1997. Focus Groups as Qualitative Research. 2 ed. London: Sage.
Muller, Edward N. and Mitchell A. Seligson. 1994. “Civic Culture and Democracy: The
Question of Causal Relationships.” American Political Science Review 88(3):635–652.
Norris, Pippa. 1999a. Conclusions: The Growth of Critical Citizens and its Conse-
quences. In Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance, ed. Pippa
Norris. Oxford: Oxford University Press pp. 257–272.
Norris, Pippa. 1999b. Introduction: The Growth of Critical Citizens? In Critical
Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance, ed. Pippa Norris. Oxford:
Oxford University Press pp. 1–27.
Norris, Pippa. 2002. Democratic Phoenix: Reinventing Political Activism. New York:
Cambridge University Press.
Norris, Pippa, ed. 1999c. Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Nye, Joseph S., Phillip D. Zelikow and David C. King, eds. 1997. Why Don’t People
Trust Government? Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
O’Donnell, Guillermo. 1993. “On the State, Democratization and Some Conceptual
Problems: A Latin American View with Glances at Some Post-Communist Coun-
tries.” World Development 21(8):1355–1369.
O’Donnell, Guillermo. 1994. “Delegative Democracy.” Journal of Democracy 5(1):55–
69.
158
O’Donnell, Guillermo. 1999. Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies. In The
Self-Restraining State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies, ed. Andreas
Schedler, Larry Diamond and Mark F. Plattner. Boulder, CO: Lynne Reiner pp. 29–
52.
O’Donnell, Guillermo. 2001. “Reflections on Contemporary South American Democra-
cies.” Journal of Latin American Studies 33(3):599–609.
Ortega Frei, Eugenio. 2003. “Los Partidos Pol´ıticos Chilenos: Cambio y Estabilidad en
el Comportamiento Electoral 1990-2000.” Revista de Ciencia Pol´ıtica 23(2):109–147.
Oxhorn, Philip D. 1995. Organizing Civil Society: Popular Organizations and the
Struggle for Democracy in Chile. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University
Press.
Payne, J. Mark, Daniel Zovatto and Mercedes Mateo Dı´az. 2007. Democracies in
Development: Politics and Reform in Latin America. Washington, D.C.: Inter-
American Development Bank and International IDEA.
Petras, James and Fernando Ignacio Leiva. 1994. Democracy and Poverty in Chile:
The Limits of Electoral Politics. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Pharr, Susan J. and Robert D. Putnam, eds. 2000. Disaffected Democracies: What’s
Troubling the Trilateral Countries? Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Posner, Paul W. 1999. “Popular Representation and Political Dissatisfaction in Chile’s
New Democracy.” Journal of Interamerican and World Affairs 41(1):59–85.
Powers, Nancy R. 2001. Grassroots Expectations of Democracy and Economy: Ar-
gentina in Comparative Perspective. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press.
Pe´rez-Lin˜a´n, An´ıbal. 2007. Presidential Impeachment and the New Political Instability
in Latin America. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Roberts, Kenneth M. 2007. “Latin America’s Populist Revival.” SAIS Review 27(1):3–
15.
Rock, David. 1987. Argentina 1516-1987: From Spanish Colonization to Alfons´ın.
Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press.
Rose, Richard. 2004. Voter Turnout in the European Union Member Countries. In Voter
Turnout in Western Europe since 1945: A Regional Report. Stockholm, Sweden:
International IDEA pp. 17–24.
Royston, Patrick. 2005. “Multiple imputation of missing values: Update of ice.” Stata
Journal 5(4):527–536.
159
Rubin, Donald B. 1987. Multiple Imputation for Nonresponse in Surveys. New York:
John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Sarsfield, Rodolfo and Fabia´n Echegaray. 2006. “Opening the Black Box: How Satis-
faction with Democracy and Its Perceived Efficacy Affect Regime Preference in Latin
America.” International Journal of Public Opinion Research 18(2):153–173.
Schedler, Andreas, ed. 2006. Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree
Elections. Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner.
Schedler, Andreas and Rodolfo Sarsfield. 2007. “Democrats with Adjectives: Linking
Direct and Indirect Measures of Democratic Support.” European Journal of Political
Research 46(5):637–659.
Schmitter, Philippe C. and Terry Lynn Karl. 1991. “What Democracy Is...and Is Not.”
Journal of Democracy 2(5):75–88.
Scully, Timothy R. 1992. Rethinking the Center: Party Politics in Nineteenth and
Twentieth Century Chile. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Seligson, Amber L. and Joshua A. Tucker. 2005. “Feeding the Hand that Bit You:
Voting for Ex-authoritarian Rulers in Russia and Bolivia.” Demokratizatsiya: The
Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization 13(1):11–42.
Seligson, Mitchell A. 2005. “Improving the Quality of Survey Research in Democratizing
Countries.” PS: Political Science January:51–56.
Seligson, Mitchell A. 2007. “The Rise of Populism and the Left in Latin America.”
Journal of Democracy 18(3):81–95.
Smulovitz, Catalina and Enrique Peruzzotti. 2000. “Societal Accountability in Latin
America.” Journal of Democracy 11(4):147–158.
Stephenson, William. 1953. The Study of Behavior: Q-Technique and Its Methodology.
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Stokes, Susan. 2001. Mandates and Democracy: Neoliberalism by Surprise in Latin
America. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Stokes, Susan. 2005. “Perverse Accountability: A Formal Model of Machine Politics
with Evidence from Argentina.” American Political Science Review 99(3):315–325.
Svampa, Maristella and Sebastia´n Pereyra. 2003. Entre la Ruta y el Barrio: La Expe-
riencia de las Organizaciones Piqueteras. 2 ed. Buenos Aires: Editorial Biblos.
Tarrow, Sidney. 2000. Mad Cows and Social Activists: Contentious Politics in the
Trilateral Democracies. In Disaffected Democracies: What’s Troubling the Trilateral
Countries?, ed. Susan J. Pharr and Robert D. Putnam. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press pp. 270–290.
160
Theiss-Morse, Elizabeth. 1993. “Conceptualizations of Good Citizenship and Political
Participation.” Political Behavior 15:355–380.
Torcal, Mariano, Richard Gunther and Jose´ Ramo´n Montero. 2002. Anti-Party Senti-
ments in Southern Europe. In Political Parties: Old Concepts and New Challenges,
ed. Richard Gunther, Jose´ Ramo´n Montero and Juan J. Linz. Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press pp. 291–317.
Ullmann-Margalit, Edna. 2004. Trust, Distrust, and In Between. In Distrust, ed. Russell
Hardin. New York: Russell Sage Foundation pp. 60–82.
UNDP. 2004. La Democracia en America Latina: Hacia una Democracia de Ciudadanas
y Ciudadanos. New York and Buenos Aires: Aguilar, Altea, Taurus, Alfaguara, S.A.
Valenzuela, Arturo. 1977. Political Brokers in Chile: Local Government in a Centralized
Polity. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Verba, Sidney, Kay Lehman Schlozman and Henry E. Brady. 1995. Voice and Equality:
Civic Voluntarism in American Politics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Wiarda, Howard J. 2004. Corporatism and Authoritarianism in Latin America – Re-
visited. Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Press.
Zechmeister, Elizabeth. 2006. “What’s Left and Who’s Right? A Q-Method Study of
Individual and Contextual Influences on the Meaning of Ideological Labels.” Political
Behavior 28(2):151–173.
161
